might be desirable. Our ships resting on Sierra Leone and Gibraltar must calculate on operating at 1,200 miles from either station; that is, they must be prepared to steam to a spot 1,200 miles off, fight there, and return, or steam another 1,200 miles in a different direction. That is, their coal supply must exceed that necessary to steam 2,400 miles. But in discussing the coal supply necessary for a ship protecting the great castern routes, we allowed a steaming capacity of 3,500 miles; therefore any ship whose propulsive power is based on the necessities of the eastern routes, is so far competent to deal with the northern part of the outward southern route, even if she is deprived of her very probable coal depôts at Madeira, the Azores, and the Cape de Verdes. The northern part of the homeward southern commercial route is not geographically so convenient for defence as the outward route just treated of. There is a point in that route in latitude 30° north and longitude 35° west, which is nearly equally distant from all the English naval stations surrounding it, or, speaking quite roughly, 1,600 miles from St. John's, Bermuda, Barbadoes, Sierra Leone, and Gibraltar. That is, if there were no alliance with Portugal, our ships might have to steam 1,600 miles to that spot, fight there, and return 1,600 miles, making in all 3,200 miles. But after all, we are no worse here than we were in the far cast, (paragraph 25), and the propulsive power of coal for 3,500 miles found necessary there, would be a sufficient supply even for this extreme case. But including as usual the Portuguese Islands of Cape de Verde and the Azores as our assured friends, there would be a quadrilateral of coaling stations, none of which were more than 1,100 miles from the most distant point within it. So that a ship furnished with 3,500 miles of coal, might go to the centre spot, and cruise, or lie there till she had spent nearly half her remaining coal, before she was called on to return for replenishment. On the other hand, setting Portugal aside, there is no power in so good a geographical position for attacking this route as we are for defending it.

29. South of the Line, no European State is geographically as well prepared to interrupt our lines of traffic as we are to secure them. Brazil, indeed, and the Southern States of South America, would, if hostile, seriously menace geographically the whole of the route south of the Line to the Pacific, and the northern portion of that to the Cape, and the Indian Ocean. But I think that these States must be regarded as either neutral or friendly. If allied with us, which would be their natural condition with their commerce at our mercy, all our routes in the South Atlantic would be practically secure. If neutral, our bases of operation must be Ascension, St. Helena, Simon's Bay, and the Falkland Islands. This quadrilateral is so much larger than the northern one spoken of in a previous paragraph, that there is a point within it, perhaps 1,800 miles from any English naval station, and supposing the South American States inimical, there would be some difficulty in protecting from such distant points, the outward traffic to the Cape of Good Hope, and both outward and homeward traffic to the Pacific, seeing that the track lies along the hostile coast. But here it is not impossible that nature has placed at our command

the means of meeting these difficulties, and of establishing a geographical control over this part of the ocean, sufficient for all practical purposes, even without alliances. A hostile Brazil would place Fernando Noronha at our discretion. Further south is Trinidad, with an anchorage, which though described as "unsafe" in the old days of sailing ships, might not be unavailable to the modern men-of-war as a coal depôt. South-east again lies Tristan da Cuna, with its "abundance of vegetables, bread, bacon, eggs, butter, milk, poultry, beef, and mutton." This was a British naval station in 1815, and clearly might, at a time of pressure, come under its old rulers. True the anchorage remains marked "unsafe," but steam and chain cables have not been without their influence on the safety of anchorages. Trinidad, Tristan da Cuna, and the Falkland Islands, form a triangle within which there is no point at a greater distance from one of the three others forming it, than perhaps 1,200 miles, and therefore, with the coal supply premised for ships guarding the eastern route, the South Atlantic routes might also be guarded, even without alliances: but much more easily with those which would in all probability be made. The homeward route from the Cape may be dismissed in a sentence. It coincides with the nerve running from Simon's Bay through St. Helena and Ascension, and as these stations are not 1,500 miles apart, the geographical command of the track is complete. When we follow the eastern branch of the South Atlantic commercial stream round the Cape, we find a nerve 2,200 miles long, running from Simon's Bay to Mauritius, which may be broken at Natal, so that the longest nerve should not exceed 1,500 miles. At Mauritius we connect with the eastern nerve system which has been already discussed.

30. The western branch of the great southern trade route passes into the Pacific and follows the coast line to the north. The nerve system here is the most defective of any, and it is evident it cannot be preserved unbroken without alliances, or a class of ship altogether more fully provided than those which are capable of guarding the routes already treated of. There is nowhere in the world so large a Nor are space of ocean unstudded by British possessions, as the great triangle formed by the Falklands, Fiji, and Vancouver's Island. there within that space many points which are suitable for being converted into naval stations. There may be some spot in the Low Archipelago capable of affording a moderately smooth-water anchorage, and perhaps Easter Island might become a depôt as a temporary expedient; but France and America already possess the Pacific Islands most eligible for affording support to ships operating within the triangle. On the other hand, the whole of the American Pacific States It south of Mexico, are so situated, that their interest would lie in an alliance with that power which had the chief command of the sea. appears to me that on such alliances the safety of the eastern Pacific If these alliances were not contracted by us, trade route must rest. inimical European Powers would at least meet us in the Pacific on equal terms, a thing which it is of vital importance to us to prevent. Neglect on our part to form these alliances, and to place a suitable force in the Pacific to rest upon, and at the same time to sustain them, C 2

would indeed leave our trade route open to the attacks of hostile "Alabamas," and would practically leave us no other resource but "counter-Alabamas," a state of things which would undoubtedly cause the disappearance of the English flag from those waters. Mexican ports might be less open to us than those more to the south, for if the United States were mixed up in the war, they would be able to bring pressure to bear on Mexico by land, and so force her into neutrality. In a European war, in which the United States were distinctly neutral, Mexican ports would be available to us so long as we held the sea on both her coasts. The Sandwich Islands being quite at the mercy of the power holding the sea, might also be calculated on to sustain that power, and so remove some of the defects exhibited by the Pacific as a British nerve-system. But I hold it futile to attempt the defence of the Pacific trade route by any description of vessels which must rest for their supplies on Vancouver, Fiji, and the Falkland Islands. With a friendly coast from the Straits of Magellan to Panama, I do not think it is so difficult to defend the trade routes of the Pacific with ships of the propulsive powers designed for other parts of the world. Were the United States hostile, and did they carry Mexico with them, the Island of Guadaloupe, with a moderately sheltered anchorage, lying directly in the track from Panama to Vancouver, might be made available as a depôt, and would reduce the length of the nerve to one quite under control.

31. The north-eastern commercial route, and the method of preserving it intact, do not require much discussion. It is liable to interruptions only by the Great European powers, and we know by experience that so far as Russia is concerned, naval forces resting on temporary bases in the Baltic are quite competent to preserve it. The forces necessary to blockade those ports whence might issue our enemies' " Alabamas," would by the act of blockade preserve the trade route intact.

32. There remains now only the south-western route, that to the West Indies, to be dealt with; but a glance at the chart will show that practically we have already done so. When the means are provided for protecting the southern and western routes, that which lies between them is already protected. Once past the line joining Bermuda and Barbadoes, the British traders come into a perfect network of naval stations, all close together, and offering a system of naval bases not equalled in any other part of the world.

33. We have now fairly examined the whole of the marvellous chain of posts which constitute the strength of the British Naval Empire. We have seen that, depending on British territory alone for supplies, ships capable of steaming at a given moderate speed for 3,500 miles, may everywhere, except in the Pacific, pass from point to point under steam alone. In the Pacific it is seen that, either ships must be independent of coal supply, or they cannot operate when resting alone on British naval stations; but we also know that to be without coal supply is to lay the whole trade route open to depredators of the "Alabama" class. We see also that everywhere on our trade routes there lie either the territories of small States capable of alliances

offensive or defensive with us, or else those desolate spots which, turned into coal depôts, become all that we require. Our great conclusion therefore is, that our Naval Empire depends upon coal supply: that capacity for coal stowage is the first requirement of a British man-ofwar. That she must use the wind as an auxiliary only-to be cheated Such, we see, must be our when foul, and to be used when fair. "propulsive policy," while it can be that of no other nation at war with us. No other nation has these coal depôts under her lee even if she had the coal to place in them—and all other nations must therefore, in attacking our trade routes, reverse our propulsive policy. They must have great sail power, and their steam must be reserved for fighting purposes. It appears to me impossible for such ships to seriously attack commercial lines guarded by other ships practically independent of the wind; though they would of course meet British ships depending greatly on sail power on an equality.

34. The study of our geographical condition, therefore, determines the ratio which steam is to bear to sail power, and determines it If 3,500 miles was an impossible altogether in favour of the former. coal supply for a ship, then indeed our geographical studies would not have led to much; but we know that if all other things give way to this one quality of coal-carrying capacity, there is no difficulty about it, and I should myself put 4,000 miles at 5 knots, as the least amount of coal stowage proper for an English man-of-war.

35. But before leaving finally the geographical part of my essay, it is worth while to note how a sort of destiny has possessed us not only with a command over all the great commercial routes, but with the GATES of these routes. Egypt, it is well understood now, is tied to us by bonds of friendship and interest, and gives us the gate of the Red Sea route to the East; we already hold the gate of the Mediterranean, and the outer gate of the Red Sea. Galle is the gate leading to the east and south-east trade routes. Singapore, that of the China and Japan highways. The Cape of Good Hope forms the gate of all eastern trade routes in the southern hemisphere; while the Falkland Islands command the gate of all western roads by water there. Possessed of these gates; how are enemies to pass them? If they do pass them, what hopes are there of success against our trade, so long as we hold our chain of posts intact, with sufficient maritime forces resting on them? The answer is clear-None.1

36. But I have set out with a statement, or a promise, that my scheme for war purposes would rest on our peace requirements, and of that the two things are not so antagonistic as they might be thought. expense Here I may be asked how I am to reconcile the tremendous a fleet depending almost wholly on steam power with peace estimates? In answer, I deny the "tremendous expense," and I assert that it is more than probable that a peace fleet formed on the principle that sail power is the merest auxiliary, would be cheaper than the present one is, where in most cases steam and sail fight for the mastery.

It will be clearly seen that up to this point I have done little more than amplify the views of Captain J. C. R. Colomb on "Imperial Defence," taking—as I am bound to do--the more naval view of the question.

This is a question of facts, and although I have not space to give all the facts, I can give as many as are necessary to prove my case. In the first place, let it be laid to heart that the estimate for coal to be purchased by the Admiralty was, for 1876, but £113,000; while raw hemp, canvas, and some minor articles of like nature, were expected to cost £123,000. Next, I must point out that I have made a very close examination of the economical results of sail power, as applied to an ironclad, through two years' service, and to a gun-vessel through some 15 months. I should state that the ironclad had a sail area equal to four square feet per ton of displacement, while the gunvessel had 16 square feet. As to the ironclad, I found, I think beyond the possibility of doubt, that her masts and sails cost the country, partly in coal, partly in wear and tear, and partly in interest on capital, not less than £2,000 a-year over and above what the ship would have cost had she been entirely mastless. As regards the gunvessel, I traced her minutely over a voyage of 6,100 miles, of which only 1,800 were done under steam, with or without sail, and 4,300 were done under sail alone. The wind was fair and strong for more than seven-tenths of the voyage, and the foul winds never exceeded the force of five. Under such circumstances, the resort to sail only, delayed her voyage by about 14 per cent. Supposing she had had no masts or sails, that the fair wind would not help her in any way, and that the masts and sails as existing did not in any way retard her when the wind was foul; then it is possible to say that this ship, while reducing her speed as above, did actually save 60 per cent. of her coal on this particular passage, so very favourable to such result. But being here concerned with the money cost, we must ask several questions. Suppose the ship, even as she stood, had steamed at the reduced speed forced on her by the resort to sail, would she not have made a probable saving? Can we truly say that fair winds, even without any sail, do not make an economy on coal? Is it not true that masts and yards do in fact greatly retard a ship when steaming against foul winds? What was the cost in wear and tear, and interest, of the sail power? Lastly, this ship had 3 of light foul winds to 7 of strong fair winds, suppose we allow 1 for the difference of force, and say that she had 2 foul to 8 fair winds; and suppose we strike a proportion, allowing that a ship must expect as much foul as fair wind, what shall we get as the result? To answer the last question, and the rest with it, we get her average gross saving at no more that 37 per cent. from which we must deduct the loss due to foul winds acting on masts and yards, and the gain due to fair winds acting on a mastless hull, as well as the probable saving due to the reduced speed. When I followed this gunvessel to conditions where fairer averages may be taken, I got a gross saving of coal, without any per contras whatever, such as I have noted above, of 5 per cent. only. In this case the struggle to make a steamer a sailing ship, or a sailing ship a steamer, whichever way it may be looked at, has resulted in a ship very helpless indeed under all circumstances requiring propulsive power. Space does not permit me to go more into this question at present, I have brought this forward to throw the onus probandi on those who differ from me.