our most inveterate enemy lording it over Now I am up, Sir, give me leave to the continent of Europe, and at laft over take notice, that the troops voted in the ourselves; or we must engage in a new committee, which are now to be agreed to war, as heavy, as dangerous, and per- by the house, amount in whole to 50,857 haps as tedious as the laft: and when we men, which is 815 more than was voted feriously reflect, we have the mortifica- laft year; and those are exclufive of the tion to find, that all this has been chiefly troops in the plantations, Minorca and owing to our own conduct. This is in- Gibraltar, which are likewife on the Eng deed a most melancholy, à most dreadful lifh establishment. You have 13 regi fituation: we have been brought into it by ments, and 14 companies of invalids there, our parliament's taking every thing upon which amount to above 11,700 men; fo truft from our minifters; therefore I hope that in the whole you have in the British we will do so no more. I hope we will pay, befides foreigners, above 62,500 landnow confider first the state of the nation; men, and 40,000 feamen, which coft the because from thence alone we can deter- nation above three millions fix hundred and mine what number of troops ought to be eleven thousand pounds per annum; and these kept up for the enfuing year: for if there are exclufive of half-pay officers: A large is no appearance of our being able to form number of forces indeed; too great, I fear, a proper confederacy upon the continent, for this nation long to fupport: therefore we ought to disband a great part of the I hope, Sir, I trust, from what the Hon. troops we have now on foot, in order to Gent. over the way [M. Cato] said in the be able to increase our naval force; be- committee, (and I repofe great confidence cause it is upon that alone, after the ba- in what he does fay), that these troops lance of power upon the continent is de- will not only be kept up, but that they ftroyed, that we must depend for the con- will be employed; and the moment the tinuance of our future independency. neceffity of keeping them up ceafes, that thofe that are not neceffary for guards and the troops fhall alío ceafe, I mean all garrifons at home. If this is done, the nation will be convinced, there is an alte ration of measures as well as men; and that the troops were not kept up to awe the people into a flavish dependence on - The speech of P. Furius Philus, on the refolutions of the committee of Feb. 19. being reported, relating to the army. Before the report, upon a motion made by this Gentleman, the members were fummoned to attend. [See Mag. 1742, p. 92, 3.] I Mr Prefident, DO not rife, Sir, to oppose any of the refolutions that have been now read to you, but only to take notice, that, when fome of those refolutions were agreed to in the committee, I mean particularly those relating to the marines, and the regiment in America, the committee was in fo great a confufion and disorder, that it was impoffible for any Gentleman who was not close to the table, to know what was doing. It is greatly for your honour, Sir, that you never fuffer any question to be put, without keeping the house to the ftricteft attention; and I hope that, for the future, before questions of this great importance are put in the committee, the chairman will take care to preserve the fame attention, that every Gentleman may have an opportunity of giving his diffent, as well as his affent, and that nothing may be obtained by furprise. men in power at home, but to retrieve the almoft loft honour and reputation of the nation abroad; that they were not kept up to make fine fhews in camps, and at reviews, but to do the nation real service; that they were not kept up to influence elections in England, but to restore the ba lance of power in Europe. These confiderations will make every man chearfully contribute his proportion to the expence of them. Give me leave to say a word more : When these fupplies are granted, I hope we fhall all join hand in hand to make inquiries, to redress grievances, and to pafs fuch wholfome bills as may effectually put it out of the power of any miniftry to mislead the King, to corrupt the parliament, to enflave the people. If thefe mea fares are taken, and I hope these measures will be taken, England will again rear its VOL. V. head, head, the mutual confidence that ought to fubfift between the King and his fubjects will be restored, and the fpirits of the people, which have been long depreffed with the weight of heavy taxes, without any profpect of relief, will be revived, trade and manufactures will flourish, and we shall indeed be a new people. The pro fpect of these things, Sir, is greatly pleafing; and the more fo, when we confider that they are in our power: let us then chearfully fet about this great work, and England will date the era of its happinefs from the glorious feffion of 1741. Some Speeches made April 29. when the refolution of the preceeding day, relating to the troops transferred from the Irish to the British eftablishment, was reported. Inferted here because of their connexion with what goes before. [See Mag. 1742, P. 193.1 The fpeech of P. Furius Philus. Mr Prefident, Attended yesterday, in the best manner I could, to the arguments that were ufed in the committee of the whole house, in favour of the troops now under your confideration; and they were drawn, either from the neceffity of fupplying the Queen of Hungary, in order to preferve the balance of power in Europe, or from the fear of an invafion from fome foreign power, in the absence of the 16,000 men that his Majefty has ordered to be fent into Flanders. As to the Queen of Hungary, I believe this houfe is unanimous in their opinion, that he ought to be fupported; and if the question had been, Whether the troops fhould be fent abroad to her affistance or not? that argument would have been proper, but has no relation at all to the prefent queftion. His Majefty has, without advifing with his parliament, thought fit to order thofe troops to imbark; and that matter is not now under our confideration: but I hope his minifters are fatisfied, that the Dutch and Hanover troops will act in concert with thofe troops; the imbarkation will then be highly proper and juftifiable, but otherwife mad and un accountable. As to the arguments drawn from the fear of an invafion, I cannot think Gentle men were in earnest when they made ufe of them. Our navy must be in a profound fleep, and our minifters void of intelligence, if they fuffer Spain to approach our coafts; and as to France, her finances are fo low, and fhe has fo many armies on foot, to make good her engagements to the new Emperor and her other allies, that it would be ridiculous to imagine fhe would attempt to invade us, especially when we have an army marching to her frontiers. our pay peo It was faid, a neceffity might arise of fending more troops abroad. If fo, will it not be time enough to fend troops abroad, directly from Ireland, when that neceffity appears? and cannot they be foon replaced by new-raised troops here? What argument then can be used for taking into this additional number of troops? None but what prevailed in the time of the late adminiftration, (but which I was in hopes would have died with them), That it is always neceffary to keep up a large ftanding army in England: A dangerous doctrine! and I will venture to say, that whoever advises a British King to delight in a ftanding army, is an enemy to his country, as it tends to enflave the ple, and, inftead of being a fecurity to the crown, alienates the affections of the fubject, and creates murmurings and jealoufies; for, when people feel, they will complain. And I cannot help expreffing the great furprife I was under yesterday, to hear fo many Gentlemen that are profeffed friends to liberty, advocates for the increase of our army. The fupplies already granted, amount to above five millions three hundred and eight thousand pounds; the imbarkation of the troops, as they consist of so many horfe and dragoons, will greatly increase that fum; and I am fure this nation is not in a condition to be at any expence that is not abfolutely neceffary for its fafety. That thefe 4000 men are neceffary for that end, I cannot at all believe, and therefore must give my negative to them, The Hon. Gent. [L. Valerius Flaccus] that made the motion yesterday in the committee, was pleafed to fay, that when the 16,000 men are imbarked, you would not have above 11,000 men left in the kingdom, I am fatisfied a lefs number will be fufficient in our prefent circum- ferve ourselves, by preferving the balance ftances for the fecurity of the kingdom; of power. Whether I concur in this gebut I beg leave to take notice, that the neral opinion, it is not now neceffary to 1600 men that are coming over from Mi- declare; but now, when it is refolved to norca, instead of those that are to be fent fend troops to her affiftance, and fome of there, are not included in that number; thofe troops are, for our domestick fecuneither are the marines; and tho' many rity, to be replaced by others, Gentlemen of these are abroad, yet they are not all; begin to find fault with both these meaI am fure many of the officers are at fures, because both must be attended with home, and they might foon raife men to a publick expence. ferve in the place of thofe that we have been obliged to fend to help to man the fleet. Shall we never have done increafing the forces? An army of 66,000 men is inconfiftent with the conftitution, and must one day ruin it. I was in hopes the redreffing of grievances would at least have kept pace with the granting of fupplies; but, alas! the one has quite diftanced the other; and the great expectations from this parliament will, I fear, end in nothing, but granting more forces and more money than has been granted in any parliament within the fo much talked of period of twenty years past. The fpeech of Valerius Lævinus. Mr Prefident, N all countries, especially in this, the We are told, that it will be mad and unaccountable to fend our troops abroad, unless we are well affured that thofe troops will be joined by the troops of fome other powers. Suppofe we were not sure of being joined by the troops of any other power in Europe, except thofe of the Queen of Hungary herfelf, yet I cannot think it will be either mad or unaccountable to fend a large body of troops over to Flanders; becaufe it will fhew, that we are not only willing, but ready to join with thofe other powers of Europe, who have certainly as great an intereft, and ought to have an equal concern for preferving a balance of power in Europe. There are several states and princes in Europe, who at present affect a neutrality, and yet we cannot fuppofe, they are quite eafy at I people their feeing the government, they expect to be fecured even from the approach of danger; and yet they grudge every expence which becomes neceffary for that purpose. This renders it popular to oppofe all publick measures, because every publick measure must be attended with a publick expence; and this very often, I believe, creates a prejudice in Gentlemen who are fond of popularity, which makes them judge amifs of almost every measure and every precaution that can be taken by the government. It is to this prejudice that I muft impute the oppofition which the meafure now under our confideration has met with: for, if we confider it impartially, and without prejudice, there can nothing, I think, appear more prudent or more reafonable. That the Queen of Hungary ought to be fupported, that the ought to be affilted, has been for fome time almoft the univerfal cry of this nation: We ought, they fay, to affift her, not only in confequence of our engagements, but in order to pre to the princes of Germany, and appropriating to itself the greatest part of Italy. Even the princes of Germany themselves, who at prefent continue neutral, and perhaps fome of thofe who are now joined in alliance with France, may be prevailed on to join in a confederacy for pulling down, or at least for prefcribing bounds to the overgrown power of that monarchy, as foon as they fee the armies of Britain upon the continent, and ready to protect them againft that power which, in their prefent fituation, they find they cannot refift. This is an effect which this nation has, I am fure, great reafon to wifh for; and as the tranfporting a body of our troops to Flanders, will be attended but with a very fmall additional expence, and can be attended with no other inconvenience, I think it is worth our while to make the trial, even tho' we be not previously affured, that either the Dutch, or any other ftate in Europe, will join their troops with ours, or enter into any confederacy for the I 2 fupport of the Queen of Hungary, or for limiting the ambitious views of the house of Bourbon. From hence I hope, Sir, it will appear, that the imbarkation of our troops can in no cafe be deemed mad or unaccountable; but, when we send our troops out of the kingdom, it would certainly be both mad and unaccountable to leave this island destitute of a fufficient number of troops for its defence, and for fecuring its domeftick tranquillity. Whatever others may think of the difaffected party amongst us, I have fo great an attachment to our prefent happy establishment, and to the Royal family now upon our throne, that I am ftill jealous of that party, and apprehenfive of their power, True love, they fay, is always mixed with jealoufy; and this makes me dread every opportunity, the difaffect ed may think they have got, for putting their designs in execution. There are ftill many Gentlemen of figure and fortune amongst us, who openly profefs their attachment to the pretender; there is a fort of enthufiaftical spirit of difaffection that till prevails among the vulgar, and, I am afraid, there is by far too great a number of men of all ranks and conditions, who now feem to be true friends to the Proteftant fucceffion, that would declare them felves otherwife, if they thought they could do fo without running any great or unequal rifs. Thefe confiderations fhall always make me jealous of the Jacobite party's getting any opportunity to rebel; and this they have always thought they had, and always will think they have, when they fee the nation deftitute of troops: for which reafon, I fhall always be for keep ing in the island, in time of war, as well as in time of peace, fuch a number of regular troops as may be fufficient for awing them into obedience. But the danger of an infurrection at home, is far from being the only danger we have to apprehend from not having in the ifland a fufficient number of troops for our defence. The danger of an invafion from abroad, with the pretender at the head of it, is equally to be apprehended; and the nature of thefe two dangers is fuch, that each contributes to the increase of the other. We are now in actual war with Spain, and as we are vaftly fuperior in naval force, even tho' fhe fhould be openly affifted by France, fhe can expect no fuccefs: fhe muft dread the effects and the event of that war, unless she can raise some domeftick combustion amongst us. Muft we not then expect, is it not certain, that fhe will use every art that can be thought of, for throwing 8 or 10,000 of her beft troops into this island, with the pretender and fome of his adherents at their head? And is it not as certain, that, upon their landing in any part of the island, they would be joined, not only by all the dif affected, but by all thofe of defperate fortunes, who are always more ready to join in overturning, than in fupporting an eftablifhed government; because, from their fuccefs in the former, they must expect greater encouragement than they can expect from their fuccefs in the latter. Spain, we know, has a fufficient number of troops to fpare for this purpose; and we know, what a fmall number of fhips would be fufficient for tranfporting 10,000 foot and difmounted dragoons from Spain to the fouthern or fouth-weft parts of this island for they would have no occafion to transport horfe to a country where horses are fo plenty, and which is fo much inclosed, that horfe can in very few places come to a regular engagement. Twenty or thirty good merchant-fhips would be fufficient for fuch a purpofe; and thefe might be provided, the troops imbarked, and even landed here, before our court could have any intelligence of the defign; which would have been the cafe in the year 1718, if their fleet had not at that time met with an accidental ftorm and contrary winds. Our navy, Sir, may be useful, it will al ways be fufficient, I hope, to defend us againft a formidable invafion; because we muft have intelligence of the defign, long before the neceffary preparations can be made for fuch an invafion, and may, by a fuperior fquadron, lock the enemy's fleet up in their port, before it can be ready to fail: but against a fudden invafion with a fmall force, fuch as I have mentioned, our navy can never be a fufficient fecurity. For defending us against such an invafion, we must always have a fufficient number of troops in the island; and I must leave to to Gentlemen to confider, what a woful and dangerous condition we should be in, if 10,000 of the veteran troops of Spain were landed in the fouthern or weitern parts of this island, and we had but 10 or 12,000 regular troops in the whole island. They might march to our capital, drive the Royal family and all its friends from thence, and place the pretender upon the throne, before we could bring an equal number of our regular troops together to oppose them; and if they could do this, who can say, that our regular army itself, or a great part of it, would not declare in favour of the invaders ? The danger of an invafion from Spain, is not therefore fuch a bugbear as fome Gentlemen seem inclined to reprefent it; but, upon fending our troops to Flanders, Spain is not then the only country from whence an invafion may be justly apprehended. The defign of our fending our troops into Flanders is well known: it must be to circumfcribe the views of France, or directly to attack that kingdom. Either of these will make France our enemy, and will induce that court to contrive, if poffible, how to make an invasion upon us. They are, 'tis true, at present at a great expence: they have loft great armies in Germany; they have ftill great armies there: but they have likewife great armies of regular troops at home, much more than would be fufficient for making an invafion upan us, if we had but 10 or 12,000 regular troops in the whole island; and they now fee, that they will be in danger of lofing all the money they have fpent, and all the blood they have fpilt, without being able to reap any benefit to themselves, unless they can divert the power of this nation by raising a civil war amongst ourselves. Can we fuppofe, that in these circumftances they will not attempt making an invafion upon us, if by our own misconduct we put it any way in their power? By the fuperiority of our naval force, and by keeping a strong squadron in the channel, we may prevent their being able to make an invafion upon us with any formidable army but, confidering how many ports they have within a few hours fail of our coaft; how many fhips, fishing-veffels, and barks fit for transporting foldiers in fuch a fhort voyage, they have in every port; and how well acquainted their fmugglers are with every creek and corner of our fhore, we must admit, that it would be very eafy for them to imbark and land 10 or 12,000 of their best troops upon our fouthern coaft, before we could any way hear of their defign, or fend any fquadron to difappoint them; and this, we may depend on it, they would attempt, if they knew that we had no fufficient number of regular troops to march and attack theirs as foon as landed. I must therefore think, it would be the height of madness in us, to leave this island deftitute of a number of troops fufficient for defending us against any invafion that can be made fuddenly and at unawares; and as the army we have now in this ifland, together with the troops to be brought from Ireland, is no more than fufficient for that purpose, I cannot but approve of their being brought hither, and muft therefore be for providing for their fubfiftence. Our army, Sir, as it is at prefent modelled and commanded, is fo far from being dangerous either to the liberty or property of the subject, that I think it the fureft pledge we have for the quiet enjoyment of both. I thought fo under the late administration; I fhall think fo under every adminiftration, unless I fee an attempt made to model it so as to make it fit for ferving the ends of those that may aim at arbitrary power. And as to the millions we have raised, or may be obliged to raise, I wonder to hear them complained of by Gentlemen, who, upon former occafions, exclaimed fo much against our inactivity, and who have lately appeared fo fanguine for fupporting the Queen of Hungary. Surely they do not think, that war is to be carried on without the aid of millions; or that our foldiers and feamen are to fight their battles for them, without the ufual fubfiftence. I wish we could raise ten times as many millions as we do; I am fure I fhould think the whole well bestowed, if thereby we could procure a fafe and honourable peace both for Europe and ourselves. We may perhaps, Sir, (for I have not made the calculation), have at present above 60,000 foldiers, if all the regiments were compleat, befides foreign |