mary impulse, and to sustain the mind in its course. Logic, strictly speaking, does not teach us how to reason, but only how to avoid violations of those essential principles on which all reasoning is founded. In like manner, a legitimate system of rhetoric would teach, not what eloquence is, but what it is not; it would disclaim all purpose of qualifying its students to compound an eloquent discourse by rule, as a medicine is compounded after a prescription; and it would occupy itself mainly in discovering, by the immediate study of the mind itself, and by critical examination of the works of genius, those guiding and universal laws of human intellect which the student of eloquence must not disobey, if he wishes to attain, in any shape, the end which he pursues. It must be that such principles exist: if we apprehend rightly what eloquence is, we may reasonably hope to discover at least some of them; and even if we could discover them all, which no sound thinker has ever yet pretended to do, the speaker or writer would still retain ample space for the exertion of his natural powers, which indeed would act with redoubled ease and vigour from his distinct knowledge of the limits of their domain. A chart does not teach the mariner how to navigate his vessel; but it may fare hardly with him if he wants one in a narrow sea, with whose soundings he is imperfectly acquainted.

It is designed, in this treatise, not to present a dissertation having any claim to be considered as a complete exposition of the subject in any of its sections, but simply to sketch in outline a plan of rhetorical studies, which the student may not find altogether useless as a clue when he attempts to master the details under the guidance of more ambitious

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works; and it may be well to state at the outset the view which, in common with those who have thought most deeply on the matter, we entertain as to the means by which rhetoric is qualified to execute the very important task which it undertakes.

In the first place, then, we hold that the systematic view of the principles and rules of eloquence which rhetorical treatises usually offer, must peremptorily be embraced, as an essential part, in the studies of every one who would become really eloquent in speech or in writing. But this proposition must be understood with two cautions. First, in regard to many particulars indispensable towards the attainment of eloquence, every sound scheme of rhetorical precepts, abandoning all claim to primary discovery, contents itself with informing or reminding the student, that he must seek for knowledge elsewhere, from reflection on the phenomena of his own mind, from the best works in philosophy, and from an observation of the world and of human nature. This is true, not merely as to the matter on which eloquence may employ itself, as to which, however, it is true universally; but also as to most of the instruments which the art uses. Secondly, and more particularly, the real usefulness of rhetoric rests, not on its special rules, but on its general principles. As soon as a rule diverts the student's attention from the principle, it for him ceases to be an aid, and becomes a positive hinderance. As soon as a treatise on rhetoric has impressed on the student's mind distinctly and indelibly the great principles on which eloquence is founded, it has given him a talisman to guard him against all seductions into error, and even against the very mistakes which may be inculcated in

the book itself. Systems of rhetoric aid effectually in the attainment of eloquence, so far only as they teach the student to reflect on its principles.

But, further, we have called systematic rhetoric a part only of the studies leading towards eloquence. It is in truth a part which, by itself, is insufficient for the attainment of the end; for we must add to it a critical acquaintance with the best models of literature, extending over as many of its departments as possible, but especially minute in that which the student chiefly designs to cultivate. What is here meant is a study of literary works, not for the knowledge which they contain, but as models; a study directed towards an analysis of the mode in which they communicate knowledge, and of the conformity or disagreement of that mode with the laws of eloquence. Such a study may be said to bear towards the systematic portion of rhetoric a relation similar to that which, in physical science, an examination of the experiments made by the best philosophers bears towards the series of fundamental propositions in which the result of the experiments is embodied; but the study of the experiments is incalculably more imperative in rhetoric than in natural science, from the incompleteness of the systematic result in the one case compared with that which is reached in the other. Treatises on eloquence, which aim at expounding its principles, can seldom, in regard to the critical branch, do more than recommend its prosecution, or practically countenance it by incidental illustrations; but it possesses such importance as to merit a more prominent place than it occupies in most systematic works on the subject.

Lastly, long practice must be added to all these studies

before the end can even be approached. This requisite, however, a treatise on rhetoric can do little more than acknowledge and urge.

In pursuance of the opinions now expressed, these pages will endeavour to illustrate the subject in Three Divisions. The First will embrace general observations, intended to elicit the true principles of Eloquence, and to exhibit them in various points of view. From our strong impressions as to the predominant importance of the general principles over the special rules, we shall be tempted to linger on this branch longer than may be approved by those who are attached to the minutiae of the study; and for the same reason we will not allow ourselves to be deterred by the fear of being charged with truisms, from stating considerations which seem calculated to lead us nearer to the goal. The Second Division will contain a brief summary of the most important rules which have been expounded in the best systems of rhetoric; our principal guides, however, being the treatises of Aristotle, Dr. Campbell, and Archbishop Whately. The Third Division will attempt to furnish the student with some aids towards his critical acquaintance with models.

PART I.

"THE word Eloquence," says Campbell, adopting the ancient definitions, "in its greatest latitude, denotes 'that art or talent by which a discourse is adapted to its end.' All the ends of speaking are reducible to four; every speech being intended to enlighten the understanding, to please the imagination, to move the passions, or to influence the will." The observations by which the same most acute writer immediately afterwards illustrates this his leading proposition, have much truth and great value. It is said, first, that "any one discourse admits only one of these ends as the principal," to which the others, so far as they are admissible at all, must be rendered conducive; secondly, that "each preceding species, in the order above exhibited, is preparatory to the subsequent ;" thirdly, that, in addressing the understanding, the speaker proposes either to explain to his hearers something unknown or not distinctly comprehended, or to prove something disbelieved or doubted; so that, "in the one case, his aim is their information, in the other their conviction;" fourthly, that the address to the imagination is common to oratory with poetry, to which indeed it may be added, that the address to the passions must also be considered common to these two arts; and, lastly, that the height of success in persuasion, the fourth end of the orator, is attained by effecting all these ends in the same discourse.