yielding to the idlest delusions from correspondents in the interior of Syracuse'. force and in Syra length con to retreat. Orders for retreat pri vately cir culated. Nearly a month after the night-battle on Epipolæ, Increase of Gylippus and Sikanus both returned to Syracuse. confidence The latter had been unsuccessful at Agrigentum, cuse where the philo-Syracusan party had been sent into Nikias at banishment before his arrival ; but Gylippus brought sents with him a considerable force of Sicilian Greeks, together with those Peloponnesian hoplites who had started from Cape Tænarus in the early spring, and who had made their way from Kyrênê first along the coast of Africa, and then across to Selinus. Such increase of strength immediately determined the Syracusans to resume the aggressive, both by land and by sea. In the Athenians, as they saw the new allies marching in over Epipolæ, it produced a deeper despondency, combined with bitter regret that they had not adopted the proposition of departing immediately after the battle of Epipolæ, when Demosthenês first proposed it. The late interval of lingering hopeless inaction with continued sickness, had farther weakened their strength, and Demosthenês now again pressed the resolution for immediate departure. Whatever fancies Nikias may have indulged about Syracusan embarrassments, were dissipated by the arrival of Gylippus; nor did he venture to persist in his former peremptory oppo1 Thucyd. vii. 49. ̓Αντιλέγοντος δὲ τοῦ Νικίου, ἔκνος τις καὶ μέλλησις ἐνεγένετο, καὶ ἅμα ὑπόνοια μή τι καὶ πλέον εἰδὼς ὁ Νικίας ἰσχυρίζηται. The language of Justin respecting this proceeding is just and discriminating" Nicias, seu pudore male actæ rei, seu metu destitutæ spei civium, seu impellente fato, manere contendit" (Justin. iv. 5). * This interval may be inferred (see Dodwell, Ann. Thucyd. vii. 50) from the state of the moon at the time of the battle of Epipolæ, compared with the subsequent eclipse. Eclipse of the moonAthenian retreat sition-though even now he seems to have assented against his own conviction'. He however insisted with good reason, that no formal or public vote should be taken on the occasion-but that the order should be circulated through the camp, as privately as possible, to be ready for departure at a given signal. Intimation was sent to Katana that the armament was on the point of coming away-with orders to forward no farther supplies. This plan was proceeding successfully: the ships were made ready-much of the property of the army postponed. had already been conveyed aboard without awakening the suspicion of the enemy-the signal would have been hoisted on the ensuing morning-and within a few hours, this fated armament would have found itself clear of the harbour, with comparatively small loss—when the Gods themselves (I speak in the language and feelings of the Athenian camp) interfered to forbid its departure. On the very night before (the 27th August, 413 B.C.)—which was full moon-the moon was eclipsed. Such a portent, impressive to the Athenians at all times, was doubly so under their present despondency, and many of them construed it as a divine prohibition against departure until a certain time should have elapsed, with expiatory ceremonies to take off the effect. They made known their wish for postponement to Nikias and his colleagues; but their interference was superfluous, for Nikias himself was more deeply 1 Thucyd. vii. 50. ὡς αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ ὁ Νικίας ἔτι ὁμοίως ἐναντιοῦτο, &c. Diodor. xiii. 12. 'O Niklas ǹvaykáσdŋ ovyxwpĥσai, &c. 2 Thucyd. vii. 60. • Diodor. xiii. 12. Oi orpatiŵrai tà okeún évetíßevTO, &c. Plutarch, Nikias, c. 23. affected than any one else. He consulted the prophets, who declared that the army ought not to decamp until thrice nine days, a full circle of the moon, should have passed over1. And Nikias took upon himself to announce, that until after the interval indicated by them, he would not permit even any discussion or proposition on the subject. considered of Philo The decision of the prophets, which Nikias thus Eclipses made his own, was a sentence of death to the Athe- as signsdifferently nian army: yet it went along with the general interpreted feeling, and was obeyed without hesitation. Even opinion Demosthenês, though if he had commanded alone, chorus. he might have tried to overrule it-found himself compelled to yield. Yet according to Philochorus (himself a professional diviner, skilful in construing the religious meaning of events), it was a decision decidedly wrong; that is, wrong according to the canonical principles of divination. Το men planning escape or any other operation requiring silence and secrecy, an eclipse of the moon, as hiding light and producing darkness, was (he affirmed) an encouraging sign, and ought to have made the Athenians even more willing and forward 'The moon was totally eclipsed on this night, August 27, 413 B.C., from 27 minutes past 9 to 34 minutes past 10 P.M. (Wurm, De Ponderib. Græcor. sect. xciv. p. 184)-speaking with reference to an observer in Sicily. Thucydidês states that Nikias adopted the injunction of the prophets, to tarry thrice nine days (vii. 50). Diodorus says three days. Plutarch intimates that Nikias went beyond the injunction of the prophets, who only insisted on three days, while he resolved on remaining for an entire lunar period (Plutarch, Nikias, c. 23). I follow the statement of Thucydidês: there is no reason to believe that Nikias would lengthen the time beyond what the prophets prescribed. The erroneous statement respecting this memorable event, in so respectable an author as Polybius, is not a little surprising (Polyb. ix. 19). 2 F VOL. VII. Renewed attacks of the Syra cusansdefeat of in quitting the harbour. We are told, too, that Nikias had recently lost by death Stilbidês, the ablest prophet in his service; and that he was thus forced to have recourse to prophets of inferior ability'. His piety left no means untried of appeasing the gods, by prayer, sacrifice, and expiatory ceremonies, continued until the necessity of actual conflict arrived2. The impediment thus finally and irreparably intercepting the Athenian departure, was the direct, though unintended consequence, of the delay previously caused by Nikias. We cannot doubt, however, that, when the eclipse first happened, he regarded it as a sign confirmatory of the opinion which he had himself before delivered, and that he congratulated himself upon having so long resisted the proposition for going away. Let us add, that all those Athenians who were predisposed to look upon eclipses as signs from heaven of calamity about to come, would find themselves strengthened in that belief by the unparalleled woes even now impending over this unhappy army. What interpretation the Syracusans, confident and victorious, put on the eclipse, we are not told. But they knew well how to interpret the fact, which nian fleet in speedily came to their knowledge, that the Athenians had fully resolved to make a furtive escape, the Athe the Great Harbour. 'Plutarch, Nikias, c. 22; Diodor. xiii. 12; Thucyd. vii. 50. Stilbidês was eminent in his profession of a prophet: see Aristophan. Pac. 1029, with the citations from Eupolis and Philochorus in the Scholia. Compare the description of the effect produced by the eclipse of the sun at Thebes, immediately prior to the last expedition of Pelopidas into Thessaly (Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 31). 2 Plutarch, Nikias, c. 24. : and had only been prevented by the eclipse. Such a resolution, amounting to an unequivocal confession of helplessness, emboldened the Syracusans yet farther, to crush them as they were in the harbour, and never to permit them to occupy even any other post in Sicily. Accordingly Gylippus caused his triremes to be manned and practised for several days he then drew out his land-force, and made a demonstration of no great significance against the Athenian lines. On the morrow, he brought out all his forces, both land and naval; with the former of which he beset the Athenian lines, while the fleet, 76 triremes in number, was directed to sail up to the Athenian naval station. The Athenian fleet, 86 triremes strong, sailed out to meet it, and a close, general, and desperate action took place. The fortune of Athens had fled. The Syracusans first beat the centre division of the Athenians; next, the right division under Eurymedon, who in attempting an evolution to outflank the enemy's left, forgot those narrow limits of the harbour which were at every turn the ruin of the Athenian mariner -neared the land too much-and was pinned up against it, in the recess of Daskon, by the vigorous attack of the Syracusans. He was here slain, and his division destroyed: successively, the entire Athenian fleet was beaten and driven ashore. cess ashore Few of the defeated ships could get into their Partial sucown station. Most of them were forced ashore or against Gylippus. grounded on points without those limits; upon which Gylippus marched down his land-force to the water's edge, in order to prevent the retreat of the crews as well as to assist the Syracusan seamen |