a large sum was taken out of the beggared Indian Treasury to defray the expenses of his tour, and even the passages of his suite from London. In fact, so embarrassed was the Treasury at the time, that taxes had to be levied summarily in the middle of the year. My ancestors on the Border had not a high reputation, but, compared with this, their lives stand high in the moral scale. Then, their appropriations were justified by their circumstances. What is there in our national circumstances to justify the plundering of these feeble people? Does it pay? It certainly does not. A national reputation is surely worth something, and, if it is not, let me tell you that every shilling of these charges is just so much lost to those useful works which are so necessary to ward off those famines which threaten to overwhelm our Indian Empire. Shall it be said that we yielded to the threats of America that justice which we deny to our feeble Eastern subjects? Common honesty demands that a commission should be appointed to investigate this matter, with a view of restoring to the Indian Treasury the sums with which it has been unjustly charged.

The next point on which much reform is possible is that of the native army. But here, if you hint that it might be reduced and remodelled in a cheaper way, you are at once met by a reference to the 315,000 men and 5,300 large guns of the native chiefs and princes. If, then, I were to go into this question here, the whole policy of our permitting those States to keep up armies, which are a source of expense to us, would have to be discussed, and I need hardly say that we have no time for that. I can, then, only here say that the numbers, and especially the improved discipline and arms, of these forces have an immense bearing on our ability to contend with the famines that threaten to ruin us. There are three ways of solving the question. The first, and I venture to think the best, is to bring about a federation of States, and ally the princes with us in the government of a United Indian Empire; the second, is to make them reduce their forces; the third, to make them contribute towards the cost of keeping the peace, which is now entirely thrown on our own subjects.

In conclusion, let me suggest that the famine charges of the future might be more easily met if the import duties were slightly enhanced. These are the only taxes which fall on the British and native-State inhabitants of all India, and in proportion to their means-much on the rich and well-to-do, very little on the poor. As one-fourth of these taxes falls on the inhabitants of the native States, the proposed enhancement would cause

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them to contribute more largely to that expenditure for keeping the peace which their chiefs so largely cause. A tax with all these advantages, and the only one which has any promise of elasticity, ought evidently to be a favourite one with our financiers, especially as it is the one of all others which the natives of India least object to. Now, what does the Govermnent propose here? It has promised the abolition of the duties as its first financial reduction. This is Lord Salisbury's policy. He promised it to the people of Manchester, who are aggrieved at the duties on their wares. What was the nominal objection to them? That they were protective. Now the Commission appointed to inquire into the subject proved that they were not so, because the Indian mills do not make those fine goods which Manchester sends to India. What the Indian mills do compete with is the native hand-looms, and in the manufacture of coarse goods. Nor did the duty injure the sales of Manchester, as an immense increase had taken place in the shipment of her production. But, it is urged, the mills in India will one day manufacture the fine goods now solely supplied by Manchester, and then the duty will be protective. When it becomes so, it will be time enough to put a duty on the produce of Indian mills equal to the import duties now levied. Permit me one more word on this subject-one word for the interests of those helpless masses who have no means of making their wants known, unless, as in the case of the disturbances in the Bombay district previously alluded to, they take to rioting. For them the first duty which needs lowering is that on salt, both for themselves and for their cattle. What is the first tax that Lord Salisbury has promised to reduce? One that will lighten the burdens of the rich and relatively increase those of the poor, on whom the great weight of taxation already falls; that will remove a tax from native States, and relatively increase the demands on our own subjects.

I have now flayed the body of the beast, but, as the Spaniards would say, there is still a good deal of skinning left in the tail— minor reforms, such as the abolition of the costly governments of Bombay and Madras, with their commanders-in-chief; the increased employment of cheap natives, in place of dear Europeans; the purchase of stores directly by the Government in India, and without the intervention of the India Office; and other matters which I have no time even to mention. A few more remarks, however, I must make, and on Lord Salisbury's speech at Bradford, to which I have previously alluded.

What was the main tenor of that speech? It was that nothing

should be done, and expressed much dread lest the public here should force on the Government any scheme to ward off the famines of the future. Canals were sneered at because water would not run up-hill; tanks and wells because they would dry up in a drought. What were his Lordship's remedial measures for the famines ofthe future? The people were to save-from Heaven knows what; and when too many for the land, were to emigrate-Heaven knows where. He made but one allusion to financial reform, and that was to lament that, from the want of money, he could not sweep away those import duties to which I have just alluded. I cannot express to you my feelings of disappointment on reading that speech. It showed a desire merely to shelve the whole question-an easy course, no doubt, for Lord Salisbury, but one that neither the public nor the press ought to submit to, if either have the smallest regard for British interests. Are we to be asked to conclude that our rule in India has reached her utmost limits of perfection? If Lord Salisbury was Prime Minister, and, in the face of some threatening calamity here, folded his hands, and said there was nothing to be done or attempted, I think I could tell you what would become of Lord Salisbury. But it is impracticable to complain without suggesting a remedy. The one here evidently is that, in future, the Secretary of State should, before accepting office, be examined as to his knowledge of Indian affairs. The examination need not be made a hard one. If, for instance, Lord Salisbury again became a candidate for office, he might be interrogated as to the bearing of tanks and wells on famine; whether the people have the means of saving so as to feed themselves in times of famine, and, if so, what these means consist of; whether they can emigrate when the worst comes to the worst, and, if so, where. In the case of the Duke of Argyll becoming a candidate, he might be advantageously asked some questions in arithmetic, and whether it would pay the State to acquire her railways. Should Mr. Lowe, who has lately been writing on India in the Fortnightly, become a candidate, he might be asked whether India has ever contributed to the English Treasury. And, if the examination papers and answers were published, they would at least teach the public what opinions it was not advisable to hold on Indian affairs, and some approach would thus be made to a sound knowledge of the most rudimentary facts relating to them.

One word more. What is the grand difficulty as regards successfully ruling India? Ignorance of the country and the wants of the people, and therefore an imperfect conception of what should be done. There is, too, no method in the thoughts

of those who govern. With them civilisation is not only to emanate from above, but percolate downwards. They have taken the crowning points of our civilisation, plastered them on the surface of Indian life, and are now waiting for the propagation of the germs. They may wait for ever. The object of this lecture is to prove that this is not the true method. Civilisation, to be permanent, must be evolved from the base, and the base of civilisation is the safety of life. Till measures are adopted which will secure that end, our Indian Empire must ever continue to be what it now is, merely a costly sham. I have shown what can be done to rescue it from the quagmire into which it is rapidly sinking, and, if the common. sense of the great English people could be brought to act, I should have some hopes that my suggestions would yield fruit, for the good of England and of those helpless masses of India amongst whom I have spent the best years of my life. But I fear this cannot be. The importance of what I have urged will be seen when it is too late. My suggestions and warnings may indeed some day come to light, but I fear it will only be when some future historian digs this lecture out of the records of your Society, and points to it as one of many instances to prove that every Indian calamity that has come upon us has been amply foretold, but foretold to no purpose whatever.

DISCUSSION.

Mr. ALEXANDER ROGERS (late a member of the Bombay Council) said: I have to congratulate the Institute on the ability with which Mr. Elliot has set forth his views on the subject of Indian famines and the measures which should be adopted to modify them. He has gone over such a great number of topics that it would lead me to write an essay if I were to touch upon them all. Therefore I hope I shall be excused if I merely take the most prominent points. I think the best way to bring the attention of the Institute to these different points will be to take them in the order in which he mentioned them in his paper. I am happy to say in a great many instances I am entirely at one with Mr. Elliot, but I cannot say that this is the case with all of them. He has not been in official life in India, and therefore I think he takes a very hard view of what government in India is. I have been an official all my life almost, and therefore to some extent my remarks may be looked upon as an official protest against what Mr. Elliot has said. I still hope in the course of my remarks you will find that I am not

so entirely official as to be prejudiced, and that I am open to conviction on many points. Mr. Elliot commences by mentioning the extraordinary rate of increase of the Indian population, and he dates from this that in a very short time India will be quite unable to meet the cost of future famines. The population of course is very large indeed, and the increase is rapid, but I am inclined to think that the rate of increase he lays down is rather in excess of what is the actual fact, because, although he points to various circumstances which tend to increase the population very rapidly, he has not noticed others which tend the other way. I think it would be found, if we had statistics sufficient to go through, that the system of early marriages and other causes lead not to such a very rapid increase of population as in European countries. Another point to be considered is that the rate of mortality is very great, especially that of infants. The first objection I have to make to Mr. Elliot's statement is with regard to the finances. of India, which I do not think he has stated quite correctly. He says that the published account of the revenues of India gives the total amount as £51,310,068, but by deducting various items from that sum he reduces the total to £38,251,560 as the value of the revenue on which we can rely as a permanency. The balance is made up chiefly of £8,471,425, derived from opium; and the residue, he says, consists of items which are matters of account. That is not exactly the case. I find from the statement I hold in my hand that the items he has omitted comprise items which are certainly items of revenue, which can be fairly relied upon every year. One very large item is that of the army, which is over one million. The marine and various other items he has omitted, with this, make up some £3,310,000, which is a large addition to the £38,000,000 which he says we can alone rely upon. Then with regard to the opium, he seems to predict that we cannot rely upon the income from that source as a permanent source of revenue. I do not think that this is such a weak source of revenue as he considers it. The Chinese are, it is true, growing opium extensively, but inasmuch as that got from India is of a better quality than they can themselves produce, and is therefore a luxury, so long as the Chinese like good opium they will get it from India, until such time as they find the way to grow opium of the quality they like. The next point he touches is that with regard to railways, and he says: "The idea that railways can solve the grand problem has often been entertained. I need hardly say that it is delusive. Railways can indeed modify a slight scarcity by carrying grain from one part of the country to another." No doubt that