Great effect

of his

speech on the Pelo

can now do you as a friend. But above all, do not shrink back from instant operations both in Sicily and in Attica, upon which so much depends. You will thus put down the power of Athens, present as well as future; you will dwell yourselves in safety; and you will become the leaders of undivided Hellas, by free consent and without force'."

Enormous consequences turned upon this speech -no less masterly in reference to the purpose and ponnesians. the audience, than infamous as an indication of the character of the speaker. If its contents became known at Athens, as they probably did, the enemies of Alkibiades would be supplied with a justification of their most violent political attacks. That imputation which they had taken so much pains to fasten upon him, citing in proof of it alike his profligate expenditure, overbearing insolence, and derision of the religious ceremonies of the state-that he detested the democracy in his heart, submitted to it only from necessity, and was watching for the first safe opportunity of subverting it-appears here in his own language as matter of avowal and boast. The sentence of condemnation against him would now be unanimously approved, even by those who at the time had deprecated it; while the people would be more firmly persuaded than before of the reality of the association between irreligious manifestations and treasonable designs. Doubtless the inferences so drawn from the speech would be unsound, because it represented, not the actual past sentiments of Alkibiadês, but those to which he now found it convenient to lay claim. As far 1 Thucyd. vi. 89-92. 2 ' Thucyd. vi. 28.

as so very selfish a politician could be said to have any preference, democracy was, in some respects, more convenient to him than oligarchy. Though offensive to his taste, it held out larger prospects to his love of show, his adventurous ambition, and his rapacity for foreign plunder; while under an oligarchy, the jealous restraints, and repulses imposed on him by a few equals, would be perhaps more galling to his temper than those arising from the whole people'. He takes credit in his speech for moderation as opposed to the standing licence of democracy. But this is a pretence absurd even to extravagance, which Athenians of all parties would have listened to with astonishment. Such licence as that of Alkibiadês himself had never been seen at Athens; and it was the adventurous instincts of the democracy towards foreign conquest-combined with their imperfect apprehension of the limits and conditions under which alone their empire could be permanently maintained-which he stimulated up to the highest point, and then made use of for his own power and profit. As against himself, he had reason for accusing his political enemies of unworthy manœuvres; and even of gross political wickedness, if they were authors or accomplices (as seems probable of some) in the mutilation of the Hermæ. But most certainly, their public advice to the commonwealth was far less mischievous than his. And if we are to strike the balance of personal political merit between Alkibiadês and his enemies, we must

1 See a remarkable passage of Thucyd. viii. 89—¿âov тà åñoßaívovтa, ὡς οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἐλασσούμενός τις φέρει—and the note in explanation of it, in a later chapter of this History, chap. Ixii.

Misrepre

sentations contained in the

speech.

take into the comparison his fraud upon the simplicity of the Lacedæmonian envoys, recounted in the last preceding chapter but one of this history.

If then that portion of the speech of Alkibiadês, wherein he touches upon Athenian politics and his own past conduct, is not to be taken as historical evidence, just as little can we trust the following portion in which he professes to describe the real purposes of Athens in her Sicilian expedition. That any such vast designs as those which he announces were ever really contemplated even by himself and his immediate friends, is very improbable; that they were contemplated by the Athenian public, by the armament, or by Nikias, is utterly incredible. The tardiness and timid movements of the armament (during the first eight months after arriving at Rhegium) recommended by Nikias, partially admitted even by Alkibiadês, opposed only by the unavailing wisdom of Lamachus, and not strongly censured when known at Athens-conspire to prove that their minds were not at first fully made up even to the siege of Syracuse; that they counted on alliances and money in Sicily which they did not find; and that those, who sailed from Athens with large hopes of brilliant and easy conquest, were soon taught to see the reality with different eyes. If Alkibiadês had himself conceived at Athens the designs which he professed to reveal in his speech at Sparta, there can be little doubt that he would have espoused the scheme of Lamachus-or rather would have originated it himself. We find him indeed, in his speech delivered at Athens before the determina

tion to sail, holding out hopes, that by means of conquests in Sicily, Athens might become mistress of all Greece. But this is there put as an alternative and as a favourable possibility—is noticed only in one place, without expansion or amplification— and shows that the speaker did not reckon upon finding any such expectations prevalent among his hearers. Alkibiadês could not have ventured to promise, in his discourse at Athens, the results which he afterwards talked of at Sparta as having been actually contemplated-Sicily, Italy, Carthage, Iberian mercenaries, &c., all ending in a blockading fleet large enough to gird round Peloponnesus'. Had he put forth such promises, the charge of juvenile folly which Nikias urged against him would probably have been believed by every one. His speech at Sparta, though it has passed with some as a fragment of true Grecian history, seems in truth little better than a gigantic romance, dressed up to alarm his audience2.

of the Spar

Intended for this purpose, it was eminently suit- Resolutions able and effective. The Lacedæmonians had al- tans. ready been partly moved by the representations from Corinth and Syracuse, and were even prepared to send envoys to the latter place with encouragement to hold out against Athens. But the peace of Nikias, and the alliance succeeding it, still subsisted between Athens and Sparta. It had indeed been partially and indirectly violated in many ways, but both the contracting parties still considered it as subsisting, nor would either of them yet consent to break their oaths openly and avow1 Thucyd. vi. 12-17. 2 Plutarch, Alkib. c. 17.

The Lace

dæmonians

racuse.

edly. For this reason—as well as from the distance of Sicily, great even in the estimation of the more nautical Athenians-the Ephors could not yet make up their minds to despatch thither any positive aid. It was exactly in this point of hesitation between the will and the deed, that the energetic and vindictive exile from Athens found them. His flaining picture of the danger impending-brought home to their own doors, and appearing to proceed from the best informed of all witnesses-overcame their reluctance at once; while he at the same time pointed out the precise steps whereby their interference would be rendered of most avail. The transfer of Alkibiadês to Sparta thus reverses the superiority of force between the two contending chiefs of Greece "Momentumque fuit mutatus Curio rerum'." He had not yet shown his power of doing his country good, as we shall find him hereafter engaged, during the later years of the war: his first achievements were but too successful in doing her harm.

The Lacedæmonians forthwith resolved to send send Gylip- an auxiliary force to Syracuse. But as this could pus to Sy- not be done before the spring, they nominated Gylippus commander, directing him to proceed thither without delay, and to take counsel with the Corinthians for operations as speedy as the case admitted2. We do not know that Gylippus had as yet given any positive evidence of that consummate skill and activity which we shall presently be called upon to describe. He was probably chosen on

1 Lucan, Pharsal. iv. 819.

2 Thucyd. vi. 93; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 23; Diodor. xiii. 7.