es men with the best excuse in the world, for yielding themselves up to the government of their fleshly appetites and passions. It teaches them that, being sinners by nature, or constitutional infection, they must continue such, until released by some foreign and powerful arm ! Ours, on the contrary, sweeps away all such refuges of lies, shows them that they have no sin but their own, and, that there is no excuse for it under the sun. (5.) The light in which the subject is here viewed, is more likely than the other to enlist all hands and hearts, in order to arrest the progress of moral evil. Whilst men believe that sin springs from a constitutional depravity, which they neither contracted, nor can remove, it is not to be expected that any thing like a general effort will be made for the reformation of mankind; but let it be understood, that every man's sin is the consequence of his own misconduct only—that he is required to change his wicked course, and may do it, with the means which he now possesses; and, that every moment of delay, is at the risk of his salvation, present, and eternal; then may we hope for the regeneration of our guilty race. We do not set aside, or under value the grace of God, which brings salvation to all men. But we think it is wrong, and of most pernicious tendency, to represent the Almighty as the sole agent in man's conversion. Nothing is more false, or unscriptural. Our firm conviction is, that, if the conversion of the world had depended upon God only, it would have taken place long since. The advocates of what is called sovereign grace,

have done more, perhaps, to retard the great work of moral reform, than all other obstacles which have laid in its way. (6.) Our view is in perfect accordance with what we know of the philosophy of man. It is the union of the rational and animal natures of man, which renders him a subject of moral government.* From the appetites and passions, which belong to the animal nature,

"What is done according to the animal part of our nature, which is common to us with the brute animals, is in itself neither virtuous nor vicious, but perfectly indifferent. Then only it becomes vicious, when it is done in opposition to some principle of superior importance and authority. And it may be virtuous, if done for some good or worthy end.

"When appetite is opposed by some principle drawing a contrary way, there must be a determination of the will, [as to] which shall prevail; and this determination may be, in a moral sense, right or wrong.

"But it may happen, that, when appetite draws one way, it may be opposed, not by any appetite or passion, but by some cool principle of action, which has authority without any impulsive force: For example, by some interest, which is too distant to raise any passion or emotion; or by some consideration of decency, or of duty.

"In cases of this kind, the man is convinced that he ought not to yield to appetite, yet there is not an equal or a greater impulse to oppose it. There are circumstances, indeed, that convince the judgement, but these are not sufficient to determine the will against a strong appetite, without selfgovernment. "The man who suffers himself to be led by appetite to do what he knows he ought not to do, has an immediate and natural conviction that he did wrong, and might have done otherwise; and therefore he condemns himself, and confesses that he yielded to an appetite which ought to have been under his command.

"Thus it appears, that though our natural appetites have in themselves neither virtue nor vice, though the acting merely from appetite, when there is no principle of greater authority to oppose it, be a matter indifferent; yet there may be a great

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we are in perpetual danger of doing wrong. because those appetites and passions are in themselves sinful; but because their full and unrestrained indulgence cannot be allowed, without infringing on the rights of others. The relation in which we stand to our brethren of the human family, requires the exercise of selfgovernment-requires that the bodily appetites shall be under the dominion and control of reason. This is a subject, however which is but little considered. The art of self-government is scarcely known or practised in the land-this land of bibles and christian ordinances! The great mass of the population is governed more by appetite and passion, than by the dictates of sober reason. Not, indeed, because they approve of such a course, for they condemn it in themselves and others. They have a conviction that their conduct is improper, and opposed to the laws of their maker, and their own sense of duty. But the ten thousand voices which are raised in defence of the doctrine-the pestiferous doctrine of propagated sin, drown the voice of reason, of conscience, and of revelation; they tell the sinner, that, contrary as it is to duty, to reason, and to the high authority of heaven, for men to live in sin, yet it must be so. Their nature is corrupted, their life cannot but be impure! And as all evil doers, from Adam to the present day, are, less or more, ashamed of their conduct, and seek an excuse for

deal of virtue or of vice in the management of our appetites; and that the power of self-government is necessary for their regulation”. Dr. Reid on the mind, Vol. iii. Essay iii. Chap. 1.

it, they are here furnished with the very best that could have been invented. The ground on which we account for human depravity and guilt, not only deprives transgressors of this pretext-this apology for crime; but it gives that solution of the origin and nature of moral evil, which is in agreement with our genuine convictions of right and wrong, of duty and obligation; and which accords best with the true philosophy of man, in whose composition are united, the amazing extremes of animal, and spiritual—of sensual and intellectual, being.

SECTION V.

Sin cannot be pardoned without an Atonement.

Ir may, at first sight, appear somewhat strange, that he, who possesses all power, and all authority, in heaven and on earth, should not be able to forgive sin, unless some atonement, or satisfaction be made in behalf of the offender. It will be necessary, therefore, to attempt, by a few observations, to substantiate the truth of the proposition which heads this section. We observe then,

1. That God's individual right is not all that is concerned in the affair of man's forgiveness. Had the conduct of the sinner affected none but the Almighty

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himself, it is easy to perceive, in that case, that he might have been pardoned without the consideration of any propitiatory sacrifice being offered. All that would have

been necessary, under such circumstances, was the sincere repentance and reformation of the offender. Το say that God could not have pardoned in that case, would be to limit him, in the exercise of his power, when there was nothing to limit the exercise thereof; and to bind him, where every other intelligent being is left free! To say that he would not forgive, when there was nothing to prevent the exercise of his clemency, is to divest his character of moral goodness, which consists in the giving up of individual right in favour of the needy; and to declare, that, where his own rights only are concerned, he will grant no favour, until he shall have received private satisfaction! This would indeed be reducing the benevolence of the Deity to the standard of selfish man! And would not the same principle conduct us to the absurd conclusion, that no favour ever was, or ever will be bestowed? For if no favour be granted until an equivalent has been received; or granted only where no sacrifice of individual right has been made, it ceases, under those circumstances, to be a favour. It cannot be denied therefore that sin might be forgiven, without an atonement, did the sinner stand related to none but the gracious and merciful creator.

2. But although we may clearly perceive the possibility, and even propriety of God's forgiving an offender,