fessor, is equal to that of Pythagoras. The difference between discovering the existence of God from the phenomena of nature, and being able, after God is talked of, to prove his existence from these phenomena, is so well expressed by Cicero after Aristotle, that with his words I shall conclude this letter, after exhorting you, when you have done with BENTLEY and CLARKE, and KING, and WOLLASTON, to read PALEY'S Natural Theology without interruption. *

Præclare Aristoteles, SI ESSENT, inquit, qui sub terra semper habitavissent bonis et illustribus domiciliis, quæ essent ornata signis atque picturis, instructaque rebus iis omnibus, quibus abundant ii, qui beati putantur, nec tamen exissent unquam supra terrorem; accepissent autem FAMA et AUDITIONE esse quoddam numen, et vim deorum: deinde aliquo tempore patefactis terræ faucibus, ex illis abditis sedibus evadere in hæc loca, quæ nos incolimus, atque exire potuissent: cum repente terram et maria, cœlumque vidissent; nubium magnitudinem, ventorumque vim cognovissent, adspexissentque solem, ejusque tum magnitudinem, pulchritudinemque tum etiam effici

* It will likewise be of great advantage to study, especially in Mosheim's Latin version, Cudworth's intellectual system of the universe, where you will find every species of ancient atheism, into which, as a mine, the moderns have digged for their systems, completely exposed in all its nakedness. The study of this great work, however, may be postponed till you have made yourself more completely master of the Christian system.

entiam cognovissent, quod is diem efficeret, toto cœlo luce diffusa cum autem terras nox opacasset, tum cœlum totum cernerent astris distinctum, et ornatum lunæque luminum varietatem, tum crescentis tum senescentis, eorumque omnium ortus et occasus, atque in omni æternitate ratos, immutabileisque cursus; hæc cum viderent, profecto et esse Deos, et hæc tanta opera deorum esse, arbitrarentur.-De Nat. Deorum, Lib. II. Cap. 37.

LETTER IV.

REMARKS ON THE DUTIES OF NATURAL RELIGION, AND ON THE DIFFERENT THEORIES OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

HAVING, in the preceding Letter, shown by what means you may make yourself acquainted with such truths as can be inferred, concerning the existence and attributes of God, from the phenomena of Nature, I proceed now to inquire what duties may be proved to be obligatory on mankind from their natural relation to each other as fellow-creatures, and to Him as the Creator and Governor of the universe. The subject of my last letter was, in propriety of language, natural THEOLOGY, as the subject of this will be natural RELIGION.

We cannot here take either Dr Clarke or Mr Wollaston for our guide, though the works of both deserve to be read, for they place moral obligation on a foundation different from the will of God, as Cudworth and many other eminent divines had done before them, and as Dr Price and others have done since. All these authors, indeed, agree, that

it is the will of God that mankind should practise virtue, and that he will reward those who are obedient, and punish those who are not; but, according to them, the obligation to the practice of virtue arises not from the will of God, but from a certain fitness or suitableness of things to each other, considered abstractly.

"That there are," says Dr Clarke, the most perspicuous writer of this school,—“ different relations of things one towards another, is as certain as that there are different things in the world. That from these different relations of different things there necessarily arises an agreement or disagreement of some things to others, or a fitness or unfitness of the application of different things or different relations one to another, is likewise as certain as that there is any difference in the nature of things, or that different things do exist. Farther, that there is a fitness or suitableness of certain circumstances to certain persons, and an unsuitableness of others, founded in the nature of things and in the qualifications of persons, antecedent to will, and to all arbitrary or positive appointment whatever, must unavoidably be acknowledged by every one who will not affirm that it is equally fit and suitable in the nature and reason of things, that an innocent being should be extremely and eternally miserable, as that it should be free from such misery. There is therefore such a thing as fitness and unfitness, eternally, necessarily, and unchangeably, in the nature and reason of things. Now what these relations of things abso

lutely and necessarily are in themselves, that also they appear to be, to the understanding of all intelligent beings, except those only who understand things to be what they are not, that is, whose understandings are either very imperfect or very much depraved. And by this understanding or knowledge of the natural and necessary relations of things, the actions likewise of all intelligent beings are constantly directed, unless their will be corrupted by particular interest or affection, or swayed by some unreasonable and prevailing lust." *

"This," he says, "is the true ground and foundation of all morality;" and elsewhere he adds, "That these eternal and necessary differences of things make it fit and reasonable for all rational creatures so to act; they cause it to be their duty, or lay an obligation upon them, so to do; even separate from the consideration of these rules being the positive will or command of God; and also antecedent to any respect or regard, expectation or apprehension, of any particular, private and personal advantage or disadvantage, reward or punishment, either present or future, annexed either by natural consequence, or by positive appointment, to the practising or neglecting of these rules. "+

Were morality practicable on this principle, were mankind to be uniformly just and wise in all their

* Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, p. 106, Tenth Edition.

+ Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion, p. 4, Tenth Edition.