his proper capacity as such, is evident; for all create unfavorable impressions or do them away in their exordia: as, "O king, I confess, indeed, that not with haste,» etc.; and again, "Why such long preludes?»

They, too, employ exordia who have, or appear to have, the worse case; for it is better to pause anywhere than on the case itself. On which account servants tell not what is asked them, but all the circumstances, and make long preambles.

But the means out of which we must conciliate have been stated, and each other point of that nature: and, as it is well remarked by the poet, "Grant that I may reach the Phœacians a friend and object of their compassion"; we ought, therefore, to aim at these two objects. And in demonstrative orations, you should cause the hearer to suppose that he is praised simultaneously with the subject, either in his own person or his family, or in his maxims of conduct, or at least somehow or other. For true it is, as Socrates remarks, that "To praise Athenians before an Athenian audience is no difficult thing, however it may be in the presence of Lacedæmonians.» But the exordia of deliberative rhetoric are derived from those of judicial: but this species has them naturally least of all the three; for indeed the audience are aware of the subject; and the case needs no exordium except 1. on account of the speaker himself; 2. or his opponent; or 3. if the audience conceive of the importance of the matter otherwise than he could wish, thinking it either too serious or too trifling; with a view to which objects respectively there is a necessity for either exciting or doing away a prejudice, or for amplification or diminution. On account of these things there is need of exordium; 4. or otherwise for the sake of ornament; since without it a speech appears hastily got up. Of this sort was the panegyric of Gorgias on the Eleans; for without anything like the preluding display of gesture and attitude in the Gymnasium, he begins forthwith,-"O Elis, city blest by fortune!»

OF THE NARRATION OR STATEMENT

'N DEMONSTRATIVE speeches the narration is not given in continuity, but in scattered portions; for one must go over the actions out of which the speech arises: for a speech is a kind of compound, having one portion, indeed, independent of art, [since the speaker is not at all the cause of the actions themselves,] and another portion originating in art; and this last is either the showing that it is fact should it be incredible, or such either in character or degree, or in showing all these points at once. Owing to this, there are times when one ought not to narrate every fact successively; because this mode of exposition is difficult to remember. From some, then, establish the character for courage, from others for wisdom, and from others for justice. The one style of narration is too simple; the other has the grace of variety, and is not so void of elegance. But you have only to awaken the recollection of facts well known; on which account, many subjects will stand in no need of narration: supposing, for instance, you would praise Achilles, because all are acquainted with his actions; but you must employ them at once. But in praising Critias, an orator must narrate; for not many are acquainted with his exploits.

But now people tell us, ridiculously enough, that the narration should be rapid. And yet I would say, as did one to a baker, who inquired "whether he should knead his bread hard or soft," "What," said he, "is it then impossible to knead it properly?" And so here [in rhetoric a mean is to be observed]. For one should not narrate at too great length, just as he should not make too long an exordium, nor state his proofs [too fully]. For neither in this case does propriety consist

either in rapidity or conciseness, but in a mean betwixt both: and this is the stating just so much as will make the matter clear, or as will cause one to conceive that it has taken place, or that the party has inflicted hurt, or committed injustice, or that the case is of that importance which the speaker wishes to establish; and to the opposite party the opposite points will avail. And an orator should narrate, by the bye, such incidents as conduce to his own excellence: thus, "I all along used to instruct them in what was just, bidding them not to abandon their children," or, to the villainy of the other party;- "but he replied to me, that wherever he might be, he should have other children." Which, Herodotus says, was the reply of the Egyptians on their revolting. Or whatever is pleasing to the judges.

In the case of a defendant, the matter will be more brief; the points for dispute being, either that it has not taken place, or is not hurtful, or not unjust, or not of such importance. So that on acknowledged points he need not pause, unless they conduce in some degree to the objects suggested; e. g., if the fact be acknowledged, but its injustice disputed. Moreover, you should mention as already done those things which, in the course of being done, failed of producing pity or horror. The story of Alcinous is an instance, which is despatched to Penelope in sixty verses. And as Phäyllus does in the circle, and the opening scene of the "Eneus." The narration should also convey a notion of the character: this will be secured, if we know what gives rise to the moral character. One source is the manifestation of deliberate choice; and of what kind is moral character we ascertain from knowing of what kind this is; and of what kind the deliberate choice is, from being acquainted with its proposed end. Hence the doctrines of mathematics have no display of character, for neither have they deliberate choice; and this for that they have not the influence of motive: but the Socratic discourses [have this display], for they treat concerning subjects of this kind. But those things convey a notion of character, which is consequent upon the several characters; e. g., "Whilst saying this he began to hasten off"; for this manifests a hardihood and rusticity of character. And be cautious not to speak coldly as from the understanding merely, as orators do nowadays, but as though from the deliberate choice. «I, for I wished and deliberately preferred this; and if I profit nothing by it, then it is the more honorable»: for the one is characteristic of a prudent, the other of a good man: since [the proposed end] of the prudent consists in pursuing the expedient; of a good man, in pursuing what is honorable. And should any circumstance be incredible, you must subjoin the reason; as Sophocles does. He furnishes an example in the "Antigone," that she mourned more for her brother than for a husband or children; for these, if lost, might again be hers.

"But father now and mother both being lost,

A brother's name can ne'er be hail'd again."

But if you should have no reason to offer, then avow "that you are well aware that you speak what exceeds belief, but that such is your nature": for the world discredits a man's doing anything voluntarily, except what is expedient.

Again, draw your remarks out of those things which are indicative of the passions; narrating both their attendant circumstances, and those which the audience know, and which attach peculiarly either to the speaker himself or his adversary: —“He, having scowled at me, departed.” And as Eschines said of Cratylus, "that whistling and snapping his fingers-:" for they have a tendency to persuade: therefore these things which they know become indices of that which they do not know. Such instances one may get in abundance out of Homer:

-"Thus Penelope

spoke, and the old woman covered her face with her hands»: for those who are beginning to shed tears cover their eyes. And forthwith insinuate yourself as a person of a certain character, in order that they may look upon you as one of such a description, and your adversary [as the reverse]; but beware of observation as you do it. And that it is easy to effect this we may observe in those who report anything to us; for respecting the communication (of which as yet we know nothing), we still catch a kind of guess. But the narration must be carried on in different parts, and, in some instances, even at the commencement.

But in deliberative speeches narration occurs least of all, because no one narrates respecting what is yet to be: if, however, there should be any narration, it will be respecting things which have already happened, that the recollection of them having been awakened, the judges may determine better on the future; the orator either reprehending or praising them: but he is not then performing the functions proper to him as an adviser. If, however, the thing narrated be incredible, see you promise to state a reason for it immediately, and to submit it to whom they please: like the Jocasta of Carcinus in his "Edipus," who always keeps promising when he who was seeking out her son inquires of her: and the Hæmon of Sophocles.

OF THE PROOF

P

ROOF should be demonstrative; and the points of dispute being four, you must demonstrate by producing proof respecting the particular point at issue: thus, if the adversary question the fact, you must at the trial produce proof of this point above the rest; should it be that he did no harm, then of that point; and so should he urge that the action is not of the importance supposed, or that it was done justly: [and it must be done in the latter cases] exactly in the same way as if the inquiry were respecting the matter of fact. And let it not escape us that in this single inquiry it must needs be that one party is guilty; for it is not ignorance which is to blame, as though any were to dispute on a point of justice. So that, in this inquiry, the circumstance should be employed; but not in the other [three].

But, in demonstrative rhetoric, amplification, for the most part, will constitute the proof, because the facts are honorable and useful; for the actions should be taken on credit, since, even on these subjects, a speaker on very rare occasions does adduce proof, if either the action be passing belief, or if another have the credit of it.

But, in deliberative speeches, the orator may either contend that the circumstances will not take place, or that what he directs will indeed take place, but that it is not just, or not beneficial, or not in such a degree. And it will be well for him to observe whether any falsehood appears in the extraneous observations of his adversary; for these appear as so many convincing proofs, that he is false in the case of the other more important statements.

And example is best adapted to deliberative rhetoric, while enthymeme is more peculiar to judicial. For the former is relative to the future; so that out of what has been heretofore, we needs must adduce examples: the latter respects what is or is not matter of fact, to which belong more especially demonstration and necessity; for the circumstances of the past involve a necessity. The speaker ought not, however, to bring forward his enthymemes in a continued series, but to blend them by the way; should he not do this, they prove an injury one to the other, for there is some limit on the score of quantity too:-"O friend, since you have spoken just

so much as a prudent man would"; but the poet does not say, of such a quality. Neither should you seek after enthymemes on every subject; otherwise you will be doing the very thing which some philosophers do, who infer syllogistically conclusions in themselves better known, and more readily commanding belief, than the premises out of which they deduce them. And when you would excite any passion, do not employ an enthymeme; for either it will expel the passion, or the enthymeme will be uttered to no purpose; for the emotions which happen at the same time expel each other, and either cancel or render one or the other feeble. Neither when one aims at speaking with the effect of character ought he at all to aim at the same time at enthymeme, for demonstration possesses neither an air of character nor deliberate choice. But a speaker should employ maxims alike in narration and in proof; for it has an expression of character:-"Yes; I delivered it, even knowing that one ought never to repose implicit confidence." And if one speak with a view to excite passion:-"And injured though I be, yet I do not repent; for the gain, indeed, is on his side, but justice on mine.»

And deliberative is more difficult than judicial rhetoric, and probably enough,— because it respects the future; whereas, in the latter, the question is respecting the past, which has already become matter of absolute science, even to diviners as Epimenides the Cretan used to say; for he did not exercise his art of divination respecting things yet to be, but respecting those which had already happened indeed, but which were obscure: again, in judicial questions there is the law as the basis of reasonings; but for one who has something wherewith to begin it is easier to discover means of proof. Neither has [deliberative rhetoric] many opportunities of digression; none, for instance, in reference to an adversary, or respecting oneself, or in order to excite passion; but it possesses these opportunities least of all the three branches, unless it depart from its proper province. If, then you are at a loss, you should do what the rhetoricians at Athens do, and particularly Isocrates; for in the course of deliberative speaking he accuses the Lacedæmonians, for instance, in the panegyric, and Chares in the speech about the alliance. But in demonstrative speaking, you should insert praise in the speech by way of episode, as Isocrates does, for he all along keeps introducing something. And that saying of Gorgias, "That he never failed of something to say," is nothing more or less than this: for if he be speaking of Achilles, he praises Peleus, then Æacus, then his goddess mother, and so, too, valor in the abstract; or he does something or another in this strain.

Now, the language of one who possesses proof should be both fraught with the impress of character and fitted to convey the proof. But if you possess not enthymemes, let it convey an impression of your character; and the show of goodness more befits a virtuous man than accuracy of speech.

But of enthymemes the refutative are more approved than the confirmative, because in the case of as many as produce reductio ad absurdum, it is more plain that a conclusion has really been arrived at; for opposites, when set by each other, are more clearly recognized.

Touching reasonings directed against the adversary, they are not in anything different in species; but it belongs to the province of proof to do away his arguments, some by starting an objection, others by contrary inference. And the speaker who begins, ought, both in deliberative and judicial rhetoric, first to state his own proofs; and, subsequently, to meet objections by doing them away, or by treating them with contempt beforehand. But should the points objected to be many, first he must confront the objections, as did Callistratus in the Messeniac assembly; for previously having swept away what his adversaries would be likely to allege in this way, he then spoke on his own part. But the last speaker

should speak first what makes against the adversary's speech, doing it away, and drawing opposite inferences, and particularly should his arguments have been well received. For just as one's mind does not cordially receive a person on whom a slur has been previously cast, in the same way neither does it favorably listen to a speech, if the opposite speaker appear to have spoken truly. It is necessary, then, to gain a footing in the hearer's mind for the intended speech; and it will be gained if you sweep away objections: wherefore a speaker, having combated either all, or the most important, or the most approved arguments of his adversary, or those which readily admit a contrary inference, is in this way to substantiate his own

In this she first lays hold of the most silly point. Thus much, then, of proof. But as to the effect of character, since the saying some things respecting oneself either is invidious, or involves prolixity, or a liability to contradiction; and respecting another, either slander or rusticity; it behooves one to introduce another as speaking: the thing which Isocrates does in the speech respecting Philip, and in the "Antidosis"; and as Archilochus conveys reproof, for he introduces the father saying in an iambic line respecting his daughter, "There is not anything which may not be expected, nothing which may be affirmed impossible on oath"; and Charon, the mechanic, in that iambic whose beginning is, "I regard not the wealth of Gyges"; and as Sophocles introduces Hæmon pleading in behalf of Antigone to his father, as though another character were speaking.

But it is necessary sometimes to alter the form of our enthymemes, and to make them into maxims: for example, "It behooves men of sense to come to reconciliation while yet successful; for thus will they be the greatest gainers." But, in enthymematic form, it is thus: "If persons ought then to be reconciled when the reconciliation will be most to their advantage and profit, they should be reconciled while yet they are successful.»

THE

OF THE PERORATION

HE peroration is composed of four things: of getting the hearer favorable to oneself, and ill-disposed towards the adversary; and of amplification and extenuation; and of placing the hearer under the influence of the passions; and of awakening his recollection.

For after showing yourself to be on the right side, and your adversary on the wrong, it naturally follows to praise and blame, and to give the last finish. And one of two things the speaker ought to aim at, either to show that he is good relatively to them [the audience], or is so absolutely; and that the other party is bad, either relatively to them, or absolutely. And the elements, out of which one ought to get up persons as of such characters, have been stated; both whence one should establish them as bad, and whence as good. Next to this, these points having been already shown, it follows naturally to amplify or diminish: for the facts must needs be acknowledged, if one be about to state their quantity; for the increase of bodies is from substances previously existing. But the elements, out of which one must amplify and diminish, are above set forth.