It is also

citly as in proving the laws of motion. indisputable, that we often desire the happiness of others and occasionally their woe, and we call the fact indisputable, because we think it established chiefly by what every man experiences in his own breast; likewise by observations on the words and deeds of other men, whether known by personal observation or by testimony. True, it has been maintained, that in desiring the welfare of our fellows, we really look to our own, and that the pleasure anticipated from sympathy creates the motive to charitable deeds. In this view of the case, we still wish for the good of our neighbour, but only as the means to an end, that end being self-gratification. Even here it is allowed, that we have benevolent desires, and this is sufficient for our present purpose. This being granted, it may be a matter of curiosity whether self-interest lie at the bottom of all, or whether it do not, and as such the question properly belongs to purely mental philosophy, but having no perceptible influence on practice, it is excluded from moral science.5

Being once thoroughly convinced of the truth of the distinction between the self-regarding and the social desires, and the reality of the pleasures of sym

5 Dr. Brown puts the purely disinterested theory in the most startling point of view, when he says, "We desire the happiness of others, and we have pleasure in this desire; but with the same capacity of mere love as now, we should have desired the happiness of others, though no direct pleasure to ourselves had followed our generous wish." Lectures, vol. iii, lect. lxvi. "With the same capacity of love as now!" this is indeed a strange supposition! How can we conceive such a capacity co-existing with

pathy, it follows that all systems of happiness which make no account of these last, must be considered as radically deficient. They at once cut off a grand source of human enjoyment, and leave us as maimed in mind as if we were deprived of sight or hearing. What should we think of a treatise on the senses, which should omit all mention of the eye? And shall a system of moral philosophy be considered perfect, which excludes our social feelings, the boast and brightest ornament of our nature?

Here, then, is a fundamental point never to be lost sight of. He who pursues, exclusively, his self-regarding interest, acts like the man who should cut off one healthy limb, with a view to increase the other. If more blood and nourishment should really fall to its share, would this be a sufficient compensation for the member which he had lost? We may concentrate all our thoughts in what concerns our self, we may never lose an opportunity of pushing what we call our interest; we may be long-sighted and dispassionate, and yet be far from the greatest happiness of which our nature is susceptible. Laughing at the benevolent folly which would make us forget our end, were it but for a moment, we may think ourselves supremely wise, while in truth we are lamentably ignorant. In laying our plans of enjoyment, we have

the absence of all pleasure of sympathy? One is even at a loss to understand the meaning of the terms, so contradictory do they appear. I may observe once for all, that Brown, admirable as a pure metaphysician, sinks at once when he approaches the subject of morals. This remark on Brown has been made also by Dr. Chalmers, in his very interesting work, "Sketches of Moral and Mental Philosophy."

omitted some of the principal data, and therefore, it cannot be surprising if the result should prove a failure. In vain should we hope to obtain the greatest happiness by denying the first principles of our nature. God has given us propensities and corresponding gratifications of two very different kinds; and if by an over devotion to self we become dead to the social feelings, we abandon, of our own free will, some of the choicest blessings of His providence. When, therefore, the cares of life begin to engross our soul, when the more generous sentiments of youth wax cold by contact with the world, let us repair to the temple of Divine philosophy, and consult her hallowed voice. She will tell us, that in seeking for bliss, we must enlarge not contract our minds, and keep them open to reflected, as well as to direct felicity. Before quitting the threshold she will show us the altar of benevolence, rising beside her own, and will tell us to snatch from it a brand to nurse the sacred glow.

In that invaluable part of the "De Augmentis," where Bacon touches upon moral science, he lays particular stress upon what he calls the Bonum Communionis, or social good, considered as a source of happiness to the individual who pursues it; and he shows, by a reference to various systems of antiquity, that here lay their radical deficiency; for those systems placed happiness in the bonum suitatis only, or in that of which self is the direct object. This consideration alone is sufficient to determine the merits of many highly venerated schemes, which have been handed down to posterity under imposing names, to

some of which I have alluded in the opening of the present chapter. They agreed in this alone, that they were based upon a narrow view of human nature, some attending more to one class of phenomena, some to another, while the importance of the social feelings was properly estimated by none. The stoics, in some respects, approached most nearly to the truth; but their system was disfigured by the most shocking paradoxes, such as the denying of all outward advantages, and of pain as a real evil. Still to them belongs the merit of having estimated the social good much more justly than the rest. It was reserved for the Christian religion to raise the common good to its highest pitch, by enjoining us to love our neighbour as ourselves, a precept which philosophy shows to be equally favourable to both. Charity, like Mercy, is twice blessed, "it blesseth him that gives, and him that takes."

PART II.

ON DESIRE AND PASSION.

CHAPTER I.

On Desire in General.

HAVING, by these general considerations, in

some degree prepared the way for what is to follow, and, as it is hoped, already thrown a little light upon our path, we may proceed with greater security to inquire further into the essential elements of human happiness.

I. The first element to be mentioned is the existence of one or two strong and permanent desires for some object or objects. This is an element of the utmost importance. Two very different systems of life may be conceived and acted upon; in the one, a perpetual succession of little wishes is attempted to be kept up; in the other, one or two prominent and durable desires pervade our whole existence. Assuredly we ought to prefer this latter regulation of the mind. One or two strong desires give that zest to every thing in life, which nothing else can supply. They are not only eminently delightful in themselves, at least if well chosen, but they throw a charm round all other things by effectually expelling the tædium vita. They constitute a perpetual emotion generally