throughout its existence, to the purpose for which it was made. His care extends, therefore, and must extend, to minims, ephemera, and atoms, as truly, and as exactly, as to the concerns of cherubs and seraphs in the heavens.

Accordingly, we actually behold him alike animating the blade, the stem, and the leaf, in the vegetable kingdom; living in the mite and the insect, the bird and the beast; thundering marvellously with his voice; sending lightnings with rain; rolling the billows of the ocean; making the earth to quake at his presence; shining in the stars, glowing in the sun, and moving with his hand the various worlds which compose the universe. At the same time, his presence and agency are more sublimely visible in the universe of minds, in all the amazing powers of thought, affection, and moral action, in the knowledge, virtue, and enjoyment, of the myriads which form the peculiar kingdom of JEHOVAH.

5thly. It is equally evident that this end must be Himself.

Before God made the universe, there was nothing beside him. Whatever motive prompted him to this great work, must, of course, have been found in himself; because, beside him there was nothing. It must, also, have been found in himself, because, when other beings existed, all were nothing in comparison with him; and, therefore, in the same comparison, undeserving of his regard. But this end could not respect any change in himself; any increase, diminution, or alteration, of his greatness, power, and glory. It was, therefore, the manifestation of himself alone which could be the end of this mighty work. Himself is the sum of excellence; of all that is great, or wise, or good. The manifestation of himself is, therefore, only the manifestation of boundless excellence to the creatures which he has made. The manifestation of all attributes, though capable of being made in declarations, is principally discerned in actions. Excellence, therefore, is discovered, chiefly, by doing what is great, and wise, and good. All this is so evident, as to need no illustration.

God, when he intended to disclose his perfections to the universe, intended, therefore, to exhibit them, chiefly, by an endless course of action, in which wisdom, greatness, and goodness, should be supremely, and most clearly, discovered. The highest blessedness, he has told us, and therefore the greatest glory, is found in communicating good, and not in gaining it; in giving, and not in receiving. To this decision Reason necessarily subjoins her own Amen. The great design of God in all things is, therefore, to do good, boundlessly, and for ever; and in this conduct to disclose himself, as the boundless and eternal good.

It must, of necessary consequence, be supremely pleasing to him, that his intelligent creatures voluntarily unite with him, in loving, and promoting, this divine purpose; while all opposition to it must be supremely displeasing. How important then must it be to us, that we cheerfully coincide with his perfect pleasure

in this great end, and devote to the advancement of it all our faculties. Should we resist his designs, so excellent, so dear to him; how unworthy in itself, and provoking to him, must be the conduct. What terrible consequences must spring from the exertion of such power and knowledge, exerted to manifest his anger against those who thus disobey his will, and oppose his designs! What must they not feel! What ought they not to fear!

On the contrary, what an universe of good, immense and endless, may he be expected to provide for those, who voluntarily unite with him in this glorious design, and cheerfully perform his pleasure. Such good he can make, and give, and repeat for ever, with a wish, and with a word. To make, and give it, is his delight and glory. It will, therefore, be done. In this wonderful work, how divinely great and good does God appear! How deserving of all admiration, love, homage, obedience, and praise. How amazing the wonders, which he has done! How much more amazing the transcendent purpose, for which they were done! Who would not fear, who would not bless, who would not adore, that glorious and fearful name, JEHOVAH OUR GOD; the Being selfexistent, eternal, and immense; and without beginning, limits, or end; united with eternal and immeasurable wisdom and power; from whom are derived all worlds, and all their inhabitants; on whom all depend; and by whom all are preserved, governed, and blessed, and conducted with supreme wisdom and goodness to an end, immortal and divine? Blessing, and honour, and glory, and power, be unto Him that sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb for ever and ever.

SERMON II.

ATHEISTICAL OBJECTIONS AND SCHEMES OF DOCTRINE CONSIDERED.

PSALM xiv. 1.—The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God.

IN the preceding discourse, I endeavoured to prove the existence of GOD by arguments which have appeared to men of great distinction for learning and wisdom, to be not only satisfactory, but unanswerable. Plain men, also, though comprehending them imperfectly, have admitted both the force of the arguments themselves; and the point which they are intended to establish; without a question, and almost without an exception. Yet it cannot be denied that there have been atheists, speculative as well as practical. A few of them may have existed in the uneducated classes of mankind, but almost all have been found among those who, professedly at least, have been more or less learned.

But to whatever class these persons may belong, and whatever pretensions they may make to knowledge and wisdom, they are in the text universally characterized by folly. The fool, says David, hath said, there is no God. In other words, every man who says this, is a fool; and the assertion is the result of his folly only.

It is remarkable that this assertion is declared to be made in the heart of the fool; that is, to flow from his wishes, and not from his understanding. For the words, there is, in the translation, there is nothing in the original. Hence, it has been supposed by some commentators, that the passage ought to be rendered, let there be no GOD. Whether this rendering be admitted, or not, there can be no doubt that the chief reason why the assertion is adopted at all, is the indisposition of the heart to acknowledge the existence of the Creator.

That we easily believe what we wish to believe, is a truth so obvious, as to have passed into a proverb. He who hates the control, disreslishes the character, and dreads the inspection, judgment, and retribution of his Maker, and intends to persevere in a course of sin; will find no refuge from anxiety and alarm, and no source of quiet in sinning so comfortable, or in his view so safe, as the belief, that there is no God. It is not strange, therefore, that this belief has been cherished by such beings as mankind are; and particularly by such beings as atheists have universally been.

Still, this conduct cannot be denied to be folly of a very gross kind. As our belief can make no difference in the fact; as if GOD exists, he will continue to exist; as our danger from his anger against our sins, is exactly the same whether we believe it or not; as our quiet in sin will in this case only cheat us into ruin; and as

the little consolation which we find in the indulgence of this belief. will only enhance our wretchedness by adding to it the anguish of disappointment; no sober man will hes.tate to pronounce this conduct foolish in the extreme. To him, who walks over the edge of a precipice, what benefit can it be to shut his eyes? What greater stupidity can there be, than to shut our eyes, when this conduct will prove the certain means of conveying us to this scene of absolute destruction?

Atheists have, however, determined to encounter this hazard, and boldly resolved that there is no GOD. Against the doctrine of the divine existence they have raised up several objections, which they declare to be satisfactory, at least, to themselves. These they have also formed into a scheme, and presented it to the public with a face of bold assurance. Even this has not satisfied them. They have triumphed, in the most open manner, in the supposed ingenuity of their efforts; and in the boasted strength of their argu ments, have ridiculed the arguments of their antagonists; and have treated the doctrines not only of Christianity, but even of Theism, with contempt. It is the design of this discourse, to examine the objections of these men, and the principal doctrines with which they have been connected.

The first of these objections which I shall mention, is that Creation is so great a work, as to make it seem impossible, even for God to accomplish it.

This was the great difficulty in the mind of Aristotle. This singular man, in the early parts of his life, found his thoughts so much perplexed with this consideration, that he for a time gave up the doctrine of creation, and determined that the universe, as to its substance at least, had existed from eternity. I cannot help remarking here the difference between him and the modern opposers of the divinity of Christ. Arians and Socinians have very generally insisted, that creation is so easy a work, as to afford no proof of divine agency; and declared, that, even if Christ did in fact create all things, this fact does not infer his divinity. To Aristotle it appeared too difficult a work, even for God himself to perform.

To this objection we are furnished with a conclusive answer. God does actually, and daily, create the human soul in innumerable instances; and the creation of the soul evidently demands all the power, necessary to the creation of matter. He who can give existence to the soul, can plainly give existence to any thing. As I propose in the progress of these discourses to discuss at large the immateriality of the soul, I shall at present take it for granted.

This objection is also completely overthrown by the fact, that God upholds, moves, and governs the universe. Had Aristotle known the doctrines of the Copernican astronomy, and beheld God moving with entire and unabated ease, the systems of worlds, which com pose the universe; his capacious mind would, I think, have been irresistibly led to admit, that the hand which moves them, could with

the same ease have created them. Indeed this great man appears, in the later parts of his life, not to have placed any serious reliance on this objection.

2dly. It is objected, that the state of the world is such, as to forbid the belief, that it is the work of a God.

"The world," says the objectors, "is full of imperfection, and of suffering. The course of nature is such, as to entail upon all its animated inhabitants, pain, disease, and death. Nor is the moral state of things materially different from the natural. Depravity, in all its odious forms, appears to have existed from the beginning; and has ever constituted, to say the least, no small part of the character of mankind." God, on the part of all enlightened men, who believe in the existence of such a being, and particularly on that of Christians, is declared to be possessed of infinite perfection. Can a being of such perfection be supposed to be the author of so imperfect, incongruous, and deformed a work? Is it not plain, that God either did not make the world, or that he has forgotten it, and left it wholly to the control of chance?

To this objection, which is attended with a degree of speciousness, and fitted to awaken fretfulness, where it will not produce conviction, I answer, in the

1st, place, that all the real weight of it lies in the existence of moral evil; a subject, which I shall have occasion to examine, when I come to discourse on the benevolence of God, and on the apostacy of

man.

2dly. The whole force of this objection lies in the inexplicableness of certain things which it alleges; and amounts to no more than this, that there are several things in the world, the nature, use, and end, of which we cannot understand. The argument contained in it, if resolved into a general principle, will stand thus. Nothing, the nature, use, and end, of which we cannot understand, can be the work of God. This argument needs only to be proposed, to be exploded; for it is absolutely certain, that God can do very few things, whose nature, use, or end, can be comprehended by us. It is equally certain, that, according to this rule of concluding, the same thing may, at the same time, be proved to be, and not to be, the work of God. One man may distinctly comprehend the nature of a thing, and discern in it certain proofs of divine workmanship. Another man may, at the same time, be wholly ignorant of the nature of the same thing; and his ignorance will, according to this rule, be decisive proof, that it is not a divine work. The same man, also, may, according to this rule, in the different periods of childhood and manhood, be able to prove a thing to be, and not to be, wrought by the hand of God. The evidence of the divine agency, and the want of it, are here placed, not in the nature of the work, but in the nature of the optics by which it is perceived: an absurdity too palpable to need any further discussion. The real proof in this, and every other case, must, if it be found at all, be found in some VOL. İ.

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