ade aimed at their sterns, which, if it take effect between the inner and outer sternposts, in which space are imbedded the rudder-head and case, the trunk, the yoke, and other steering apparatus, it might reduce a formidable steam ship into a very helpless and impotent antagonist.

130. A fleet, consisting of nine ships of the line, ranged in line abreast in the centre, and en échelon on the wings (fig. 15), at the distance of 970 feet from each other, measured from centre to centre, will cover a space of nearly 2600 yards, in which case the fire of the ships en échelon on each flank will cross each other efficiently in front of the ships in line; but a fleet consisting of 20 sail of the line or upwards should put forward an uneven number of its ships, say 5 or 7, and form them in double échelon on the centre, as in fig. 18, disposing them so that their fire in both

Fig. 18.

directions may cross the fires from the two wings. This formation resembles very much a front of fortification, and, like such a front, it possesses great military strength.

It must be understood, however, that this disposition of ships in a fleet, and also that described in Art. 120, are consistent chiefly with the occupation of purely defensive positions, in circumstances which make it impossible, or at least difficult, for the enemy by turning either wing of the fleet, to avoid attacking it in front: this may be the case when it is required to defend a strait of the sea. If the position be on the wide ocean, and the enemy, declining to attack in front the fleet which is on the defensive, should move towards a flank

with a view of turning it; the ships en échelon may speedily be moved into the general line, and the whole fleet may change its position, moving in line towards the menaced side. In doing this, it will have to describe only the chord, while the enemy's fleet will have to pass over the length of the arc; the commander of the fleet on the defensive will, therefore, be able to anticipate his opponent, and, probably, to frustrate his

intention.

131. Fleets of sailing ships have ever had their look-out frigates and small vessels in attendance for the purpose of obtaining intelligence; but such vessels have not been used as advanced guards to cover the fleet, on account of the impossibility of keeping such ships out of the lines of fire from the fleet; but with steam fleets it will be practicable, and highly important, to adopt in this respect a practice corresponding to that of an army in an open country, by having advanced posts of small and swift steamers, with supports composed of steam frigates, (fig. 8, p. 92), so that an enemy may not be able to approach without driving back these advanced posts, and thus, in some degree, disclosing his intentions. When compelled to retire, these advanced squadrons should concentrate in échelon positions; and ultimately either pass through intervals in their own line or round its flanks, and range themselves in reserve prepared for whatever duty may be required of them.

132. The formation of a fleet in two parallel lines in chequered order (fig. 19), the ships in the second Fig. 19.

line covering the intervals between those in the first line, is a convenient order of steaming, though by no means a good order of battle; since, to enable the ships in the second line to defend the intervals in the first, or to enable them to form the two lines into one,

the intervals between all the ships in each line, as well as between the two lines, must be very great—at least equal to two cables' length. It would be better that the ships in the front line should be ranged at the usual distance of one cable's length, and that the second line should constitute a reserve force ready to move in any direction that might be required.

133. With a fleet of sailing ships the operation of doubling upon an enemy's line can only be made upon the rear ships of a fleet under sail to leeward, by slanting towards them, supposing these to be sailing on the wind on the same tack. In all such operations there is great difficulty in keeping sailing ships, on either side, in proper positions, one on the bow, and the opposite one on the quarter of the ship attacked, so that the attacking ships may not fire into each other.

134. The most skilful, brilliant, and successful battle fought by Nelson, and perhaps ever fought on the sea, was assuredly that in which he attacked the French fleet at anchor in Aboukir Bay, in 1798, by doubling upon the French van in such a manner that seven French ships were attacked on both sides by eleven British ships, whilst the rear of the French fleet anchored head to wind, and therefore to leeward, could render the van no succour.

The French fleet consisting of thirteen sail of the line was anchored in line ahead N.W., the van ship about 2400 yards distant from a shoal, between which and the van it was never imagined that the British fleet could pass." The intervals between the ships of the French line were 160 yards, and the length of the line, including the length of the ships, was about one and a half mile.

The French admiral concluding that Nelson would postpone his attack till the morrow, as the day was far

a Lord Nelson, observing that the French ships were at single anchor, had the sagacity to perceive that the French admiral must have ascertained that the depth of water between the van ship and the shoal was sufficient to allow that ship to swing round on her anchor in the event of a change of the wind; and on this assumption the plan of attack was determined.

advanced, remained at anchor for the night, laying out his anchors in such a manner as to spring the broadsides of his ships towards his opponent. But he was

6

deceived. Nelson formed his fourteen ships into two divisions, one of which was to pass athwart the van of the French fleet, between it and the shoal, and attack the ships on the interior side, whilst the ships of the other division were to range themselves on the exterior side, so that every French ship, down to the seventh, the Orient,' should be attacked by two British ships, one on the port bow or stern, the other on the starboard quarter or bow. For this each British ship prepared to anchor by the stern, passing a stream cable out of her gun-room-port and tricing it up alongside, beneath the lower deck ports, bending it to the bow anchor on that side; so that by paying out the cable when the anchor was let go, the ship might be brought up by the stern, and thus having two cables attached to the same anchor, the ship's broadside might be 66 sprung " into the proper direction for action, by slackening one cable and hauling upon the other. Thus eleven British ships doubled upon the seven van ships of the French fleet with the utmost skill and regularity; and in that celebrated action which began about 5 P.M., while the British ships did no injury to one another they captured all those to which they were opposed. The French admiral committed a great mistake in not getting under way as soon as the British fleet appeared.

135. A steam fleet will never be caught in so helpless a position; the ships would have their steam up, get under way, and try the issue of a general action; or the ships not doubled upon in this mode of attack might rush up and double upon one or both of the attacking divisions.

The tactical skill evinced by Nelson in this great battle was a practical exemplification of that maxim in military tactics, which teaches the importance of so conducting a battle as to bring upon the point of attack a great superiority of force, in such manner that

the enemy, even if numerically superior upon the whole, might be unable to succour the part so overpowered-a maxim to the application of which Napoleon I. owed mainly his triumphs, and which Nelson so skilfully adopted in the battle of the Nile. Had the French fleet been anchored in two lines, Nelson either would not have attempted this audacious mode of attack ; or if he had, one or other of his divisions must have been placed between two divisions of his enemy-an observation which the author here makes to show the evils of extending a fleet, whether at anchor or under sail, in a single line, and the importance of always ranging fleets in two lines, or, at least, with a strong reserve in a second line.

Doubling upon the ships of an enemy's fleet, will, however, be hereafter an important evolution in the offensive movements of steam fleets; but this must be managed very differently from that which has heretofore been practised, and should rather be by doubling upon the van and throwing it into confusion, than by attacking the rear of a fleet.

136. It would be a hazardous undertaking to endeavour to penetrate the line of a steam fleet ranged in order of battle en échelon, as in fig. 16, p. 100, the ships of the attacking fleet moving in directions contrary to those of the fleet attacked, for all the lines of fire from the ships in that order are open in every direction; and those from two ships at least would cross each other upon any one ship which might be advancing to penetrate the line of battle. A ship in the act of penetrating, and after having penetrated, would assuredly be in a thoroughly crippled state. is obvious, however, that the intervals between ships en échelon, on any line of bearing, are open in all their width to the ships of an enemy's fleet coming up on the same course as is kept by the ships in that line, for the purpose of cutting through it: but a fleet so coming up, suppose in line ahead, towards the interval between the ships B and C, fig. 16, and parallel to the directions. of those ships, would find itself opposed in its advance

It