plating there are many different trades to be represented, and as many varying in

terests.

But is this really so? Is not the relationship of employers to unskilled labor very much the same whatever the trade may be? I put that question not argumentatively, but inquiringly or suggestively. Are there greater differences in the relations of unskilled labor to various employments than there are in the relations of hewers to various collieries? But, even if this suggested view be altogether erroneous, then is it not possible to classify unskilled labor under such heads as may be proved to be necessary, and to have a Joint Board in each case?

But it is said that there is a serious difficulty inherent to unskilled labor, and that is the impossibility of defining the district over which any Board should exercise jurisdiction. The finished iron trade of the North of England and that of Staffordshire are alike precise terms; in both cases there are well recognized geographical and other limitations. But the unskilled labor of Northumberland is the same as that of Cumberland, or Durham, or Lancashire.

This does not seem to me to be really so serious as it looks at first, for exactly the same may be said of the skilled labor in the coal trade of Northumberland and in that of Durham, each of which has its Board. Again, the building trades of Wolverhampton do not materially differ from the building trades of the surrounding district, yet they have their own Board. So that, theoretically, there should be no difficulty in the unskilled labor of each trade having its own Joint Board in each town or district. But this is quite unnecessary if the system of Joint Boards spreads to definite trades and becomes general. One of the best results of the recent contests, in which unskilled labor has played so remarkable a part, has been the convincing testimony of the sympathy which exists between skilled and unskilled

labor. Where a trade has its Joint Board the interests of both are attended to, and, if most trades had Boards, it would only be the unskilled labor employed in industries which had no skilled labor, or in trades which had not formed Boards, that would need to combine and have a Board of its own.

Upon such a Board every employer of unskilled labor could not be personally represented, but every large employer would have a seat, and the small employers would elect representatives. Sufficient employers must be represented to give the decision of the Board general significance, and to insure its general acceptance.

But whatever is done will have to be the result of agreement between employers and employed-Law will not bind the two parties together in this country. Much valuable time and labor have been thrown away in the endeavor to introduce institutions similar to the "Conseils de Prud'hommes," which have flourished in France since 1806 and in Belgium since 1810. They are doubtless very good in their way, and we may gain valuable hints from them, but they are not what we want. It is the bringing together of employers and employed as equals in friendly argument which is of the first importance, and which no law can provide.

I do not think that, at the present stage of this inquiry, I should go further than I have done. I believe that the difficulties in the way of the union of unskilled labor, though very great, will assuredly be overcome, and that, after many trials and much disappointment, perhaps after frequent strikes with their attendant misery and loss, "far off in summers which we may not see," success will be built up on many failures, and the peaceful method of settling disputes will be adopted in the case of unskilled labor also. And not only the laborers, but the entire nation also, will reap the benefit.-Contemporary Magazine.

IN considering the effects in future wars of recent inventions, either untried or of which we have only imperfect experience, I shall naturally confine myself to operations on land. It is the opinion of thoughtful officers that some at all events of the new factors will produce a startling modification in the art of war. An at tempt therefore to forecast their results cannot be unprofitable to either the soldier or the statesman.

In future wars railways, the number of which in Europe is daily increasing, will play an unprecedented important part, not only strategically, but also tactically. For mobilization and concentration at the outset of war their value was shown in 1870; with armies of increased size they will be still more essential. After the commencement of operations they will still occasionally-especially in the case of the army which assumes the defensive-be used for the rapid conveyance of troops, but as a rule they will chiefly be employed for the transport of food and stores. It has been calculated by the Americans, from the experience of their great civil war, that to supply an army in the field of a hundred thousand men by means of a single line of rails there should be twenty-five locomotives and six freight carriages to every mile of road. It is therefore evident that even with double lines an army of a hundred thousand men working a hundred miles from its base would require-setting aside the requirements of sieges-an immense quantity of rolling stock. As to the movements of troops by rail, experience on the Continent shows that time is not gained when the proportion of bayonets and sabres to a mile of double line is greater than four hundred and thirty-five. Apart therefore from the fact that once the army in the field, the railway resources will be absorbed in bringing up stores and taking back sick and wounded, the railway transport of troops will seldom be profitable for an army on the offensive. The strain on the railways needed for the conveyance of food and stores will be largely augmented, seeing that in all probability the size of armies will be much increased. The limit to their size will, in

fact, be practically determined by the carrying capacity of the railways. Hence two things are obvious: 1st, that for strategical operations railways will, after the commencement of a campaign, be used comparatively little; 2nd, that even if only employed for the transport of stores, their capacity will have to be largely increased by the addition of sidings, the construction of platforms, and the doubling of lines. For this reason all armies are daily paying increased attention to the formation, augmentation, and training of military railway battalions, we, perhaps, least of all. For operations

which lie in the border land between tactics and strategy, occasional use with great effect will probably be made of railways for the conveyance of troops for short distances. Had Bazaine turned his railway facilities to full account at Forbach, the result of that battle might have been different. It can easily be understood that though there would be no saving of time in transporting an army corps with all its impedimenta a distance of 30 miles by railway, it would be feasible and desirable to convey a brigade of four battalions, with a field battery attached, a distance of 15 miles. In the former case 185 trains would be required, and the operation, under the most favorable cir cumstances, would occupy four days. In the latter case the troops, moving with nothing but men, officers, chargers, and what the French call a train de combat, the whole force could be transported to its destination in two hours from the time the first man entered to the time the last man quitted the train. As to armor clad trains, they will on exceptional occasions be used and be of great value, as was shown in the case of Sir Archibald Alison's operations at Alexandria in the first Egyptian war.

The importance of railways being so great in modern war, there will certainly be made vigorous efforts to destroy those by which the adversaries are supplied. I shall not, therefore, be at all surprised if wide-reaching raids, as in the American civil war, be frequently attempted. Large bodies, numbering several thousands of mounted men, will break through or turn

one flank of the cavalry screen, and, passing quite round the enemy's army, will destroy food, telegraph wires, railways, and roads on the principal lines of communication of the army. These will consist chiefly of cavalry, accompanied by mounted infantry, if there are any, mounted engineers, and machine guns, but, as in the case of Stewart and Sheridan, the proportion of field artillery will be very small, if, indeed, this arm be not altogether eliminated. These expeditions will be facilitated by the perfection to which the concentrated food for men and compressed food for horses has been carried, while owing to the introduction of machine guns it will be possible to dispense with or reduce the number of guns. Nailless horseshoes, which can be rapidly adjusted by the riders, will remove one cause of delay. In the operations alike of the raiders and those who seek to baffle the latter, much will often depend on the intelligence, knowledge, and acquirements of junior officers. For this reason, and also because in scouting the youngest subaltern will have to judge and act for himself, special endeavors will have to be made in order to secure the most superior young men for the positions of cavalry officers. Till lately it was thought that it was more essential to have good officers in the infantry than in the cavalry. Formerly it was considered that if a cavalry subaltern was a good rider, understood horses, and was smart, resolute, and enterprising, it was sufficient. Now it is admitted that cavalry subalterns, being more frequently employed on detached duties where the experience and guidance of their superiors are wanting than infantry officers of corresponding rank, a higher training is needed for the former. Nevertheless, with strange inconsistency, those who are lowest on the list of competitors for admission are permitted to enter the army provided they accept cavalry commissions.

Balloons were first employed in war nearly a century ago during the campaigns of the French Revolution, but till thirty years ago they sank as accessories of war into oblivion. In the Italian war of 1859, during the American civil war, and at the siege of Paris, they were employed, and some ten years ago systematic endeavors were made to remedy the inherent defects which limited their employment. As re

gards captive balloons, these efforts have been attended by a certain measure of success, as shown in Sir Gerald Graham's last campaign in the Soudan; but as regards free balloons, little progress has been made, notwithstanding the sustained energy of the French. It is probable, however, that, thanks to the perfection of electric apparatus, a motive power sufficiently strong may be provided by machinery sufficiently light to enable a shipshaped balloon to sail against the wind or at a small angle with the opposing current. The importance of such a development of balloon power for scouting in rear of or over an enemy's army, or for communicating from without with a blockaded fortress, cannot be overrated.

In the meantime the captive balloon affords immense advantages. By its means a staff officer from headquarters will be enabled to reconnoitre a large tract of country. It will be possible also to ascertain the numbers and position of the enemy's reserves screened from ordinary view by low hills and woods. Also defenders of a line of river will be able to ascertain what preparations for forcing or surprising a passage are being made by their opponents. The Duke of Wellington once said that he had been all his life endeavoring to find out what was on the other side of the hill. An inferior commander will henceforth be able to ascertain by mechanical means and with certainty that which the great Duke only imperfectly discovered by the use of his great reasoning powers.

By the aid of electricity also search lights will render in the future invaluable service. With them night attacks will be rendered infinitely more difficult than at present. In the case of an attempted surprise by night of outposts no considerable force can, save on exceptionally favorable ground, advance otherwise than along the roads. By the electric lights troops moving along a road will be as visible for several miles as during the day. Similarly at a siege a strong party will be seen as soon as it leaves the cover of the trenches. On the other hand the besiegers will be able, by keeping a light on the breach, to detect the presence of any working party, and to drive them away with case, shrapnell, or machine guns.

The increased range and rapidity of firing of rifles, machine guns, and artillery,

enemy's side of the stream than 400 yards, the old smooth-bore guns would not have been effective at any substantial distance from the defenders' bank. With modern guns and range-finders, and a river half a mile broad, the assailants' guns, even if dispersed in groups so far back as to be 1,100 yards from the point of landing, could still fire with effect on an enemy a mile and a quarter from the defenders' bank.

There was for some years a controversy in Germany as to the respective advantages and disadvantages of the attack and defence of a position. The conclusion at length arrived at by German officers was that the assailants enjoyed the superiority. . From this opinion, however, Lord Wolseley and a few other British officers have dissented in the assumed case of British troops on the defensive, and I venture to think that recent inventions and changes confirm the opinion of Lord Wolseley. If time be granted to prepare a position, the first line would be protected by shelter trenches, or existing banks and ditches. If time were wanting for this purpose the defenders would lie flat, taking advantage of any little swell of the ground to obtain partial shelter. Under any circumstances they would offer but a very small and difficult target. They would also possess the inestimable advantage of having determined the distance, either with a rangefinder or by actual measurement from various conspicuous objects in their front, such as a rock, a stream, a tree, a road, or a knoll. On the other hand, the assailants would labor under the disadvantages of being exposed from head to foot on the occasion of every rush forward, of firing at small objects at unknown and constantly varying ranges, and with hands unsteady from exertion. These facts are so thoroughly recognized, that it is laid down that any attack on a position must be preluded by a heavy and prolonged fire of artillery. As, however, the assailants' guns cannot, save when they have a great command over the enemy's position, continue the fire when the assailants' infantry have arrived within a few hundred yards of their opponents-say 200 yards -and the ground is seldom so unfavorable to the defenders that they cannot obtain within a short distance of the crest of the position cover from fire, in such a case the preliminary cannonade of the enemy cannot

do much harm; for during it the defenders' first line can withdraw under cover, returning only when the infantry of the assailants are within a few hundred yards of the crest. With breech loaders there would be quite time enough to destroy the enemy during the short time occupied in passing over the final 200 yards. Besides, in the face of machine guns favorably hidden behind hedges, bushes, or in high grass, and suddenly unmasked at the last moment, no infantry, however brave or skilfully handled, could advance, for the reason that every man would be killed or disabled. I therefore see nothing for it, when it becomes absolutely necessary to attack a deliberately occupied position of fair strength, but to advance by a succession of stages, the assailants entrenching themselves at the end of every stage under cover of their artillery. Such being the case, I consider that the defence, if conducted by resolute troops, is now superior to the attack.

It

The chief characteristic of the wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was a series of sieges and manœuvres. would seem as if a similar practice will prevail in the future. The most ready way of baffling an enemy and causing him to fall back will be by rendering it impossible for him to obtain food. As, however, local resources contribute but slightly to the maintenance of the large armies now assembled, it becomes a question whether the injury to your opponent by laying waste a district will be sufficiently great to compensate for the pain which every humane man, every humane nation must feel if wholesale misery be inflicted on the civil population. At times, however, such devastation may produce unquestionable injury to the enemy's troops, when we may be certain that a general will act logically and not hesitate to order it. The true object of a commander should be to bring about as rapidly as possible peace favorable to his own country. In the pursuit of this object he should shrink. from no measure, for if he can prevent loss or suffering to his own nation, and especially to his own troops, by inflicting the same on the enemy, it is his clear duty to do so. He is only bound not to cause needless suffering to the enemy, i.e., suffering which will not improve his chances of success. To further limit his freedom of action is to act as illogically as if a