must have minifters and evil counsellors. Though the prince himself be hid by his own fplendor, or intrenched behind his royal prerogatives, the Houfe of Commons can effectually defeat his purpose, by attacking his evil counfellors, and bringing them to justice. In Sparta, the five Ephori chofen annually from the people, had authority to arrest and imprison the perfon of their kings. This inftitution. preferved the liberty of Sparta for more than fix hundred years. The privilege of the Commons of England gives greater fecurity for the preservation of liberty than the Spartan inftitution could give to any nation, where gold and filver are admitted, and at the fame time is lefs invidious to fovereigns. § 3. As all fupplies muft originate in the House of Commons, this House can throw infurmountable difficulties in the way of any prince in his purfuit of deIpotic power. The numerous barrows which furround Stone-henge evidently mark out that fpot as holy. Here our druidical ancestors contended contended pro aris et focis, and much of the best British blood was fhed to preferve that facred pile from violation. The Britons, in defending that, defended what they valued moft; their invaders; when wifhing to bring them to an action, had only to approach their témple. The treasury is the facred fhrine of liberty; round this the most bloody battles have been fought, and the monuments of the flain are seen on every fide. Our anceftors in defending this, eventually secured what they valued moft; their liberty. Here first unhappy Charles attacked his parliaments, here they had their fierceft conflicts. In order to establish a defpotic power, it was neceffary that he should be able to raise fupplies without the aid of parliaments; hence his fhip-thoney, tunnage and poundage, his monopolies and loans: to stop him in his career, they met him on this ground, and drove him from it. In gaining this, they gained every thing. To procure money he was obliged, though moft unwillingly, and with a bad grace, to grant their petition of right, and to say after many struggles and evafions, "Soit droit fait comme il eft defiré." To procure money he was obliged to give up his evil-counsellors, and redress: all the grievances of his fubjects. After this, all would have been well, if the parliament could have trufted him for his future conduct. This confidence was wanting, and the unhappy monarch fell a facrifice to his own miftaken notions of the English conftitution, and parliament's want of confidence in his fincerity. Riches have been looked upon as the finews of war. Whenever therefore our fovereigns have been at war, they have been obliged to redress the grievances of their fubjects. Herodotus relates, that when Sennacherib had entered Egypt with a numerous and victorious army, he was opposed by Sethon king of Egypt with only a handful of undifciplined: troops. In the night a prodigious mul titude of rats entered the camp of Sennacherib, and gnawing to pieces all the bow-ftrings, and all the thongs of the fhields, fhields, rendered his army incapable of making any defence; in confequence of which, that monarch retreated with precipitation and difgrace. This fiction has been often realifed in England. Our sovereigns however, have had their option, either to redrefs the grievances of their fubjects, or to retreat from their enterprizes with precipitation and difgrace. It is the prerogative of the crown to make war; the prince may draw the fword, but the House of Coinmons alone can give that fword an edge. Had it not been for this check, the kings of England had been long fince defpotic. They were seldom fond of meeting their parliaments, excepting they wanted money as foon as that was granted, the parliament was diffolved. Senfible of this, it has been the policy of all honest parliaments, to make the redrefs of grievances and the fupplies, go hand in hand together. As I fhall refume this fubject, I fhall only now obferve, that it has been the opinion of all men, that K 2 Englishmen |