body of their own hoplites to defend it against the Eleians. The latter loudly protested against this proceeding, and denounced the Lacedæmonians as having robbed them of one of their dependencies, contrary to that agreement which had been adopted by the general confederacy when the war began,to the effect that each imperial city should receive back at the end of the war all the dependencies which it possessed at the beginning, on condition of waiving its title to tribute and military service from them so long as the war lasted. After fruitless remonstrances with Sparta, the Eleians eagerly embraced the opportunity now offered of revolting from her, and of joining the new league with Corinth and Argos'.

1 Thucyd. v. 31. τὴν ξυνθήκην προφέροντες ἐν ᾗ εἴρητο, ἃ ἔχοντες ἐς τὸν ̓Αττικὸν πόλεμον καθίσταντό τινες, ταῦτα ἔχοντας καὶ ἐξελθεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἴσον ἔχοντες ἀφίστανται, &c.

Of the agreement here alluded to among the members of the Peloponnesian confederacy, we hear only in this one passage. It was extremely important to such of the confederates as were imperial cities—that is, which had subordinates or subject-allies.

Poppo and Bloomfield wonder that the Corinthians did not appeal to this agreement in order to procure the restitution of Sollium and Anaktorium. But they misconceive, in my opinion, the scope of the agreement, which did not relate to captures made during the war by the common enemy. It would be useless for the confederacy to enter into a formal agreement that none of the members should lose anything through capture made by the enemy. This would be a question of superiority of force-for no agreement could bind the enemy. But the confederacy might very well make a covenant among themselves, as to the relations between their own imperial immediate members, and the mediate or subordinate dependencies of cach. Each imperial state consented to forgo the tribute or services of its dependency, so long as the latter was called upon to lend its aid in the general effort of the confederacy against the common enemy. But the confederacy at the same time gave its guarantee that the imperial state should re-enter upon these suspended rights, so soon as the war should be at an end. This guarantee was clearly violated by Sparta in the case of Elis and Le

from

thians are

ed-their

through the

Athens.

That new league, including Argos, Corinth, Elis, Refusal of and Mantineia, had now acquired such strength and separate confidence, that the Argeians and Corinthians pro- Sparta. ceeded on a joint embassy to Tegea to obtain the The Corinjunction of that city-seemingly the most powerful disheartenin Peloponnesus next to Sparta and Argos. What application grounds they had for expecting success, we are not Baotians to told. The mere fact of Mantineia having joined Argos, seemed likely to deter Tegea, as the rival Arcadian power, from doing the same: and so it proved, for the Tegeans decidedly refused the proposal, not without strenuous protestations that they would stand by Sparta in everything. The Corinthians were greatly disheartened by this repulse, which they had by no means expected-having been so far misled by general expressions of discontent against Sparta as to believe that they could transfer nearly the whole body of confederates to Argos. But they now began to despair of all farther extension of Argeian headship, and even to regard their own position insecure on the side of Athens; with whom they were not at peace, while by joining Argos they had forfeited their claim upon Sparta and all her confederacy, including Boeotia and Megara. In this embarrassment they betook themselves to the Boeotians, whom they preum. On the contrary, in the case of Mantineia (mentioned a few pages back, p. 19) the Mantineians had violated the maxim of the confederacy, and Sparta was justified in interfering at the request of their subjects to maintain the autonomy of the latter. For Thucydidês expressly states, that the Mantineians had subdued these Arcadian districts, during the very time while the war against Athens was going on—Toîs γὰρ Μαντινεῦσι μέρος τι τῆς ̓Αρκαδίας κατέστραπτο ὑπήκοον, ἔτι τοῦ πρὸς 'Alŋvaíovs modéμov övтos (v. 29). The Eleians were in possession of Lepreum, and in receipt of tribute from it, before that war began.

again entreated to join them in the Argeian alliance: a request already once refused, and not likely to be now granted-but intended to usher in a different request preferred at the same time. The Boeotians were entreated to accompany the Corinthians to Athens, and obtain for them from the Athenians an armistice terminable at ten days' notice, such as that which they had contracted for themselves. In case of refusal, they were farther entreated to throw up their own agreement, and to conclude no other without the concurrence of the Corinthians. So far the Boeotians complied, as to go to Athens with the Corinthians, and back their application for an armistice-which the Athenians declined to grant, saying that the Corinthians were already included in the general peace, if they were allies of Sparta. On receiving this answer, the Corinthians entreated the Boeotians, putting it as a matter of obligation, to renounce their own armistice, and make common cause as to all future compact. But this request was steadily refused. The Boeotians maintained their ten days' armistice; and the Corinthians were obliged to acquiesce in their existing condition of peace de facto, though not guaranteed by any pledge of Athens'.

1 Thucyd. v. 32. Κορινθίοις δὲ ἀνακωχὴ ἄσπονδος ἦν πρὸς Αθηναίους. Upon which Dr. Arnold remarks-" By ãσπovdos is meant a mere agreement in words, not ratified by the solemnities of religion. And the Greeks, as we have seen, considered the breach of their word very different from the breach of their oath."

Not so much is here meant even as that which Dr. Arnold supposes. There was no agreement at all—either in words or by oath. There was a simple absence of hostilities, de facto, not arising out of any recognized pledge. Such is the meaning of ȧvaкwxỳ, i. 66; iii. 25, 26.

The answer here made by the Athenians to the application of Corinth

dæmonians

the Arca

dian sub

jects of Mantineia

they plant

the Brasi

dean Helots at Lepreum.

Meanwhile the Lacedæmonians were not unmind- The Laceful of the affront which they had sustained by the emancipate revolt of Mantineia and Elis. At the request of a party among the Parrhasii, the Arcadian subjects of Mantineia, they marched under king Pleistoanax into that territory, and compelled the Mantineians to evacuate the fort which they had erected within it; which the latter were unable to defend, though they received a body of Argeian troops to guard their city, and were thus enabled to march their whole force to the threatened spot. Besides liberating the Arcadian subjects of Mantineia, the Lacedæmonians also planted an additional body of Helots and Neodamodes at Lepreum, as a defence and means of observation on the frontiers of Elis'. These were the Brasidean soldiers, whom Klearidas had now brought back from Thrace. The Helots among them had been manumitted as a reward, and allowed to reside where they chose. But as they had imbibed lessons of bravery under their distinguished commander, their presence would undoubtedly be dangerous among the serfs of Laconia: hence the disposition of the Lacedæmonians to plant them out. We may recollect that not very long before, they had caused 2000 of the most soldierly Helots to be secretly assassinated, with

is not easy to understand. They might, with much better reason, have declined to conclude the ten days' armistice with the Baotians—because these latte. still remained allies of Sparta, though refusing to accede to the general peace; whereas the Corinthians, having joined Argos, had less right to be considered allies of Sparta. Nevertheless, we shall still find them attending the meetings at Sparta, and acting as allies of the latter.

1 Thucyd. v. 33, 34. The Neodamodes were Helots previously enfranchised, or the sons of such.

Treatment

of the Spar

after their

liberation from

Athens and

return to Sparta

they are disfran

time and in

manner.

out any ground of suspicion against these victims personally, but simply from fear of the whole body, and of course greater fear of the bravest'.

It was not only against danger from the returntan captives ing Brasidean Helots that the Lacedæmonians had to guard-but also against danger (real or supposed) from their own Spartan captives, liberated by Athens at the conclusion of the recent alliance. Though the surrender of Sphakteria had been unchised for a tarnished by any real cowardice or military incoma qualified petence, nevertheless, under the inexorable customs and tone of opinion at Sparta, these men would be looked upon as more or less degraded; or at least, there would be enough to make them fancy that they were so looked upon, and thus become discontented. Some of them were already in the exercise of various functions, when the Ephors, contracting suspicions of their designs, condemned them all to temporary disqualification for any official post; placing the whole of their property under trust-management, and interdicting them, like minors, from every act either of purchase or sale. This species of disfranchisement lasted for a considerable time; but the sufferers were at length relieved from it-the danger being supposed to be over. The nature of the interdict confirms, what we know directly from Thucydidês, that many of these captives were among the first and wealthiest

1 Thucyd. iv. 80.

2 Thucyd. v. 34. 'Ατίμους ἐποίησαν, ἀτιμίαν δὲ τοιαύτην, ὥστε μήτε ἄρχειν, μήτε πριαμένους τι, ἢ πωλοῦντας, κυρίους εἶναι.

For the usual treatment of Spartan soldiers who fled from battle, see Xenophon, Rep. Laced. c. 9; Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 30; Herodot. vii. 231.