traverse. This traverse, if necessary, was built up to 12 or 14 feet high, revetted with sods. Beneath the traverses were shelters and magazines for a few rounds only. The inside of the embrasures and gun-pit, and lower part of traverses were revetted with hurdle-work very neatly put together, the stakes used being quite 2 inches in diameter. The hurdle-work was carried up to a height of nearly 5 feet. Around each traverse, and in all places where men had to move, trenches were cut about 5 feet deep, so as to ensure as much as possible the safety of all. In front and on the flanks of the line in which the guns stood. and at a distance of about 120 yards, was a solid earthen parapet about 20 feet thick, revetted with gabions; this acted as a screen. The ditch between the parapet and the sunk pits in which stood the guns, was cut down perfectly straight with steps cut in places to get down by. Aim was taken by small pointed sticks placed in the ground on the crest of the parapet. The trench that ran round the traverses was continued beyond the outer gun of each battery, and on the side of the trench next the front, were dug little cabins. These being dug out of the solid earth were, of course, perfectly safe. The only difference between the howitzer batteries and the 6-inch ones was that the embrasures of the latter were a little more cut away. There were always three look-out men when firing was going on; one with a telescope on a tripod to note the effect of the shots of his own battery; one to watch the jets of smoke from the battery opposed to it, so as to give timely notice of the coming shell, and the usual sentry to keep everybody out of the way except those on duty. The effect of these men really doing what they were set to do, and the effect of keeping every man not on duty under cover, was that the Russian losses were wonderfully small, 24 killed. The number of wounded I could not find out. The distance the 16 batteries were spread over, was 13 kilometres (8,1 miles). Coming back to our standpoint at No. 7 Battery, we have 4 miles occupied by guns on each side. In front, and close to, is a line of pickets and sentries, further on, at the edge of the wood, is another line; again, nearer Ruschuck on the river bank, is the third and most advanced line. Behind us, in a circle that runs to the front of Giurgevo on the one side, to the end of the line of guns at the other, are tall poles standing in twos, placed in the best positions for being seen. Round these poles are twisted tarred straw bands; these are the beacon posts. Behind again, and at a distance of 4 miles, is the reserve, a regular little army Of 4 infantry battalions, say 2 cavalry 2 batteries field artillery, 8 guns 750 = 3,000 100 4,300 4,300 men and 16 guns. The order for the commander of the beacon posts was to light his beacon if the enemy approached, so that the reserve could get quickly up to the right spot. The posts were probably put up in anticipation of Turkish raids when the Danube was frozen over. The fighting, as it then was, consisted generally of a duel between two batteries, the Russians always beginning it, and the Turks replying shot for shot. The latter also got through a certain amount of rifle ammunition, firing across the river at the sentries; they also occasionally fired canister at the soldiers sent to cut wood on the island. I watched the bombardment from a very good position, where I could see the effect of shells from both sides. The practice was certainly very good, especially that of the Turks, shells frequently catching just the crest of the parapet. I also went down to the river, and had a good look at the Turkish line of sentries through a glass, and came to the conclusion from their movements that they were short of clothes. I watched several of them that lined the curved river bank down stream of Ruschuck, and every one of these men betrayed symptoms of cold. I then looked at the Russian lines, and found the men walking about in their usual leisurely fashion. The importance of this cannot be overrated. One man comes off his post fresh and well, ready to eat, sleep, and be watchful again; the other has to contend with a regular drain on his constitution, and every fresh exposure renders him less able to bear the next, till at last you heard of a case such as was reported the day I arrived at Giurgevo, a Turkish outpost of eight men frozen to death. on. And now a word about a Russian soldier's clothes. His sheepskin coat with the wool inside is slit down at the neck sufficiently far for him to pall it on, this slit buttoning up high when It fits him tight about the waist, the skirts made like those of a frock coat reach to the calf of his leg. His boots, particularly well made, reach above his knees. His gloves are good warm woollen ones, but with only a thumb to them, the place for his fingers being a kind of bag. Instead of socks, he has a triangular shaped piece of canvas stuff that he rolls round his foot, this in spite of the clumsiness of its appearance seems to answer well. I could find no men suffering from sore feet. I must add, however, that most troops at this time were stationary, so my experience is not worth much. The garment above all others that he seems to value most is his hood. This hood has long ends to it, and is made of a thick, soft, warm stuff, brown in colour, having the appearance of felt. Its uses are numerous. The soldier uses it as a comforter, the two long ends coming under his arms and tied round his waist. Getting a little colder he folds the hood flat and puts the garment on so that the flat hood stands up at the back of his head and protects his ears, the ends still being long enough to tie round his waist. Lastly, he puts the hood on, brings the ends twice round his neck and ties them there; in this state you have to bend down to about his waist belt and look upwards if you want to see his face at all. Condition of Transport between Bucharest and Sistova on 8th January, when the Danube was full of ice but not frozen over. After the breaking of the bridges between Sistova and Zimnitza, communication was kept up by pontoons rowed by sailors. The river was full of ice, which rendered this service a dangerous one. Seventeen persons were drowned on the 8th attempting the passage in a private boat. The trip formerly occupying about 15 to 30 minutes took then from one to three hours, sometimes even longer. The pontoons were crowded with Officers on duty, and deeply laden with money in boxes and sheepskin coats. No other goods were taken. On 6th and 7th January, fog interrupted this traffic, and it was often interrupted by the same cause. What everybody hoped for was hard frost to freeze the Danube over, and so allow of the full passage of the stores the Russian Army so urgently needed. Enormous quantities of provisions and clothing were stacked in Zimnitza, carts daily arriving with more. Hay was not to be bought; the draft cattle fed alone on Indian corn died in great numbers, and the difficulties, always great of transporting supplies from the railway at Frateshti and Giurgevo, were increased greatly by this cause alone? The principle upon which animals were worked here was simply to work them to death. Every street and lane in Zimnitza was strewn with dead ponies and bullocks; ponies mere skin and bone, unable to do a day's more work, were turned adrift on the snow-covered plain to meet a certain, cruel, lingering death. The question arose, whence are the ranks daily thinned of draught cattle, to be filled. Carts from all the surrounding countries were then to be seen in Zimnitza. Bulgaria, Bessarabia, Hungaria, Wallachia, Moldavia, were all represented by both man and beast. Carters unable to fulfil their contracts of delivering their loads in Sistova, and ruined by the war prices, daily ran away, leaving the contractors under whom they worked, losers by reason of the large advances already made them. In the railway station at Bucharest at this time was an enormous number of sacks containing bread and biscuit. Sheepskin coats made in Russia for the army and sent away thence two months before, had not only not been delivered in Bucharest, but it was not known where they were, so great was the confusion. All these things had to be forwarded by the carts I have alluded to, as at Zimnitza or on the road between Frateshti and that place, or else by the new line of railway just constructed between these two places. With regard to the old railway that runs between Bucharest and Giurgevo, in two places it was so exposed, that the slightest wind drifted the snow over the line, and made it impassable. The engines were old, almost worn out, some of the worst having leaky boilers, so that in the distance to Frateshti from Bucharest, 35 miles, the engine has often to leave the train to go in search of water. The passenger train that left Bucharest for Frateshti at 9.30 A.M. on the 7th took 15 hours to do the journey. The train that left Giurgevo at 6 P.M. on the 8th arrived at Bucharest at 9.30 A.M. on the 9th. This describes the railway communications. I have confined myself to the northern side of the Danube, the difficulties increased in an increasing ratio as each cart or sleigh drew its load further into Bulgaria. Communications across the Danube at Petroshani and Nicopolis were also by boat at this time. LECTURE. Friday, March 29th, 1878. LIEUT.-GENERAL W. M. SCOTT MCMURDO, C.B., in the Chair. ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE RESERVE FORCES IN CASE OF AN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE BEING SENT ABROAD. By Colonel H. C. FLETCHER, C.M.G., Commanding 2nd Battalion Scots Guards. All that THERE is a well-known proverb, qui s'excuse s'accuse, and at the risk of having it applied to myself, I must preface this paper by saying that I can put forward little that is new, or that has not been thoroughly considered by those whose duty it is to make the necessary preparations for war, on paper, if not in a more practical manner. relates to the defence of Great Britain, has been dealt with in various books and pamphlets and formularised into plans more or less feasible, and little remains for me except to lay before you a digest of other people's thoughts, and to endeavour to present a picture of the state of affairs that would arise if England were engaged in serious war. Let us therefore endeavour to realise the condition of the country soon after war had been declared with a powerful European nation, and for the sake of argument and without prejudice let us suppose that nation to be Russia. Two army corps, comprising the whole of the regular forces of England and Ireland, excepting the skeletons of a few battalions, including six battalions of Guards, and a regiment or two of Household Cavalry, and made up of the Army reserve, and a large portion of what is called the Militia reserve, have left for the East. There are 10,000 men on their way from Canada, and the advanced corps of a force of 80,000 native Indian tooops are passing through the Suez Canal. The country is denuded of regular troops, and their ordinary work, as well as the task of providing reinforcements, is falling on the Reserve forces and on those who are left in charge of the various districts into which the country has been divided. Little or no analogy can be deduced from what was done during the Crimean war. At that time we drifted into a state of hostilities after a long peace, with but little or no prepara tion, and without recognising the latent power which a country possessing the population and wealth of England, can put forth. We fought our battles with a small body of regular troops, helped indirectly by the Militia, who garrisoned the fortresses in the Mediterranean, maintained a respectable armed force at home, and whose Officers worked nobly and unselfishly in providing recruits to repair the losses of the regular troops. As the war went on we had recourse to shifts and expedients which I scarcely think creditable to a great country. We sent to Germany, Switzerland, and Italy to hire mercenaries. whilst we neglected to utilize the large and I may say warlike population of our own Isles, not apparently imagining that soldiers could be procured by other methods than those which obtained during our wars in Spain and in America. In thus acting we, however, only followed former precedents. Indeed, to quote from "Clode's Military "Forces of the Crown," no Continental war was ever previously carried on with so small a number of foreign troops. The idea seems to have been that armies were to be recruited solely from the lower classes; that soldiers should be purchased in the cheapest market, and-provided they reached to a fixed and certainly not high standard of physical qualities-that it was a matter of indifference whether they were fighting for a cause in which they were interested, or merely for their pay. Happily for us, the brunt of the struggle fell on our own brave national troops, and notwithstanding the many disadvantages under which they laboured owing to the neglect of the Army by the nation during the years that followed the fall of Napoleon, they manfully upheld their ancient renown, and brought us out of difficulties that it would be most unwise to incur again. The ideas of the scale on which war can be conducted have changed since the Crimean days. Nations have learnt that by proper organization, and by the use of the many mechanical means which this century has produced, armies of a size unknown in former European history can be brought rapidly from distant points to the scenes of operation, and can be maintained with little reference to the seasons of the year, or to the resources of the country which may be the theatre of the campaign. War is no longer the affair of the upper classes as leaders, and of the lower as soldiers-all ranks and all conditions must take part in it, whether forced to do so by the iron rule of conscription, or propelled by the influences that free countries like England and America should know how to exert when a great national struggle stirs to the depths the patriotic feelings of the citizens. If we refuse to imitate the practice of continental nations, we may still take a lesson from the gigantic efforts made by the Northern and Southern States during the Civil War of America, and we may gather from a study of those campaigns, examples, or rather warnings, of the necessity of realizing at the commencement of a struggle the efforts requisite for conducting it to its ultimate end, and the losses in men, money, and honour, that will flow from neglecting to put forth the national energies at the outset of a war. Before proceeding further, it will be well to come to some understanding as to the land forces on which England would have to rely. |