SERMON XI.

THE TRUTH OF GOD.

PSALM CXVII. 2.-And the truth of the Lord endureth for ever.

IN my last discourse, I considered briefly the Justice of God I shall now proceed to make some observations concerning His Truth, which in the text is asserted to be an eternal, and therefore an inseparable, attribute of Jehovah.

As a prelude to these observations, it will be useful to take a concise notice of the several significations of this term. The word, Truth, denotes,

1st. A Proposition, conformed to the real state of things. Thus St. Paul says, I speak the truth in Christ, I lie not. Rom. ix. 1. 2dly. All such propositions, generally considered.

Thus Pilate asked Christ, What is truth? John xviii. 38. 3dly. That collection of such propositions, which is contained in the Gospel, and is commonly called Evangelical truth:

Thus says our Saviour, The Spirit of truth shall guide you into all THE TRUTH. John xiv. 13. Thus also St. Paul observes, Love rejoiceth in THE TRUTH. 1 Cor. xiii. 8. In both these instances, the Truth mentioned is Evangelical Truth.

4thly. Reality, in opposition to that, which is fancied, or visionary.

Thus the True God denotes the real God, in opposition to the imaginary gods of the Heathen.

5thly. The Substance, in opposition to types.

Thus Christ calls himself the Truth; as being the great Antitype of all the types in the Old Testament.

6thly. Veracity, that is, a disposition always to declare Truth, or to speak according to the real state of things.

7thly. Faithfulness, that is, a disposition always to fulfil covenants, trusts, and promises.

In these two last senses, I shall consider the Truth of God as declared in the text. Veracity and Faithfulness are attributes so nearly allied, as to be considered together, with great advantage. The former is speaking, and, as the case may be, acting according to a state of things, seen, or supposed, to exist. The latter is declaring a future state of our own conduct, and afterwards acting so, that that conduct shall be conformed to the declaration. moral attributes are more perfectly of a kindred nature; nor can we conceive of him, who possesses one of them, as in any less degree possessed of the other. There is no reason, therefore, for

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making them separate subjects of examination in this series of discourses.

It will be obvious to those who hear me, that, as the works of Creation and Providence, consisting of beings and events merely, furnish us with no declarations made by God; and as every such declaration must in its nature be a revelation; so in these works there can be no proper specimen of his Truth, or Faithfulness. To every direct display of these attributes, declarations are indispensably necessary. The only way, in which the works of God exhibit, by themselves, any manifestation of these attributes, seems to be this. In the regular succession of causes and effects, a state of things is formed, and continued, on which we usually, and safely, rely; and, so far as this is concerned, enter upon our various kinds of business with security from disappointment. This state of things may be justly considered as manifesting a disposition on the part of Him, by whom it is established, not to deceive his creatures; but to exhibit to them that conduct, on which they may place a safe reliance. Thus we confide in the regular succession of seasons; the return of day and night; the productiveness of the earth; the efficacy of rain and sunshine; and, generally, in the nature, qualities, and effects, of the various things, by which we are surrounded.

But, notwithstanding this want of declarations in Creation and Providence, the proofs, by which the Truth of God is capable of being evinced by Reason, independently of Revelation, are, I think, satisfactory and sufficient.

I. The Truth of God, (by which I intend throughout this discourse both his Veracity and Faithfulness) is completely evident from his Benevolence.

In a preceding discourse, I flatter myself, I have proved the Benevolence of God from the light of nature. From this attribute, his truth is easily, and unanswerably, inferred. The happiness of Intelligent beings is derived in a great measure from society; nor is it possible, that they should be equally happy in the solitary, as in the social, state. But no society can exist without confidence; and no confidence without Truth. Truth, therefore, is the basis, on which society rests. Even thieves and robbers are obliged to speak Truth to each other, in order to maintain their own dreadful society.

Confidence, also, is one of the most important ingredients of happiness; so important, that no rational being can be happy without it. But without Truth, this happiness can never be enjoyed. On the contrary, distrust would create in the mind a dreadful state of suspense; another name for misery. All enjoyments would be seen to hang in doubt before the eyes; and safety and quiet could never be attained.

Again, Falsehood, as an attribute, renders a moral character supremely debased and despicable. So far as we are able to judge from our experience, fixed, absolute falsehood in any mind infers

absolute depravity. No vice in man is probably so universally, and perfectly, despised, as deceit. But such depravity is utterly inconsistent with any happiness whatever.

All these evils would attend the want of Truth in Rational creatures. A general character of deceit in them would utterly destroy, or prevent, the whole of their happiness. But a deceitful character in the Creator would far more effectually destroy it. On His character, all their happiness is ultimately founded; and, were He capable of deceiving them, would be destroyed. The very sense, in them, of such depravity in Him would also completely prevent them from being happy. If, then, He wishes their happiness; or, in other words, is benevolent; it is impossible, that He should not be sincere. His benevolence, like that of creatures as described by St. Paul, rejoiceth in the Truth.

II. As God contrived, and executes, all things according to his will, throughout eternity, it is inconceivable, that he should not speak of them exactly as they are; because the state, in which they are, is exactly agreeable to his pleasure.

Truth, as I have already remarked, is, in the original sense, made up of declarations, exactly conformed to the real state of things. But that state of things is in every respect such, as God has chosen. Declarations, therefore, conformed to the real state of things, are also conformed to his pleasure; while those, which are not conformed to the real state of things, are in the same degree not agreeable to his pleasure. It seems, of course, a contradiction in the nature of the case, that he should not utter declarations of the former kind; or that he should utter declarations of the latter kind in other words, that he should not always speak that, which is exactly true.

III. The Independence, and Immutability, of God, involve, by an absolute moral necessity, his veracity and faithfulness.

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The independence of God places him above all possible temptation to vary at all from his own original purposes. These purposes were all at first perfectly pleasing to him. As his character is absolutely immutable, they will for ever be thus pleasing. the one hand, therefore, he can have no possible motive to make declarations, unaccordant with these purposes; because no being, and no event, can make it in any sense necessary, or advantageous, to him, to make such declarations, or disadvantageous to make those of a contrary nature; or to declare that which is true. On the other hand, sustaining alway exactly the same character, which he originally sustained, and choosing alway the same things, he cannot but be alway pleased with the state of things itself, and with such declarations as express it. Truth, according to what has been here said, must be infinitery advantageous to the furtherance of his designs; as being the only medium, by which his Rational creatures can understand them. If they do not understand them, it is plainly impossible that they should voluntarily coincide

with him in promoting them. But it is a prime part of his designs, that his Intelligent creatures should thus coincide with him. Truth, on his part, being, then, absolutely necessary to this voluntary conformity of his Rational creatures to his designs; and this conformity being a prime and essential part of these designs; Truth, the indispensable mean of accomplishing it, must evidently be of an importance, proportioned to the designs themselves: that is, of infinite importance. To this infinite motive to speak truth, there is no opposing motive; because he is perfectly secured by his independence from all danger of defeat and disappointment.

In the mean time, falsehood in him would effectually prevent the execution of his designs, in this essential part of them; because it would prevent his Intelligent creatures from knowing them; and, therefore, from voluntarily uniting with him in their accomplishment. An infinite motive to speak Truth only, is also furnished to the Creator by this consideration.

Further, Truth is the only Moral Immutability. Falsehood is in its own nature change of character. As every proposition, or its converse, is necessarily true: he, who should invariably utter that, which is false in form, would invariably indicate that, which is in substance true. In other words, those, who heard him speak, would invariably know, that the converse of what he declared was true. He also, who immutably intended to deceive, would speedily become unable to deceive at all; because, when his character was once known, he could never be believed. In either of these cases his conduct would differ no otherwise, in its effects, from that of him, who invariably uttered truth in the direct manner, except that, as he chose a different mode of communicating truth, or did not choose to communicate it at all, he would either be believed to declare it indirectly, or would be entirely disbelieved, and disregarded. In this manner, therefore, he would defeat his own design. Thus immutable Falsehood is evidently a self-contradiction. So obvious is this to all men, that liars, even of the weakest minds, find it absolutely necessary to speak truth frequently, in order to deceive. An immutable God therefore, unless we suppose immutability consistent with a continual change of conduct, cannot but be a God of

truth.

IV. The excellency of Truth, and the turpitude of falsehood, furnish an infinite motive to the Creator to speak truth only.

We, limited as our faculties are, perfectly discern, that Truth is entirely honourable and glorious to the character of an Intelligent being. Falsehood, on the other hand, we perceive with equal clearness to be odious, disgraceful, and contemptible. This, God sees, unquestionably, far more clearly and perfectly than we. Falsehood in him, we see beyond a possibility of doubt, would be disgrace and deformity, proportioned to the greatness of his character; and Truth in an equal proportion honour and glory. This, also, he discerns in a manner infinitely superior to ours. By the

infinite glory, therefore, with which he must be invested by truth, and the infinite disgrace, in which he would be involved by falsehood, he is presented with infinite motives to Truth, and infinite dissuasives from falsehood.

At the same time, it appears to me evident, that the adoption of Truth, or falsehood, by the Creator, must be followed by exactly the same effects, which they produce in us. In the former case, he must regard himself with entire complacency or self-approbation; in the latter, with an irresistible consciousness of turpitude and unworthiness. These views, and the emotions, with which they must be attended, must in an infinite mind be, in either case, boundless: an unlimited sense of excellence on the one hand, accompanied of course with unlimited happiness; on the other, a boundless sense of turpitude, accompanied, for aught that I can see, with boundless shame and wretchedness.

V. He has so formed his Intelligent creatures, that they irresisti bly esteem and respect Truth, and disesteem and despise falsehood.

This respect for Truth, and contempt for falsehood, is irresisti ble, from two causes. It is, in the first place, the necessary dictate of the understanding, when employed in examining the nature of these subjects; and is perfectly independent of any feeling, or influence, of the heart. Knaves, as truly, and as irresistibly, as honest men, despise knaves. No other dictate of the understanding was ever found in the present world: no other is capable of existing.

Secondly, he has made Truth absolutely necessary to the happiness of mankind, and invariably productive of it; and falsehood utterly inconsistent with our happiness, and invariably productive of misery. In this great, practical lesson, he has in his providence forced mankind to esteem and respect Truth, without a possibility of its being otherwise; and to disesteem and despise falsehood.

This argument strongly proves the truth of God in two methods. In the first place, by teaching us to respect Truth, and despise falsehood, he has irresistibly led us to respect him, if a God of Truth; and to despise him, if a God of falsehood. But, if he be not a God of Truth, this fact is utterly irreconcileable with the only end, which he can be supposed to have had in view in creating Intelligent beings.

Secondly, he has in this manner strongly impressed on the minds of his creatures his own character, as a God of Truth. As a Being perfectly Independent, he could have no inducement to impress any character on their minds, except that, which pleased him. That, which pleased him more than any other, was unquestionably his own character. As an Immutable Being, it cannot be supposed, that he could disclose to them any character as his own, except his real character. If, then, the character actually disclosed by him as his own, is not his real character; it must have arisen from one of these sources: either he was afraid to disclose his own