APPENDIX.

Showing the War Material at the disposal of the Native Princes of India.

The CHAIRMAN: Before proposing a vote of thanks to Colonel Malleson for his very interesting lecture, you will perhaps allow me to make a few remarks, in order to substantiate the statement that he has made, especially with regard to the province of Hydrabad, the most formidable of these native powers. There is no doubt that the natives of the province and city of Hydrabad are among the most warlike, turbulent, and robust men in India, comprising Arabs, Afghans, Pathans, Seedes,

Rohillas, Rajpoots, and other warlike races. With regard to the 725 guns, of which Colonel Malleson has spoken, I had an opportunity of seeing specimens of these guns about the year 1870, when I first reviewed a portion of these troops in the city of Hydrabad. I think I saw somewhere about 18,000 men, and I was shown about 30 guns. Some of them were guns that had done duty at the siege of Seringapatam. I also saw some guns from Golconda which they told me had been brought from Persia in the time of the first Nizam, about the year 1720. There is no doubt the greater portion of the guns are perfectly useless. The Army is entirely undisciplined and unofficered, in the proper sense of the term, except a small force called the reformed army that Salar Jung has placed under the control of European Officers; but really from what I saw of specimens of the 725 guns, I do not believe there is a single one that is of any use, and there were no arms of precision. I will now invite any gentleman to put any questions to Colonel Malleson on this subject, and no doubt he will be very happy to reply to them.

Captain COLLEN, Bengal Staff Corps, Assistant Secretary, Military Department: I have listened with very great attention to the able lecture delivered by Colonel Malleson, and although I had no intention of speaking when I came down, there are one or two points I should like to observe upon. I gather from the lecture that Colonel Malleson believes the armies of the native states of India could not be combined for the purpose of aggression, and I am sure that we must all agree with him in that. But he did not, I think, make sufficient of a point which I would venture to bring to your notice. Many of these native states have, as Colonel Malleson told us, forces of considerable strength; and although not of great warlike power, yet we must admit that though we may term them by the name of "rabble," they are quite sufficient to disturb order in India, if at any juncture of circumstances a portion of the British forces were withdrawn from that Empire. That is a point on which I wish to lay stress. I have only to say, as far as regards the welfare of the native states themselves, that it would be to their great benefit if their forces were reduced to a minimum. They spend a great deal of money on these men, and as Colonel Malleson pointed out, they are of very little use for military purposes. To a certain extent I have always understood, and I have seen portions of most of these forces, they are used as police, and as guards for treasure and so on. Up to that point they are useful, but for military purposes they are quite out of place. They have nobody against whom they could fight except the paramount power, England. My own earnest hope is, and I gather from the newspapers that such a measure is contemplated, that the forces of the native states of India may be reduced to the least possible strength, consistent with our treaty obligations with those states, and with the dignity of those who have been loyal and faithful to us.

Captain WEMYSS: I might mention that the regular horsemen in Barodah were the most active swordsmen I have seen anywhere.

General CAVENAGH : I think we must all fully agree with Colonel Malleson in his remarks as to the inability of the forces of the native states to make any aggressive movement upon the paramount power so long as those forces are without proper leaders. It is, however, a question whether, in the event of our ever allowing native states to take into their service men who would be able to train and discipline their troops against us, they would not in the time of emergency be found a thorn in our side. It is also possibly a question whether we ourselves are wise in training up as leaders, natives who may at any time become hostile to us. In support of what Colonel Malleson has stated with regard to the want of efficient commanders amongst the Marathas at Maharajpur,' I may mention an incident that occurred to a man in my own regiment, and although a large body of Maratha cavalry were present, they took no part in the action. The troopers were many of them friends and relatives of the very men we were leading. After the battle, when one of our men met a cousin

1 Notwithstanding this disadvantage, the Maratha artillery and infantry fought well, and stoutly defended their positions; of the British troops, upon whom the brunt of the action fell, about one in five were rendered hors de combat; the regi ments that suffered the most were the 39th Foot, 214; 40th Foot, 182; 16th Native Infantry, 180.

of his who belonged to the opposite force, he put the question to him, why, with numbers so much greater than ours, they never charged us? The reply shows conclusively what Colonel Malleson has pointed out, that it is in leaders that the native troops are deficient. The answer was given in the shape of an inquiry: "Where "were your European Officers ? " Upon which, our man replied: "Our Officers "led their troops and squadrons." "Our Officers," the Maratha replied, "were in "the rear." As to the power of the troops of the native states to meet British troops in the open field, without leaders, it would be impossible; but I think that the British Government ought not to lose sight of the fact that, considering their large numbers, in the event of any general rising, which of course wise statesmen will always contemplate, for it may occur owing to intrigues that may be carried on against us-these men would act upon our flanks and interfere with our communications; and although they might never be arrayed against us in a pitched battle, they would materially affect our operations, and possibly lead to our suffering serious and great loss.

Mr. HADDAN, C.E.: On the question of the value of Indian irregulars I may per haps mention one experience I gained in India some seven or eight years ago. During the progress of a railway which was being surveyed in Salar Jung's territory, we were supplied with a guard of so-called grenadiers, which numbered twelve in all, and which mustered about one complete uniform among the number; and when there was a review, I think about two of them could muster boots. The flintlocks were destroyed by time, and they used matchlocks. At the prize meeting, held when our Staff assembled, which was not, however, quite up to Wimbledon, they could not hit a chattee at twenty yards. I happen also to know that Scindia and Holkar, and the princes in general, were very particular about the number of guns that should be fired in their honour at the great Durbar: and Scindia thought he had managed it completely when he was assured of twenty-three, which was rather more than a Royal salute. It was only, however, when 101 were fired for the Kaiser-i-Hind, that he found the real distance which, in our opinion, exists between himself and royalty.

The CHAIRMAN: I think it is my duty now to move a vote of thanks to Colonel Malleson for his very interesting lecture.

Colonel MALLESON: I beg to thank you, Sir, and the ladies and gentlemen present, for the manner in which you have received the lecture which I have given. It has been a great pleasure to me to hear that the remarks which I made regarding the difference between the behaviour of the Marathas at Laswári and at Maharajpur have been confirmed by a gallant Officer who played a very distinguished part in the latter engagement, and who, I think, left his leg on the field. I beg further to remark, that I entirely agree with the gallant Officer who rose first, Captain Collen, in the observations that fell from him regarding the power possessed by the levies of the native troops to annoy us very considerably, in case there should be a disturbance in India. I also entirely agree with him in the hope he expressed, that the levies of those provinces would be reduced from their present extravagant number to one more within compass, so that all danger of any such disturbance on their part should be taken away. I have only to express to the meeting my grateful thanks for the attention with which you have listened to me.

LECTURE.

Friday, June 14th, 1878.

Colonel H. YULE, C.B., R.E., &c., &c., in the Chair.

ON COMMUNICATIONS WITH BRITISH INDIA UNDER POSSIBLE CONTINGENCIES.

By Major-General Sir FREDERIC J. GOLDSMID, C.B., K.C.S.I. THERE can be no doubt that the possession of so vast a territory as British India brings with it many serious responsibilities. Among the more recent illustrations of this truth is the mode in which Government has dealt with the famine. It has administered to the wants of the hungry in the far East as it would have done at home; it has acknowledged the principle that a sovereign rule must be a paternal rule; that starving subjects must be fed as well as starving children; and that without distinction of distance, colour, or creed. We do not say that nothing is received in return for this expensive fulfilment of sympathetic duties. If England had only, on the credit side, a large field of honourable employment for her sons, and the prestige of a vast empire, it would be much; but she has these and more: she has an Asiatic army, to appear at a sudden call in this as well as any other quarter of the globe; thousands of Oriental soldiers to rise up and do her work in the West, should their presence be required on an emergency. But one of our main responsibilities is that of communication. England must not only have a link with India by telegraph; she must also be always able to reach her practically and in substance, and the long sea route is out of the question in these days of rapidity of movement, when action is worthless unless it is independent of time, when practice treads on the heels of theory, and when execution almost overtakes design. To see how this is to be attained under all circumstances, independently of a long sea route, is then the object proposed in the present paper. In order to steer clear as much as possible of shoals in the shape of politics, I will, in the first instance, talk of countries and people as though we were on the best of terms with all; as if they were at our disposal to traverse and re-traverse with the same facility as we draw lines on the mute map before us; as if all we had to contend with

were physical difficulties and commercial considerations. I would ask leave, however, to include in the term "physical" the obstructiveness of robbers or of lawless tribes.

Nearly three years ago I had the honour of delivering a lecture in these rooms "On certain Roads between Turkistan and India, indepen"dent of the Oxus or of any Oxus Boundary." The two roads then described were supposed to connect the seaboard of Northern Persia with the Lower Indus, but the distances were great. The one from Enzeli, in the south-west corner of the Caspian, passing through Eastern Persia, Western Baluchistan, and Eastern Makran, was estimated at 1,870 miles; the other, from Bandar-i-gez, on the south-eastern shores of the Caspian, passing through Northern and Eastern Persia and Afghanistan, was reckoned 150 miles longer. We might possibly, as I represented at the time, reduce the two lines to much the same figure, i.e., a maximum of 1,800, or a minimum of 1,500 miles. But then the Caspian is at an immense distance from England, and these roads, however important for an invading army, are not to be thought of as a means of passing British troops to and fro between Europe and Asia. In fact, I may state at once a proposition, the soundness of which should, without demonstration, be apparent to all present, that anything like complete overland communication of such a nature, if to be considered at all, must be considered as practicable by railway. How India is to be reached by this means is what we have now to examine, and in doing so I am quite aware that we shall tread upon somewhat debateable ground.

In the first place, unless the British Channel were bridged over or tunnelled under, we must use transports for crossing it; and the embarkation of troops at all would involve much trouble, provision, and expense; so much so, indeed, that the loss of a few days in a preliminary sea voyage might be found expedient, and the land-starting-point fixed in the Mediterranean, instead of a French or Belgian port. But in order to get some practical acquaintance with our proposed lines, whether in Europe or Asia, let us glance at what has been done in this respect by the telegraph.

Twenty years ago the revolt in India had been barely suppressed; there was no such institution as a telegraph to India, or even half-way to India, though the Red Sea cable may have been under preparation for laying and collapsing, and the Government were seeking, more or less in the dark, the means of meeting a requirement which events had shown to be most urgent. Ten years later, the failure of the first Red Sea cable had been nigh forgotten; the Government Officers had carried a cable from Karachi to Bushahr and the head of the Persian Gulf, had constructed land lines in Persia and Makran; and measures were being taken to secure safe and rapid communication with the cables through Europe and Asiatic Turkey on one side, and Europe and Persia on the other-amid loud cries, be it said, of dissatisfaction at the time occupied in perfecting so delicate and intricate a process. To-day there is a Red Sea cable and a land telegraph communicating with the Government cables, the successful working of which may be certified by the conclusive and convincing evidence of the daily press. As the