fore, that if it be an innate principle, contraries may be so.* Another incongruity is involved in the doctrine of an innate moral sense, which would seem to be conclusive against it: on account of the correlation of the act of perception, and the subject of it, they must be co-existent, and we must, accordingly, if this be an innate moral sense, have, by nature, or born with idea of the object which we reject or approve.

us,

an

Whatever opinion, however, may be formed in regard to Locke's argument against the theory of innate principles, he will, at least, have the credit with all, of having honestly striven with the whole of his intellectual strength for the independence of the human mind. The dogma, that principles must not be questioned, being first ascertained and settled by casuistic doctors, was calculated to produce the most servile dependence, and to crush every inquiry into the foundations of truth; "in which posture of blind credulity," in the strong and indignant language of our philosopher, "its followers might be more easily governed by, and made useful to some sort of men, who had the skill and office to principle and guide them." Indeed, it was the great and first design of Locke, to liberate the human understanding from authoritative dicta; and however imperfect in its details his great work may be-in this point of view, at least, it has been productive of the happiest results. The second book contemplates two objects, one psychological, the other merely physiological. In regard to the former, his followers and admirers have fallen into two parties, greatly to the prejudice of his real views, which seem to be misconceived alike by both. The French school, who have ever received the philosophy of Locke with rapturous admiration, declared that the reflection which he had laid down as an original fountain of knowledge, was nothing but a modified sensation without causative power, and depending immediately upon external impression. Not only was the reflective power considered by them as a sense, but also as one active from outward objects. It is easy, therefore, to see that his principles, thus exaggerated and perverted, led to a baleful materialism; and we accordingly find them thus represented in all its moral hideousness. The Scotch school, on the other hand, and principally Dugald Stewart, in his Metaphysical Essays,† have striven, and successfully, too, against this gloss upon Locke, though in doing so, they seem to have fallen into an opposite error, of attributing more to our philosopher's words, than a strict construction of them will admit.

It is maintained by this class of commentators, that Locke lays down two radically distinct as well as original sources of ideas, in nowise related to each other: "Through the whole of his

Essay on Hum. Und. B. I. ch. iii. §. 8.

+ Essay I.

Essay," says Stewart, "he uniformly represents sensation and reflection as radically distinct sources of knowledge."* Now this radical distinction is observable only so far as it regards the operations by which the mind receives its knowledge; and is, we think, non-existent as it regards the original sources of our knowledge. Locke contended that all our ideas are acquired by experience; and everywhere represents sensation as antecedent to, and causative of reflection; and consequently that they cannot be two original and radically distinct sources of knowledge. It would therefore follow from this premise, that if a mind were supposed to be devoid of those ideas which spring or arise from sensation, it would also be devoid of those ideas which arise from reflection; "reflection," says he, "is the perception of the operations of our own minds within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got:"-and how?-by sensation. So, on the other hand, it is a correct sequitur from the same, that the ideas of sensation may exist independently of those of reflection; and we find this also distinctly advanced and maintained by Locke: "The first years," he observes, "are usually employed and diverted in looking abroad. Men's business in them is to acquaint themselves with what is to be found without; and so growing up in a constant attention to outward sensations, seldom make any considerable reflection on what passes within them, until they come to be of riper years; and some scarce ever at all." And again: "If it shall be demanded, when a man begins to have any ideas, I think the true answer is, when he first has any sensation. For since there appear not to be any ideas in the mind, before the senses have conveyed any in, I conceive that ideas in the understanding are coeval with sensation." The volumes before us, however, fortunately present us with the means of ascertaining the real sentiments of Locke in regard to this important point; and show, moreover, that they were identical both in the inception and completion of his work. In the original sketch of the Essay, which we have transcribed above, are the following words: "I imagine that all knowledge is founded on, and ultimately derives itself from sense, or something analogous to it, and may be called sensation"! In the epitome of the essay which was translated and published in the Bibliothèque Universelle, by Leclerc-the original of which, drawn up by Locke, is now given by Lord King; the following comment occurs by the philosopher himself: "I think I may confidently say, that besides what our senses convey into the mind, or the ideas of its own operations about those received from sensation, we heve no ideas at all. From whence it follows-first, that where a man * Dissertation. Encyc. Britt. Part II. § 1. Essay on Hum. Und. B. II. chap. i. § 8. tt Essay on Hum, Und. B. II. ch.‍i. § 23.

has always wanted one of his senses, there he will always want the ideas belonging to that sense; men born deaf or blind, are sufficient proof of this. Secondly, it follows that if a man could be supposed void of all senses, he would also be void of all ideas; because, wanting all sensation, he would have nothing to excite any operation in him, and so would have neither ideas of sensa tion, external objects having no way, by any sense, to excite them, nor ideas of reflection, HIS MIND HAVING NO IDEAS TO BE EMPLOYED ABOUT. vol. ii. pp. 232, 233.

We think it is conclusive, from these passages, that the interpreters of Locke have misconstrued his meaning; that he is neither the philosopher of idealism nor sensualism; that while he leaves untouched the moral predispositions and tendencies of our nature, he gives "ample scope and verge enough" for the operation of the laws of nature, which, although we are ignorant, "we may attain to the knowledge of, by the use and application of our natural faculties." The materialist, or the philosopher of selfishness, finds here no foothold for his degrading doctrines. The cause of truth is vindicated, not at the expense of virtue or of religion, but by the exposure of error.

The second and most important object of the Essay, is to generalize the facts of mental science; and its greatest merit consists, not so much in the complete execution of this task-for in this respect it is confessedly imperfect-but in the early date of the attempt, and in the truly philosophical spirit with which it is conceived. Locke accomplished for the science of mind, what Bacon had done for physics; he led the way to a more ready and useful knowledge of the constitution and laws of the understanding; and though his labours seem more humble than those of the critical philosophers and eclectics of our own day, who seem to have essayed a flight beyond the sphere of practical knowledge, they constitute an epoch even in psychological science, such as will hardly be dated from their efforts. * What he saw was not through a glass darkly; his penetrating mind searched to the bottom of every subject which it attempted-intimius per onnia perspexerat. He came short, it is true, far short of the great aim of metaphysical inquiry; but this imperfection is common to every system which has yet been invented or formed with similar views and purposes. The analysis of knowledge which oc

*We cannot refrain from expressing here the pleasure which we experienced in perusing M. Vict. Cousin's Introduction à l'Histoire de la Philosophie. We can readily imagine the applause which, it is said, accompanied the delivery of his lectures, and almost ourselves listening to his animat d discourse, reminiscent of the scenes of the Lyceum and of the Porch; but, at the same time, we cannot divest ourselves of the conviction that his Eclecticism is, though a splendid, but an imaginary reconciliation of radically adverse systems.

curs in the fourth book, shows how difficult it is for one mind, however comprehensive, original, and profound it may be, to compass the extent of human attainments and to describe the limits of the human faculties. Indeed, any attempt to mete out the bounds and use of knowledge, to define truth and mark out its province, seems to be inconsistent with the nature of the subject itself. Locke, however, did much for the cause of philosophy, and accomplished a great deal, in so far as he gave a form and name to many parts of intellectual science. Knowledge he defines to be the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas; and this connexion or disconnexion he divides into those of identity, co-existence, real existence, and relation. The proof of our knowledge, however, is of a varied character, partly intuitive, partly rational, and in part sensitive. From an attentive examination of these evidences, he concludes, that, on the one hand, we can have no ideas, and that, on the other, our understandings are incapable of connecting or disconnecting all those ideas which we have, and that consequently our knowledge comes short of our ideas. This scheme of the nature of knowledge, of the mode of perceiving it, and of its extent, is the groundwork of the subsequent inquiry which he pursues into the reality and particulars of knowledge; and constitutes the original frame which he intended to make in the first conception of his design.

We have already extended our remarks on the Essay so much further than we intended, that we must be content with a single observation more. Next to precision in ideas, Locke ranked the right use of language. The confusion incident to mixed modes of speech, especially when applied to logical and philosophical inquiry, he felt to be a serious obstacle and inconvenience in the way of truth; and the imperfection and abuse of words to be that which had nourished disputes, spread errors, and retarded the progress of man. He has accordingly given an admirable analysis of the nature and influence of words in their relation to knowledge. Bacon had barely alluded to the great causes of error referable to this source, and in his peculiar classification called them the idols of the forum. The efforts of our philosopher, however, first awakened the attention of the learned and curious; and since his day a species of philosophical nomenclature has been adopted by every sect of inquirers, though unfortunately in each case its influence has been confined to its own school-a circumstance which seems necessarily to exist from the very nature of philosophy-at least in its present vacillating state.

We haste to the consideration of the other works of Locke, which, though less known and read, and, perhaps, more exceptionable than the essay concerning the understanding, are nevertheless of deep interest to the lover of freedom. Locke lived at

a period when the greatest questions which can concern a political society were freely stirred, and when many of them were settled and determined. We accordingly find his great talents called out and employed in vindicating with remarkable moderation as well as ability, the principles of civil and religious freedom; for such emergencies are ever calculated to elicit energies and to provoke exertions which would otherwise have lain dormant and unproduced: more than all, they rouse the strong and manly virtues, as they also frequently invite the mean and degrading vices of the soul, ennobling and emblazoning the one in overpowering contrast with the other. The troublous times of the first Charles, and the agitations of the period of the Commonwealth, though they fix a more striking point in English history than the succeeding eras of the restoration and revolution, had a far less decisive influence than those periods, upon what may be termed the cardinal principles of the English Constitution. We revert with almost holy fervour to the era of Pym and Hampden -to their struggles and to their persecutions; but the great contest for the fundamentals of liberty was reserved for the period which saw the ermine soiled by contact with such men as Scroggs and Jefferies and Sawyer-the minions of a power which sealed its profligacy by the unrighteous execution of Sydney. Men's minds were unsettled during the first period; a thousand distracting parties, with views radically opposed, gave fixedness to no principle. They launched into the ocean of anarchy without any compass or polar star to direct or guide them; and it was not strange that they should return baffled to the point of departure. The period immediately preceding the revolution, was on the other hand marked by a steady and well-defined opposition of parties; one struggling for unquestioned prerogatives of royalty, on the principle a deo rex, and directing the apparatus of government, with venality on the bench, simony in the church, and sycophancy in every rank: another bold for the principles of freedom, but not so desirous of a republic, as of a security for the rights of speech, of conscience, and of personal liberty and a third anxious for the restitution of papal authority, and instigated by the zealous, insinuating, and keenly observant and sagacious followers of Loyala. The conclusion of this triple contest of the high-churchmen, non-conformists, and Catholics, fixed the principles of the English constitution; and it is from the full and able discussion given to them at that time, rather than from their determination, that the advocates of liberal views in civil and religious matters have since drawn argument as from a rich and original source.

Thus the great conflict at this time was, as may be inferred, consequent upon the establishment of the church. The Savoy conference, held in the first year of the restoration, broke up