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the existing mode of connection. As Sir George Cornewall Lewis, in his Dialogue on the Best Form of Government' (page 110), says, " The modern English system of dependencies admits of the successful government of a larger surface of the earth as one empire than any system which has hitherto been devised. An almost indefinite number of new dependencies might be aggregated to the British Empire, without deranging the constitution, or disturbing the action, of the Imperial Government. The practical limit seems to be expense of military and naval defence, which falls principally on the Imperial exchequer, and to which the dependencies (with the important exception of India) make little or no contribution." But as he subsequently points out, the system of dependence upon another government for some of the most important attributes of government, is suited only to weak communities, and could not be retained by those of advanced civilization and large population.

The colonies are theoretically parts of British soil, which we are bound, in case of war, to defend at any cost as our own shores, and cannot without disgrace abandon; and they are inhabited by men who are Englishmen, and have as keen a sense of our national honour as those who live at home, but who cannot, without breaking custom adhered to since the rebellion of American colonies, be called upon by the Imperial Parliament, to pay one single penny towards their own defence. In the first extended war in which we may embark, particularly with a naval power, it will be absolutely necessary to define, as it were at the cannon's mouth, and at the point of the bayonet, a position which we have neglected to determine during years of peace. For the Home Government would then be in this position—either (1) it would be obliged to defend the flourishing colonial cities at its own expense; or (2), against precedent, tax the colonies for so doing, a proceeding sure to arouse jealousy and resistance; or (3) leave the colonists themselves to defend their own shores.

In the first case, the strain upon the resources of England would be greater than she could hear. But for the great increase of English wealth, which has been partly acquired by trade with the colonies themselves, the United Kingdom could not have afforded the whole of the Imperial funds, and it would be unreasonable and unjust to it to propose that it should permanently do so. This is no doubt a question of time. The relative importance of the colonies to Great Britain must become greater, and with their greatness, their duties to the empire of which they are members, will acquire more importance. The inequality of the present system would not attract so much notice in a war in which special efforts were not needed on their behalf, but in a war such as we are supposing, this would be the case.

In the other cases, difficulties with the colonies would almost certainly arise which would greatly impair our strength and prestige, even if they did not produce a disintegration of the empire.

I believe that to attempt to tax our colonies under present circumstances would certainly prove disastrous. On this point, we have had a lesson that we can never forget, and we should run the risk, if we attempted to enforce such taxation in time of war, not merely of failing to get our money, but of getting an additional enemy into the bargain. For it must be remembered that it would be always open to a disaffected colony, threatened by the enemy, to make a separate peace, or even a hostile alliance, on the footing of severing its fortunes from ours.

Again, the defence of each colony at its own expense, without reference to other parts of the empire, would cause a severance of its interests from those of the empire, and would amount to a practical independence of the mother-country. It would also be the most inefficient form of defence. A general commanding purely local forces, not acting in concert with the regular troops of the empire, would, although perhaps appointed by the Home Government, find himself unable to use his forces in any way not sanctioned by the public opinion of the colony to which the forces belonged, or to take part in the organized defence of a neighbouring colony, however urgent the need might be. The same difficulties would probably arise in the uncertain case of voluntary gifts to the Imperial Government by the colonists, though that such gifts would be made is against our past experience. There would be a danger that each colony would require the allocation of its grants to special works on its own shores, or to the maintenance of a local militia, and would view with jealousy the expenditure of funds, collected locally, on the general defence of the empire, in pursuance of a policy in the direction of which its citizens had no voice.

There are other questions of Imperial policy, of which it is unfair that the home countries should bear the sole burden, but which, apparently, cannot at present be settled in any other manner.

The Imperial Government has lately, at its own expense, and in consequence of the earnest request of our Australian fellow-countrymen, accepted the cession of the Fiji Islands. The colonies, which were most interested in the annexation, were asked to contribute towards the cost incurred, but they all refused to do so. On a subsequent request, made by the Australian colonies to Lord Carnarvon, to annex New Guinea to the possessions of the British Crown, he, though declining to do this at present, stated that as such an annexation would be principally for the advantage of Australia, Great Britain should not be asked to incur heavy expenditure for the purpose, unshared by any Australian colony.

In commenting upon this answer, the correspondent of the 'Standard' newspaper in Melbourne stated that Australians boldly challenged the principle of these views—that certain portions of the empire should furnish funds towards the acquisition of new territory for the empire at large, and continued: "Is it

to be understood or laid down as a doctrine that for the future no remote dependency of Great Britain is to derive assistance from the State without paying an amount to be assessed on some definite basis? For this is really the question arising out of Lord Carnarvon's despatches having reference to Fiji and New Guinea, and a very important question it is-one which should be settled before any one part of the empire shall conceive it has cause for discontent because it has been called on for payments which have not been exacted from other portions under similar conditions."

A discussion of the relation of our colonies to the Home Government is enough to show that there are questions of primary importance in the fundamental constitution of the British Empire which require settlement, and this will have to be done either at a time of peace, such as the present, when men, both here and in the colonies, can regard the questions and principles at stake with calm and unbiassed minds, or in the excitement and pre-occupation of war, and under pressure of immediate necessity. I would submit that it is the duty of every Englishman, to whom the honour and interest of his country are dear, to turn his attention at once to the proper definition of the rights and obligations of our colonies, in order that we may, in the time of peril, present over our vast territories an unbroken and unwavering front to the enemy.

It is probable that but for the secession of the United States in the last century we should have been before this forced to settle the precise relations of the mother-country to the colonies-a settlement which would have involved some arrangement for colonial representation. The great spread of the English race in America, its comparative proximity to England, and the enormous interests at stake, would have prevented a merely temporizing colonial policy, possible towards less advanced settlements. Whether, in such a case, the lines of union would at first have been marked out in as broad and liberal a spirit as they may be in the future, is perhaps doubtful. The schemes for Imperial comprehension, which were advocated previous to this secession, planned the centralization in England of all branches of colonial government, and did not provide for the local self-government which subsequent experience has proved both to be practicable and not to be necessarily destructive of the Imperial tie.

It is very necessary that any arrangements for the closer political connection of the scattered members of the British race with England must, to insure their adoption in the first instance, and to produce strength and permanence afterwards, be laid on lines adapted to the habits of the people, so as to impair neither freedom nor sense of local responsibility. One of the greatest qualities of Englishmen, wherever they are found, is their power of local self-government, and the habit has been, by our policy towards the colonies, developed to its utmost. Perhaps the only principle from which our colonial policy has for the

last thirty years never swerved, is that of compelling the colonies to govern themselves. This may in some cases have been carried too far, but it has had the effect of generally producing stable and self-reliant communities. Selfgovernment has, however, proceeded in accordance with English traditions, and in no case has local development gone on in a path diverging greatly from home experience. Colonists have also been most sensible of English public opinion, and though resenting interference in purely colonial affairs, or what they have regarded as such, have always been willing to consider calmly recommendations of the Home Government laid persuasively and without pressure before them.*

But it is, I think, incontestable that any radical change in the policy of our colonial government must be effected with the general consent of colonists, and not by any interference with the independent action to which they have become accustomed and attached. I shall therefore assume that no system of Imperial union is practicable that does not allow to each local community the same or as great power of local self-government as it has at present.

The question next arises, Can any closer political union be formed such as still to concede to the local governments forming part of it, an autonomy, as complete as that now possessed by our principal colonies? Before considering this, I will notice very briefly the respective powers possessed and exercised at present by the Home or Imperial Government, and by the colonial communities, together with certain marked distinctions amongst the latter.

Our colonies are divided into three classes, each having different forms of local government; though within these classes no two of the colonies have institutions precisely similar to each other. The classes are defined in the 'Colonial Office List,' as follows:

(1) "Crown Colonies, in which the Crown has the entire control of legislation, while the administration is carried on by public offices, under the control of the Home Government." Of this class, the most conspicuous examples now are Jamaica and Ceylon.

(2) "Colonies possessing representative institutions, but not responsible government, in which the Crown has no more than a veto on legislation, but the Home Government retains the control of the public officers." The principal colonies of this class are the South African, and Western Australia.

(3) "Colonies possessing representative institutions and responsible government, in which the Crown has only a veto on legislation, and the Home Government has no control over any public officer except the Governor."

* If colonists have not in every case taken a sufficiently large view of the requirements of the empire generally, and have preferred provincial and local to Imperial interests, the cause may partly be found in the fact that they have no voice in central government, and have been too much encouraged by public men at home to regard their interests as apart and diverse from those of the mother-country.

A further explanation of this class of colonies is also given in the same list. It is stated that "under responsible government, the Executive Counsellors are appointed by the Governor alone, with reference to the exigencies of representative government, and other public offices by the Governor, on the advice of the Executive Council. In no appointment is the concurrence of the Home Government requisite. The control of all public departments is thus practically placed in the hands of persons commanding the confidence of a representative legislature." In this class are included the Dominion of Canada, all the Australian colonies (except Western Australia), and New Zealand.

Thus we have to deal with communities having various degrees of selfgovernment, of which it may generally be said that the widest local powers are given to those which contain the smallest admixture of foreign races.

As it is with the colonies of the third class, to which both responsible and representative government has been granted, that difficulties would be most likely to arise, it will be sufficient for my purpose to point out, very briefly, what is their legal and practical position. The powers of their legislatures originate with the Acts of the Imperial Parliament creating them, and though these Acts differ in their terms, they all bestow the widest authority within the limits of the respective colonies to which they refer. In short, they give all that is included in the power of making laws for good government, with this restriction, that such laws cannot alter existing, and are subject to future Imperial laws.* By usage, which has not been infringed for many years, the legislatures of these colonies have alone exercised the power, determined the incidence, and directed the expenditure of the proceeds of taxation within the limits of their own colonies. They have, however, in relation to foreign governments, or generally to persons outside their boundaries, had no status separate from that of the British Government, and in cases where they have entered into contracts with strangers for borrowing money and other purposes, they have done so as a municipality or corporate body, with the sanction of the colonial Governor rather than as a separate power.

The colonial legislatures are moreover subject to the absolute authority of the Parliament of Great Britain, and to the limited authority of the Crown.

The authority of the Crown over these colonies is exercised in three ways: by military protection; by allowing and disallowing laws made by the local legislatures; and by the appointment of a Governor having certain administrative powers.

The Parliament in England, which consists of the Crown, the House of Lords, and the House of Commons, acting in concert, has two characters, that of the local legislature of the three kingdoms, and the wider and Imperial one, of being the supreme authority over all parts of Her Majesty's dominions. This is finely

* See Sir Edward Creasy's 'Constitutions of the Britannic Empire.'