principal prizes, viz., the 'Santissima Trinidada,' the San Nicholas,' and the San Josef,' were taken.

153. A fleet in line or lines ahead, is far more likely to be thrown into disorder by being thus attacked at the head, than by any attempt on the rear. An attack

on the rear may be frustrated (as in fig. 23, p. 116) by having there a reserve of ships, overlapping and covering that extremity of the line; and the rear of a fleet, like the rear of a column of troops, may be disordered without throwing the whole fleet into confusion. On the contrary, when a column is disordered by being attacked at head, that disorder recoils upon the whole column. The rear of a fleet may be attacked by an enemy in parallel order, but the van of a fleet can only be attacked by a fleet moving towards it in oblique order. (See Art. 149.)

154. The great advantage of échelon formations consists in the facility which is afforded to the commander of a fleet for embarrassing the enemy by demonstrations which he may think fit to make in order to mask his real intentions. False demonstrations may promptly be executed with a view of deceiving the enemy respecting an intended point of attack. Misled by the position assumed by the ships, the enemy may be tempted to change his dispositions; on discovering his error he will make an effort to rectify it, perhaps under fire, and in the midst of the confusion attending the change of disposition, a vigorous attack being made upon him will, in all probability, end in his total defeat.

155. Let an enemy's fleet be moving in any direction in line ahead, as AB (fig. 26, p. 122), and let a fleet be advancing en échelon, as CD, the ships being disposed as shown at ab preparatory to an attack on the enemy at the head (B) of his line. This disposition of the ships can be promptly changed to cd, at right angles to a b, as if for the purpose of attacking the rear (A) of the line, by turning each ship through a quarter of a circle; while a fleet in line ahead, in the position A B, would be obliged to reverse the courses of all the

I

ships. Thus either extremity, whether van or rear, of a fleet may be menaced, and the reverse extremity

actually assailed with great facility, while the commander of the fleet is kept to the last moment in a state of uncertainty respecting the real point of attack.

The enemy in the position A B may, no doubt, change his order from line ahead into line en échelon: in that case the order of his advance should be such that the fleets may, cæteris paribus, be on equal terms. Either fleet may be forced to turn into line ahead, and by a speedy movement menace the flank of the other. When en échelon, it must be remarked, however, that, in the conflicts of well-commanded steam-fleets, feigned attacks may produce serious realities to the fleet making the feint, if the position of the enemy should be such as to permit him to penetrate with a division, in force, between the body of the fleet and the attacking division. Therefore, unless the enemy's fleet be extended in line, and the main body of the attacking fleet be in a position to support the feint with great force, any attempt to engage in that manner would be attended with considerable danger.

156. A vigorous initiative, promptly taken, as soon as the force of an enemy's fleet and its order of steaming can be distinctly ascertained, afterwards prosecuted without faltering by a tactician having a clear perception of what he has to do, and of the way in which it should be done, will force an enemy to range his ships in the order in which he means to fight, or to manœuvre in order to avoid or postpone an action. If

the enemy would simply manœuvre, a trial of skill will ensue between the admirals of the two fleets; and he who is best exercised in tactical evolutions, and can conduct them with the greatest skill, will out-manœuvre the other, and bring him to action in the circumstances most advantageous for himself.

If, on the contrary, the enemy determine to fight, he will be forced, by a resolute advance of the fleet, to extend his line in order of battle, as at A B, fig. 8, p. 92. Whatever that order may be, he should be immediately attacked while so extended. An oblique movement of the fleet, supposed to be in double columns, as at l, n, p, should be made towards the right, on the enemy's rear, and a demonstration to menace seriously that part of his line. This may be effected by the whole fleet steaming in the order represented at m, n, p, in fig. 8, and, at the same time, the steam frigates and sloops moving to the right, supported by the reserve, should advance as if to attack, and double upon the rear B, of the enemy's line. This menace should be put in execution before any change in the order of the fleet's advance has been made, which might indicate the real intention; but, when the demonstration shall have led the enemy to draw his reserve ships to the support of his rear, the divisions , n, p, of the attacking fleet, previously formed in échelon of lines on their respective centre ships, should rush up successively, in that order, at full speed, to the left. When close to the enemy they should engage, and, if possible, outflank his van, while the right division p, supported by the reserve (which will be withdrawn as soon as the feint has produced the intended effect and the real attack has commenced), will vigorously attack and charge through his centre with a superiority of force, and either penetrate it or create a mêlée which shall render it impossible for the rear ships to rejoin their leaders; at the same time the commander of the enemy's fleet will be quite unable to reverse the courses of his van ships, in order to double upon the division attacking his centre.

No doubt some of the ships will, in these attacks, be seriously injured, but it may be reasonably expected that none will be so entirely disabled in their screws, or otherwise, as to be prevented from arresting the progress of the enemy's rear ships. Some of those, at least, which had attacked and penetrated the centre, may, after having effected this object, turn into line ahead to the left, and attack on the starboard side that part of the enemy's fleet which had been previously attacked on the port side.

Should an attack thus conducted have a successful issue, half the ships constituting the enemy's line might be captured or destroyed, and then all the available ships of the fleet, with the reserve steam frigates and sloops, should be sent in pursuit of the retiring enemy. Such may not be the result of a battle under the conditions assumed in this article; the author professes only to have described a vigorous mode of action consistent with the tactical principles which arise from the employment of the new motive power in naval warfare.

157. The operation of reversing steam-ships (300 or 350 feet in length) when in line of battle, and under the guns of an enemy, is a difficult and dangerous evolution, which should be avoided if possible; and in wellplanned battles the operation should scarcely be necessary. It may be inferred, however, from what has been stated in Art. 91, that the operation of reversing the ships of a fleet may be occasionally useful, and even necessary for example, the van of a fleet being cut off from its rear, in consequence of the line being penetrated at its centre by an enemy's fleet, is thrown out of action, and can in no other way succour the rear than by reversing simultaneously the ships, and doubling, in its turn, upon that division of the enemy's fleet which, after the penetration, had enveloped its rear.

158. Steam ships in line may easily reverse their courses individually; but to reverse the alignment of a fleet by changing the flanks, moving the ships in the looped curves which they must respectively describe in

order to maintain in the new line the same order that they had in the original formation, is an evolution wholly useless and utterly impracticable on real service. It is like the obsolete military movement of changing the front and flanks of a division of troops to the rear. The alignment of a fleet of twenty ships covers a space of at least two miles. The ship A on the right flank would have to describe a curve of more than that length to gain the right A' of the reversed line, whilst the ship on the left B would have to describe looped curves of still greater extent in order to get into her position B' on the left flank; and all the intermediate ships would have to describe very complex curves in order to attain their respective stations in the new alignment. The nature of these movements may be understood from the annexed figure (fig. 27). The

Fig. 27.

B

B'

necessity of putting ships to the right-about can scarcely be required under any circumstances, unless, indeed, it be to turn their sterns to the enemy and make off, which should never be done. But, should it become necessary to reverse the position of a line of ships already in line abreast, so as to arrange them again in line abreast, but facing in opposite directions, the ships should be reversed individually. This may be done by two movements: first, the ships should be put in line ahead by