fully agree with Colonel Childers that all our forts ought to be supplemented by a floating battery-an ironclad-which would always be able to take up such a position that no part of the harbour could escape fire, because even the most elaborate scheme of land batteries may allow a certain portion of dead ground. This would be obviated by supplementing the fire of our land defences by that of a vessel of the description pointed out. Therefore, I perfectly agree with much that has been said as to the propriety of seeking the advice of our naval colleagues when planning the construction of works for the purpose of defending colonial harbours.

Captain McEvoy: I very much regret to say that I was unable to be present when the paper was read, which I have no doubt was extremely interesting. I regret it very much, because I myself saw many of the operations connected with the American War. I was attached to the Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography, under its chief, Captain John M. Brooke, and was stationed at Richmond during the last two years and a half of the war, where I had the personal superintendence of nearly all the experiments made with the projectiles and ammunition for the Navy, manufactured at the Naval Ordnance Works at that place. Had I been present when the paper was read, I might have been able to supplement it by some explanations which, perhaps, would have added to the interest of those present.

Admiral HAMILTON, in reply, said: I do not think I have much to answer. Captain Colomb, being an old friend, has let me off very easily. In reply to Sir Leopold M'Clintock, I do not think we gain much information of any value with regard to torpedoes from the American War, for the simple reason that the Southerners had very few mechanical resources. Their torpedoes, on the whole, were rather a failure. I can only trace that five vessels were blown up by them. The Northerners scarcely used them, but torpedoes have so completely altered their character since then that I do not think we can gain any knowledge from the information derived from those operations. With regard to the earthworks, that is one of the things on which I am rather puzzled to know what history is, for, since I wrote my paper, I have come across "Pollard's History of the First Year of the War." (Å Confederate account.) Admiral Porter says, in his report, that he destroyed Forts Jackson and Philip, whereas Pollard gives a telegram from General Duncan, who commanded the forts, in which he, on the 23rd April, spoke most favourably as to the condition of the forts. Although the bombardment had continued a week, and 25,000 shells were thrown by the enemy, only three guns were dismounted, five men killed, and ten wounded. The same night the forts were passed. Admiral Porter also reports, on Grand Gulf, that the earthworks were knocked to pieces, and the muzzles of the guns choked up by sand thrown into them by the shells, and that, as a rule, the water earthworks were destroyed, while the higher ones were not much damaged. The great conclusion, however, that all the accounts come to is that, though the ships could always silence the forts, they could not destroy them; that, the moment the ships passed them, the forts very often opened fire again. Mr. Scott Russell speaks as to the value of very large shells, and I must say I was not, until I had read the books, aware of the value of shells. The great reason of the success of American gunboats up the rivers against the batteries was, that these little bits of vessels were armed with nine and eleven inch guns, and, although the battery could bring three or four guns to bear against them, it could do nothing to check the damage done by the bursting of the eleven-inch shells. There can be no doubt that the Federals showed great skill in the use of their shells. Admiral Selwyn spoke of the want of trained gunners on the Federal side. I think, however, that remark attaches to both sides. Of course, the sudden increase of men from 7,000 to 50,000 necessitated that a great part should be untrained men, and, of course, we can train our men to work the guns much more quickly on board the ships than can be done on shore, because they have no military duties to perform. Therefore, we have a great advantage in that respect. Most of the actions certainly were fought in smooth water. There was, however, one case in which a fort was bombarded from the sea, and I should imagine there was a swell on, because the "Cumberland" was towed out to sea at night, on account of threatening weather. All the other actions were fought in perfectly smooth water. At Mobile, it is specially said by the Confederate report that the men were well trained artillerymen. They had been in those forts two or three years, and were, no doubt, thoroughly up to their work.

However, the smoke obscured the fleet. That obscurity caused by smoke will, I think, to a great extent stop the effect of the electric torpedo. Of course, the torpedo is to be respected, but I do not think it is as formidable as artillery fire, and I believe means will be found of neutralizing the great damage likely to occur from the use of such weapons. Admiral Selwyn said they could not lodge a shell in the Moncrieff gun-pit. No doubt that is the case, but what would be the effect on the men working that gun if shell after shell were bursting in front of them. We have heard that the men on the "Tennessee," where the shell did not penetrate, and where the port shutters were down, were blinded by the blaze of bursting shells. What would be the effect on men in a pit, of shells bursting over them? I am perfectly sure that it would be very demoralizing, and the service rendered by the guns they were working would not be of much value. The Wasp Battery was at an elevation of 700 or 800 feet, and the ships could not elevate their shot to reach it. The ships were firing shot instead of shell, and the enemy had got the range. The ships were not kept in perpetual motion, but were stationary, at 1,400 yards. I quite agree with what has been said by General Cavanagh as to the advisability of a naval Officer being consulted with reference to the erection of forts to protect harbours. If engineers only are concerned they may build forts which will not be an adequate protection, whereas, if a naval Officer is consulted, the probability will be that there will be no dead spot left which cannot be reached by the guns. I do not think that I have anything further to say, except to thank you for the attention with which you have listened to me.

The CHAIRMAN: There only remains for me the agreeable duty, which I am quite sure the meeting will support me in, of thanking Admiral Hamilton for his very interesting lecture, and also those gentlemen who have taken part in the discussion. It is a very large subjcet, and one that certainly cannot be fully dealt with in one sitting of this description.

LECTURE.

Friday, May 17th, 1878.

ADMIRAL A. P. RYDER in the Chair.

ON A COLONIAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER FORCE. By THOMAS BRASSEY, Esq., M.P., Lieutenant Commanding Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers.

It is not suprising that the idea of organizing a Colonial Naval Reserve should have been deferred to the present time. The growth of our Colonial Empire has been so rapid that the resources out of which such a force could be created have only lately been at our disposal.

It has been remarked by Mr. Wilson, in his recent volume on the resources of modern countries, that none of the colonies were of great promise before 1845. Canada languished; New South Wales-then including Victoria and Queensland-was a feeble settlement, still troubled by a residuum of transported criminals; the Cape of Good Hope was almost Dutch. The total English population of the whole of our foreign possessions did not, in 1850, exceed 2,000,000. The population of these colonies has at least quadrupled in thirty years, and in some cases is now tenfold what it was in 1845.

Visitors to the Exhibition now being held in Paris will see abundant and gratifying proofs of the marvellous development of our colonies, and of their ability to provide adequate means of self-defence. The Australian governments have wisely embraced the opportunity of showing to the world their varied and valuable products. From New South Wales we have copper, silver, lead, marble, tin, slate, and opals; wine-including all the varieties of the French and German vineyards-tobacco, and, perhaps most important of all, wool. From Western Australia we find leather, timber, silk, coal, lead, and wines. Victoria, which boasts of 800 trees and flowering shrubs, exhibits also coal, wines, and cloth manufactures. She reminds us, by means of pyramidal models, of the value of her productions of gold, and of the exceptional good fortune of certain adventurers. From the Cross Reef Mine £1,000,000 worth, from the Long Tunnel 221,262 ounces, from the Port Philip Company's workings to the value of £1,500,000 have been extracted.

Queensland exhibits malachite, gold, copper, cinnabar, chrome, iron, plumbago, and antimony, sugar, coffee, wheat, maize, tobacco, silk, and wool. The commercial and agricultural development of the colony is set forth in the following figures:

In 1876 the total value of the exports amounted to £3,875,000, including

The value of the imports in the same year was £3,126,000.
Queensland has a population of 200,000.

The live stock depastured includes

Lastly, South Australia exhibits copper, tin, wines, timber, leather, wool, and tobacco. With such a collection before us, we are justified in forming the brightest hopes for the future prosperity of the great Anglo-Saxon communities in the Antipodes. The page of their history is short, but they are a vigorous and energetic people, eager to embrace every opportunity afforded by a bountiful nature, and labouring valiantly in the spirit of their well-chosen motto, "Advance "Australia."

The time seems now to have arrived when the colonies should be reminded of their obligations to provide for their own self-defence, and of their duty to take a part in those naval and military preparations, the cost of which should be borne in due proportions by the whole Empire.

The necessity for the organization of a Naval Reserve for the defence of the colonies has been recognised by many lecturers, who have preceded me in the theatre of the Royal United Service Institution. The brothers Colomb have been among the foremost in urging the need of such a force. They have shown what are the strategical points which are of the most vital importance to the integrity of the British Empire, and have earnestly recommended the appointment of a Royal Commission to examine the subject. Nothing, however, has been done, and we find ourselves at the present moment contemplating the possibility of war, and utterly unprepared with the means of defending the important outlying members of the Empire by those local forces, which might so easily have been organized. Readers of the papers published in the "Nineteenth Century" will remember the imaginary but very forcible description recently given by Sir Garnet Wolseley of a Russian squadron performing a cruise of circumnavigation in time of war, arriving off all our most valuable settlements, and winning a series of inglorious triumphs by levying black-mail on rich seaports, which could offer no resistance. It would per

haps be found more difficult to carry out such a series of operations, than to describe them with the ready pen, which Sir Garnet so well knows how to use; but the bare conception of such a state of things ought to be unendurable, alike to the people of the mothercountry and of her dependencies.

The policy of encouraging such a movement having been accepted, there can be no practical difficulty in raising a Naval Reserve in the colonies. If it be intended to provide the means of manning seagoing ships, the Naval Reserve which has been formed for the defence of the mother-country presents a model for imitation. If coast and harbour defence alone is attempted, the system of organization adopted for the Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers may be followed with advantage.

In considering a project for a Colonial Naval Reserve, it is essential to determine, in limine, to what extent the direct intervention of the Imperial Government will be required. Among a certain school of politicians, it will be considered that local defence is a task which must be left entirely to the Colonial Governments. They think that the colonies are quite able to take care of themselves; that, man for man, the colonists are better off than the population of the mothercountry; that it is the duty of our statesmen to rear up young and vigorous communities in habits of self-defence, and to bring home to their people a sense of their obligation to make sacrifices for public objects, and to bear their proportionate share with the mother-country of the burdens of military preparations.

Another school of politicians is in favour of a closer connection with the colonies. They are anxious to promote a federal union of all the members of the British Empire. They wish to arrive at a mutual agreement on all questions of tariffs; and, with a view to concerted action in Imperial questions, they are in favour of giving to the colonies representatives who should sit in the great council of the Empire at its seat of Government. In consideration of the protection afforded by the fleet, they are prepared to recommend a contribution from the colonies to the naval expenditure of the country. In these views I concur, and I see additional evidences of their truth in the most recent incidents in our political experience. It is rarely possible for this country, under a popular representative Government, to pursue a satis factory course in its relations with foreign countries. The greater number of those who take a lively interest in public business concern themselves rather with domestic questions than with foreign policy. Being without knowledge, they arrive at hasty conclusions, and every new incident that occurs produces a corresponding change in their opinions. Hence it is that our foreign policy is inconsistent and uncertain; that we disappoint allies in whom we have raised expectations; and make sacrifices for unattainable or unworthy objects.

The Eastern Question once disposed of, it is my carnest hope that the attention of British statesmen may be directed rather to the object of drawing the colonies and the mother-country more closely together, than to continental affairs.

In our relations with other nationalities we excite jealousy by