to the existing Mediterranean fleet might therefore be held to secure that sea, were the ships built and classed as I propose. If to this force were added a corvette, and three sloops, the highway could be guarded very efficiently, while a few frigates and corvettes would watch the ports, such as Venice, capable of fitting out" Alabamas," but incapable of despatching more powerful ships. Altogether, we may say the sixteen fleet-ships, six frigates, four corvettes, six sloops, four gun-boats, and two despatch-vessels, would almost guarantee the security of the great eastern route from Gibraltar to Aden; the addition to our existing force being seven fleet-ships, five frigates, and three sloops. Let us now proceed up the coast of Europe, where, passing by Spain as neutral, and Portugal as friendly, we come to France as an enemy, and to Rochfort as the first war port which we meet. Here, however, we cannot meet the fleet-ship, as there is not water for her, so that no ship larger than a frigate is needed to blockade the Charente. L'Orient is the next war port met with; but here again a heavy blockading force would not be necessary, as I gather that at high water spring-tides there is no more than 29 feet water at the entrance. The port could now hardly be used for the collection of first class fleet-ships. At Brest, however, we may expect to find at least an equal force to that which we found at Toulon, say twelve fleet-ships, to which must be opposed in observation twelve of our own. We find our Channel Squadron to consist of four fleet-ships at the date selected. There were besides in the Home ports as a reserve, or otherwise in commission, ironclads, or their representatives, to the number of ten; therefore we should be able to deal with the coast of France as far as Brest in the matter of fleet-ships, and yet have two to spare for Cherbourg, where we might also expect to find twelve fleet-ships. An addition so far of ten fleet-ships to any existing force in commission for the Channel, and of seven for the Mediterranean, would therefore be a reasonable requirement to protect our southern and eastern commercial routes from absolute breach by hostile fleets under the conditions named. We have next to deal with Wilhelmshavn, where we may assume one-half of the German Fleet to be assembled; say, three first class, and three second class flect-ships, to be observed by six of our own fleet-ships. Entering the Baltic, we come to Kiel, where we suppose there are five German fleet-ships, calling for five of our own to observe them. Then we come to the Russian ports of Sveaborg and Cronstadt, with perhaps a single first class fleetship, and twelve second class of very inferior metal and plating. Possibly ten of our own fleet-ships would be sufficient for their observation. Upon the whole, therefore, we see that with a fleet of 62 fleet-ships, we could undertake the blockade of all the Italian, French, German, and Russian ports, whence foes worthy of their steel could be expected to issue. That is not so great a number, when we remember that we had at the time chosen for comparison, about 48 ironclads, at least as competent as those I have assumed to be arrayed against ns. As to the numbers of frigates, corvettes, and sloops, which would be required to watch and blockade the smaller ports, I need not enter on so hopeless an estimate. I assume an imperfect blockade on this

head, and suppose that if there were any hopes of a successful attack on our commerce by frigates or smaller vessels, with reasonable hopes of safe return, such ships would find means to escape our guards. Bat the very root of my position is that a proper development of our existing resources will make it hopeless for anyone to attempt "Alabama" raids. So far we have got now as to show the forces necessary to obstruct the issue of hostile fleets against us, and to prevent their junction in so overwhelming a force that our patrols along the lines of commerce must abandon their duties. I have also shown how small a force may guard the Mediterranean route when once the heavy ships are blockaded. If four ships are known to be lying between Gibraltar and Malta, and four more between Malta and Port Saïd, she would be a sanguine "Alabama" who should hope for a successful career on that line. I may now turn to the more distant commercial routes and their protection.

61. I have said that the squadron in the East Indies would be charged with protecting the eastern routes from Aden to Penang, to King George's Sound, and to Mauritius. Now the forces of Italy, or of Germany, must reach this field of operations by running the gauntlet round the Cape of Good Hope, or Cape Horn; on their route they would meet, even now, the most tremendous difficulties. There lie in wait for them even in peace time, the West African Squadron of 9 sail, and the South American of 3 sail, while they could not easily obtain coal from neutral ports on a track so watched. France, however, has at Bourbon, Pondicherry, and at Saigon, ports of her own which must be watched, while Russia has her ports and existing squadron in the North Pacific. Russian Siberia and French Cochin China would be for the observation of the China squadron of which I shall presently treat. Bourbon and Pondicherry would each require the presence of perhaps a single ship, resting on Mauritius and Trincomalee. Looked at thus, it may be seen that a very small force is necessary in the East Indies to keep our trade routes inviolate; and the present force of 1 frigate, 4 corvettes, and 7 sloops, might be actually reduced when the graver policy of a European war supplanted those smaller matters which now keep up the East Indian squadron at its high standard. With such ships as I propose, which could throw themselves at very considerable speed on menaced points, a greater concentration at the Cape of Good Hope would be a reasonable way of protecting the East Indies. Singapore and the Straits of Malacca form so inviting a sluice valve to check the waters of our commerce, that we may almost be sure that a serious attempt to get hold of the handle would be made there, if anywhere in the East, by the powers I have named. It can be approached from so many directions, that the powers in consultation might very readily agree to make a junction of all forces there on a given day, each sending perhaps two or three times as many ships as are necessary, to make up for certain losses on the way. I think therefore that some concentration of our ships should be made there, and this brings me to the consideration of the China squadron and its duties. It consisted at the date named of 1 fleet ship, 3 corvettes,

15 sloops, 4 gunboats, and a despatch vessel. Here is really a very fine force if the sloops were as efficient in their powers of locomotion as I propose they should be. If a corvette and 3 sloops watched the chief Russian port in Siberia; if the fleet-ship watched an enemy's fleet-ship say at Saigon; if she were supported according to the force found there-say with 1 corvette and 2 sloops; and if 4 sloops were left along the route from Hong Kong to Japan, we should still have 1 corvette, 6 sloops, and 4 gun-boats to protect the route from Singapore to Hong Kong, and to guard Singapore itself. It is not probable-if only the ships were as I wish them that any addition to the peace establishment in China would be necessary in war time; for, as in India, the smaller local wants of peace must immediately give way to the exigencies of an Imperial policy in war. In Australia we should probably want an addition to the 3 corvettes and 1 sloop which now represent our naval forces there, and I think that if we took that of the 4 frigates of the detatched squadron which existed at the date named by me, and placed them under the command of the Australian Admiral, together with two or three sloops, Australia would be left reasonably secure. The Pacific trade route is perhaps the most difficult of all to guard, and I think it very probable that much would have to be done by way of convoy. The route is liable to attack from the bases of Siberia by the Russians, and of Tahiti by the French, and it is difficult to see how the successful raids of sailing "Alabamas " on a sailing trade are to be prevented, the means of concealment and escape being so complex in so great an expanse of ocean. Convoy for the sailing trade would therefore appear to be a necessity, and the probability is that the traffic across the isthmus would be increased, while that round Cape Horn would be diminished. The Siberian fleet being thoroughly blockaded; and Tahiti, the Marquesas, and New Caledonia thoroughly denuded of possible 'Alabamas," the Pacific trade would only be open to the attack of "Alabamas fitted out in the neutral ports of Pacific America. It would be dangerous for the smaller States to permit such proceedings, while America might be relied on-in view of her own "Alabama "Claims" to take care that nothing touched us from a United States port. But the existing Pacific squadron of 1 fleet ship, 2 corvettes, and 5 sloops would be properly augmented by at least a corvette and 3 sloops in a war with European powers. Returning home again we pass to the Falkland Islands, on which the present force of 1 frigate and 2 sloops would, when augmented, rest in time of war. This force would be in some degree united with that on the West Coast of Africa, now amounting to 1 frigate, 2 corvettes, 1 sloop, and 5 gunboats; and I think it would be well, seeing the value of the two great commercial lines which pass there, to unite the two squadrons as a South Atlantic naval station. Even in peace the South Atlantic squadron of 2 frigates, 3 corvettes, 3 sloops, and 5 gun-boats is respectable, and if called in upon Ascension, St. Helena, and the Cape, would show a very fair guard there. But a concentration would probably be required at Ascension, as at the Cape and the Falkland Islands, as these three points form as it were the necks of the

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navigation, and if sufficiently guarded, expeditions for more distant parts of our empire might there receive a check. The West Indian and North American station is now provided with 1 fleet-ship, 1 frigate, 3 corvettes, 4 sloops, and 3 gunboats, and these with augmentations would rest upon St. John's, Bermuda, Nassau, and Barbados, to receive the streams of commerce flowing east and west, and to purify those routes from the incumbrance of chance "Alabamas.” New squadrons not now in existence would be required to guard the routes nearer home, but it would be found that they would be best disposed in a line running from Cape Finisterre to Cape Clear, and resting chiefly on the home ports. A chain of a dozen corvettes and sloops lying along that line would make a very efficient curtain to strain out the gnats which might wish to feed beyond that line on forbidden fruit.

62. I think that this cursory survey of our existing position in peace, and of our probable position in a war with four great maritime powers combined against us, is very reassuring in some respects; in others very much the reverse. If we took our present peace displacement of ships in commission, and their armaments, we should be very well satisfied; but if we look at their powers of locomotion we ought to fear. To have a force, and yet to be unable to employ it in the right place at the right time, is the ultimate blunder of bad generalship. That we should go on deliberately constructing naval forces with this flaw in them would very much surprise the ignorant. It is no surprise to those who recognize the force of the past in influencing the present. It will still be years before the great change I propose is made complete, but there is no year passes which does not more closely approach it, and if war does not come in the meantime, we shall not so greatly suffer. With ships designed as I propose they should be, our peace establishment ought to show such a front as will give us a secure basis against any possible combination

in war.

63. I should add a word or two here on the fourth division of my subject, having treated of the first and second-I mean "Colonial "and Home Defence." In the whole of my scheme I have assumed the security of the coaling stations, and I conceive that if a sufficient naval force is afloat to protect the line of communication between each pair of coaling stations, that act will protect the stations themselves. I find myself unwilling to withdraw from the fixed fund which I assume to be at our disposal, any part for the exclusive use of the coaling station, which might be employed to augment the seagoing fleet. But to be reasonable, I must admit the possibility of attack on a naval station in spite of its sea-going guard. I am only concerned then to meet this possibility in the cheapest way possible. And I think this way involves the following principles. (1.) Coal and other stores protected from shell-fire on the sea side. (2.) A garrison of sufficient strength to meet the ordinary landing parties of one or two frigates. (3.) Cover for that garrison. (4.) Stationary torpedoes where capable of application. (5.) Locomotive torpedoes either of the outrigger, or fish description. I should expect to get

news beforehand of any serious expedition against a naval station, and with ships capable of steaming at a moderate speed for a long time, I should always calculate on their assembly to defeat such an expedition. I should only give such a defence to the naval station itself, as would make its attack either useless or hazardous to anything short of a serious expedition. But I put much faith in the sea-going fleet resting on the naval station as a protective force, and little faith on any other appliance. The larger colonies are and must be in the hands of armies. The smaller colonies exist as the supports of a navy as an Imperial instrument. The larger ones and India exist as integral parts of the Empire itself. The first become parts of the Navy, and should in my opinion be entirely under naval control. The second can be attacked only after the failure of the Navy and must then be defended by an Army. Colonial and Home ports which are open to attack as a means of directly damaging the Empire, should be guarded by the Navy in sufficient force, while those naval stations which will be attacked as a means of indirectly damaging the Empire through the Navy, the Navy is doubly bound to protect. But as I have already said, I should allow to all ports open to attack, a certain sum to be expended in the cheapest defences, which appear to be the different classes of torpedo. I wish to condemn again with steady design the idea of the "Harbour Defence Ship." Such vessels are every whit as likely to be withdrawn as the sea-going ship when they are wanted, and the only result is that you build a bad sea-going ship when, had you never heard of harbour defence, you would have built a good one. The very extreme to which I would allow myself to go, would be in the ram and the "Gamma;" but these weapons, if prepared at all, would be for the great home, or the great colonial, ports.

64. My task, which has been but badly and hurriedly performed, will now be done when I have said a word about the Naval Volunteer Force; but when I have thrown local Home and Colonial defence entirely on the torpedo, I have already made the supplemental force a corps of Volunteer Torpedo Men. I think it was always difficult to say what the functions of a Naval Volunteer force should be, so long as it was thought that they must serve on board ship. But now, if they are the defenders of great ports by torpedoes, we have for them a function such as their educational status will eminently fit them for, and an exercise for their skill and daring in time of war, which might be the envy of the highest genius. I am strong on spending little on harbour defence, and I therefore recognize in the Naval Volunteers that very element which I seek, and if the enemy is to be kept at bay by a home defence of any kind, I should think that a cordon of coast torpedoes, fixed and locomotive, in the hands of a British Volunteer force, will do it.

65. I have now concluded my essay, and as a final paragraph may summarise my views in a series of theses which may form the bases of discussion should I be so fortunate as to see my essay amongst those selected for publication. The theses are these:

(1.) A frank reliance should be placed on steam power; and coal in naval depôts.