to consider whether that meddlesome disposition, with which Athens was reproached, was not highly beneficial as the terror of oppressors, and the shield of weaker states, throughout Greece. He now tendered it to the Kamarinæans as their only security against Syracuse; calling upon them, instead of living in perpetual fear of her aggression, to seize the present opportunity of attacking her on an equal footing, jointly with Athens'. In these two remarkable speeches, we find Hermokratês renewing substantially the same line of counsel as he had taken up ten years before at the congress of Gela-to settle all Sicilian differences at home, and above all things to keep out the intervention of Athens; who if she once got footing in Sicily, would never rest until she reduced all the cities successively. This was the natural point of view for a Syracusan politician; but by no means equally natural, nor equally conclusive, for an inhabitant of one of the secondary Sicilian cities— especially of the conterminous Kamarina. And the oration of Euphêmus is an able pleading to demonstrate that the Kamarinæans had far more to fear from Syracuse than from Athens. His arguments to this point are at least highly plausible, if not convincing: but he seems to lay himself open to attack from the opposite quarter. If Athens cannot hope to gain any subjects in Sicily, what motive has she for interfering? This Euphêmus meets by contending that if she does not interfere, the Syracusans and their allies will come across and render assistance to the enemies of Athens in 1 Thucyd. vi. 83-87. Peloponnesus. It is manifest, however, that under the actual circumstances of the time, Athens could have no real fears of this nature, and that her real motives for meddling in Sicily were those of hope and encroachment, not of self-defence. But it shows how little likely such hopes were to be realised-and therefore how ill-advised the whole plan of interference in Sicily was-that the Athenian envoy could say to the Kamarinæans, in the same strain as Nikias had spoken at Athens when combating the wisdom of the expedition-" Such is the distance of Sicily from Athens, and such the difficulty of guarding cities of great force and ample territory combined, that if we wished to hold you Sicilians as subjects, we should be unable to do it: we can only retain you as free and powerful allies'." What Nikias said at Athens to dissuade his countrymen from the enterprise, under sincere conviction -Euphêmus repeated at Kamarina for the purpose of conciliating that city; probably, without believing it himself, yet the anticipation was not on that account the less true and reasonable. rinæans practical The Kamarinæans felt the force of both speeches, The Kamafrom Hermokratês and Euphêmus. Their inclina- maintain tions carried them towards the Athenians, yet not neutrality. without a certain misgiving in case Athens should prove completely successful. Towards the Syracusans, on the contrary, they entertained nothing but unqualified apprehension, and jealousy of very an 1 Thucyd. vi. 86. ἡμεῖς μέν γε οὔτε ἐμμεῖναι δυνατοὶ μὴ μεθ ̓ ὑμῶν· εἴτε καὶ γενόμενοι κακοὶ κατεργασαίμεθα, ἀδύνατοι κατασχεῖν, διὰ μῆκός τε πλοῦ καὶ ἀπορία φυλακῆς πόλεων μεγάλων καὶ παρασκευῇ ἠπειρωτίδων, &c. This is exactly the language of Nikias in his speech to the Athenians, vi. 11. cient date-and even now, their great fear was, of probable suffering if the Syracusans succeeded against Athens without their co-operation. In this dilemma, they thought it safest to give an evasive answer, of friendly sentiment towards both parties, but refusal of aid to either; hoping thus to avoid an inexpiable breach, whichever way the ultimate success might turn'. For a city comparatively weak and situated like Kamarina, such was perhaps the least hazardous policy. In December 415 B.C., no human being could venture to predict how the struggle between Nikias and the Syracusans in the coming year would turn out; nor were the Kamarinæans prompted by any hearty feeling to take the extreme chances with either party. Matters had borne a different aspect indeed in the preceding month of July 415 B.C., when the Athenians first arrived. Had the vigorous policy urged by Lamachus been then followed up, the Athenians would always have appeared likely to succeed-if indeed they had not already become conquerors of Syracuse: so that waverers like the Kamarinæans would have remained attached to them from policy. The best way to obtain allies (Lamachus had contended) was, to be prompt and decisive in action, and to strike at the capital point at once, while the intimi. dating effect of their arrival was fresh. Of the value of his advice, an emphatic illustration is afforded by the conduct of Kamarina2. Throughout the rest of the winter, Nikias did 1 Thucyd. vi. 88. ' Compare the remarks of Alkibiadês, Thucyd. vi. 91. proceedings from his quarters at Katana. little or nothing. He merely despatched envoys Winter for the purpose of conciliating the Sikels in the in- of Nikias terior, where the autonomous Sikels, who dwelt in the central regions of the island, for the most part declared in his favour-especially the powerful Sikel prince Archônidês-sending provisions and even money to the camp at Naxos. Against some refractory tribes, Nikias sent detachments for purposes of compulsion; while the Syracusans on their part did the like to counteract him. Such Sikel tribes as had become dependents of Syracuse, stood aloof from the struggle. As the spring approached, Nikias transferred his position from Naxos to Katana, re-establishing that camp which the Syracusans had destroyed'. He farther sent a trireme to Carthage, to invite co-operation from that city; and a second to the Tyrrhenian maritime cities on the southern coast of Italy, some of whom had proffered to him their services, as ancient enemies of Syracuse, and now realised their promises. From Carthage nothing was obtained. To the Sikels, Egestæans, and all the other allies of Athens, Nikias also sent orders for bricks, iron bars, clamps, and everything suitable for the wall of circumvallation, which was to be commenced with the first burst of spring. envoys sent aid from While such preparations were going on in Sicily, Syracusan debates of portentous promise took place at Sparta. to solicit Immediately after the battle near the Olympieion Corinth and the retreat of Nikias into winter quarters, the and Sparta. Syracusans had despatched envoys to Peloponnesus to solicit reinforcements. Here again, we are com Thucyd. vi. 88. Alkibiadês at Sparta hostility to Athens. pelled to notice the lamentable consequences arising out of the inaction of Nikias. Had he commenced the siege of Syracuse on his first arrival, it may be doubted whether any such envoys would have been sent to Peloponnesus at all; at any rate, they would not have arrived in time to produce decisive effects'. After exerting what influence they could upon the Italian Greeks, in their voyage, the Syracusan envoys reached Corinth, where they found the warmest reception and obtained promises of speedy succour. The Corinthians furnished envoys of their own to accompany them to Sparta, and to back their request for Lacedæmonian aid. They found at the congress at Sparta another his intense advocate upon whom they could not reasonably have counted-Alkibiadês. That exile had crossed over from Thurii to the Eleian port of Kyllênê in Peloponnesus in a merchant-vessel2, and now ap 1 Thucyd. vi. 88; vii. 42. 2 Plutarch (Alkib. c. 23) says that he went to reside at Argos; but this seems difficult to reconcile with the assertion of Thucydidês (vi. 61) that his friends at Argos had incurred grave suspicions of treason. Cornelius Nepos (Alkib. c. 4) says, with greater probability of truth, that Alkibiades went from Thurii, first to Elis, next to Thebes. Isokratês (De Bigis, Orat. xvi. s. 10) says that the Athenians banished him out of all Greece, inscribed his name on a column, and sent envoys to demand his person from the Argeians; so that Alkibiadês was compelled to take refuge with the Lacedæmonians. This whole statement of Isokratês is exceedingly loose and untrustworthy, carrying back the commencement of the conspiracy of the Four Hundred to a time anterior to the banishment of Alkibiadês. But among all the vague sentences, this allegation that the Athenians banished him out of all Greece stands prominent. They could only banish him from the territory of Athens and her allies. Whether he went to Argos, as I have already said, seems to me very doubtful: perhaps Plutarch copied the statement from this passage of Isokratês. But under all circumstances, we are not to believe that Alkibiadês turned against his country, or went to Sparta, upon compulsion. The |