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CHAPTER III.

ON THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.

N commencing an inquiry into the real nature of Virtue, a subject which has occupied philosophers ages, it is peculiarly necessary to guard against verbal disputes. Let it be understood then that the question here to be discussed is not what may be the meaning of the word virtue as now used, or as it has formerly been used in our language, and still less what may be meant by the similar word in other languages, as by the virtus of the Latins, the vertu of the French, or the virtù of the modern Italians. Inquiries such as these may not be utterly useless; but they belong to the grammarian, not to the moral philosopher. The real question which we have to treat is, what may be the nature of that which generally does and always ought to command our moral approbation as above explained, whether that quality be called by the name of virtue, or by any other. Undoubtedly this word, as at present employed among us, is commonly taken in that sense, though it would be rash to affirm that it is so always. As applied to woman, for instance, the term is used in a much more limited signification, and instead of comprehending every branch of morality, is restricted to one. Among the Romans, virtus was synonymous with valour, and with the modern Italians, virtù has sunk into taste.

Dismissing these verbal differences, we have now to inquire on what occasions moral approbation ought to arise in order to fulfil the purpose mentioned in the preceding Chapter; in other words, what is the quality of actions on account of which we are justified in approving them. And as the word virtuous is commonly applied in our language to actions which we actually approve, and, as may be supposed, justly, we here take it in that sense. In short, our object is to determine the characteristic quality or qualities of Virtue, and hence of Vice, for if we know the one, we know the other.

In the former part of this Book we found that a perception of utility is essential to the first growth of moral sentiment; meaning by utility, a tendency to good, that is to the happiness of man. This speculative question, we think, has been sufficiently proved; but whether it have or not, is little to our present purpose, which is to inquire not how moral sentiment originated, but how it must be applied in order to secure the end for which it was first designed, and which alone can satisfy our reason. Whether moral sentiment did spring from the perception of utility or not, surely it is desirable that the former should conform to the latter as much as possible. This proposition is so evident, that one is almost at a loss to understand how it could ever have been doubted. Most of the disputes on this subject seem at bottom to be verbal, and depend upon different senses affixed to the word utility. If that word be understood in its most comprehensive sense, as including all that in any way, directly or indirectly, immediately or

remotely, tends not merely to the apparent and outward, but to the real and inward happiness of the species, then to argue against utility as a sound foundation of morals, is in fact to argue against the advantage of happiness. What reasoning could we address to a man who should deny that happiness is desirable? Every word that we might use would be only the same idea clothed in another garb. All reasoning begins from some first principle, self-evident or granted, by means of which we may prove something else; and if we had no primary axioms, we could no more advance one step in reasoning, than we could move a weight without a support for our machine. Not only is happiness desirable here and hereafter, but, rightly understood, that is comprehensively, nothing else is of real consequence to man. On this subject, where reason fails for want of a more simple principle from which to argue, it may be permitted to call in the aid of authority. Let us listen to the venerable and philosophic author of the Analogy of Religion. "It is manifest that nothing can be of consequence to mankind or any creature, but happiness. This then is all which any person can, in strictness of speaking, be said to have a right to. We can, therefore, owe no man anything, but only to further and promote his happiness, according to our abilities. And, therefore, a disposition and endeavour to do good to all with whom we have to do, in the degree and manner which the different relations we stand in to them require, is a discharge of all the obligations we are under to them." These are the

1 Butler's Sermons: Love of our Neighbour, Serm. 2.

words of a divine and a philosopher; and they correspond with those of a philosophizing poet who exclaims,

Oh happiness! our being's end and aim,

Good, pleasure, ease, content, whate'er thy name!
That something still which prompts th' eternal sigh,
For which we bear to live, or dare to die.

In a matter of this sort, which, if not self-evident, admits of no proof, all we can do is to state the meaning of the term, to prevent any dispute about words, and if then men be not agreed, they cannot converse together, since they appeal to different principles as the basis of their reasoning. Let it then be borne in mind, that under the term happiness, we include every species of enjoyment which man has ever felt or even conceived, whether springing directly from outward objects, or from the workings of his own mind. All enjoyments are good in themselves, but as some are incompatible with others, and as the smaller often prevent the greater, the former from their consequences are properly considered an evil. Take, for instance, the gratifications of the senses. Within certain limits these are universally considered as good, but beyond those limits they are generally and justly looked upon as evil, not only because they injure our health or impair our fortune, but also because they engender a state of mind unfavourable to more durable if not more intense happiness. For, it is a fact proved by the most ample experience, that an over-indulgence in sensual pleasures tends both to impair the intellect, and to deaden our sensibility

Pope's Essay on Man.

to the generous, charitable, tender, and pious emotions, and thus narrows the range of our felicity. And as from their consequences, certain pleasures are bad beyond a certain degree, so we can easily conceive that others, for the same reason, may be bad in any degree. These evil effects of pleasure may be often seen in children, who, when left to themselves, seem calm and happy, but after they have been violently excited, frequently lose their good humour.

What has been here said of happiness, must also be applied to utility, or the tendency to happiness. Unless, under the term utility, we comprehend a tendency to every conceivable kind of enjoyment of which mankind is susceptible, whether near or distant, connected or unconnected with sense and outward objects, and unless we suppose, that upon a view of all the consequences, the result, on the whole, and not merely on first appearances, is in favour of real mental happiness, the rule of utility cannot for an instant be maintained. Unfortunately, the term utility is commonly used in a much less extensive sense, to signify a gross and more palpable usefulness, such as can be seen and measured, or else which serves only the present purpose. It would, on this account, be desirable to employ another word in philosophical treatises on morals, did such an one occur in the English language; but as this is not the case, we must put up with what we have, for were we to coin one, it could only be made intelligible by being translated into the vernacular tongue. All then that can be done is to retain the word, but fix its meaning as distinctly as possible.