where practicable, in various parts of the empire, and the working of the Imperial Courts of Appeal in England.

Of the effect which such a change would have upon the local legislature for the United Kingdom, I propose subsequently to treat.

I am most fully sensible of the extreme difficulties which would arise in any attempt to carry out such a scheme, or indeed any other scheme for the consolidation of the empire, and of the improbability that, even if its main principle, the separation of the Imperial and local functions exercised by the present Parliament, should ever be adopted, the details I am now sketching would be accepted as worthy of notice; nevertheless, I have determined to continue these, though futile, as illustrations of my proposition. I believe however, that the changes in the constitution here proposed are the smallest which could be adopted, if a uniform plan giving equal rights to Englishmen in all parts of the empire, be regarded as the necessary object to be attained.

The English people, fortunately for themselves, are not in the habit of accepting cut and dried constitutions from legislators, or even at once, for good and all, adopting a new principle and carrying it out, in all branches of government, by a comprehensive enactment. On the other hand, new principles are generally evolved out of a series of tentative measures, through which the people both get accustomed to the novelty, and are enabled to test its truth. Assuredly we shall not see the unification of the empire accomplished by different means.

The Sovereign is the visible expression of the unity of the empire, even as it now exists, and is the means through which every subject, of whatever race or colour, living in any part of her dominions, realizes his relationship to all other subjects. Under no other form of government but that of a monarchy would the continuous political connection of the scattered communities of British race be in any way possible. The spirit of loyalty, which is so powerful a sentiment in the mass of people when not too much opposed to their material interests, is impossible towards an abstraction, and is greatly weakened when its object holds only a temporary position. There is every sign that this feeling of personal attachment to the Sovereign, which is taken out by emigrants from the mother-country to the colonies, is maintained unabated amongst their descendants; and it has shown itself in a marked manner during the visits of the children of our present Queen to British dependencies. Probably even now an average citizen of the United States of British descent feels a greater amount of personal devotion to Queen Victoria than he does to the President of his Republic for the time being. Mr. Herman Merivale has remarked,* that Imperial Rome for five centuries held the various races forming her empire in willing allegiance, regarding her with reverence as the fountain of laws, order,

*Lectures on Colonization and the Colonies,' Lecture xxii.

and civilization; and that her empire was torn asunder by foreign violence, but never divided from within. And he says: "May we not figure to ourselves, scattered thick as stars over the surface of this earth, communities of citizens owning the name of Britons, bound in allegiance to a British Sovereign, and uniting heart and hand in maintaining the supremacy of Britain on every shore which her unconquered flag can reach ?”

Under any system by which a direct share in the government of the empire is given to colonists, it is to be expected that the personal influence of the Sovereign will be of vital importance. Standing in precisely the same relation to each province and subject, the occupant of the throne, unfettered by local interest, may regard with absolute impartiality any question which may arise from time to time between the various parts, and will have it in his or her power, by persuasion, and by the influence which the possessor of a position so magnificent and exalted must ever have, to foster a spirit of compromise and public-mindedness, and to harmonize and guide the conflicting desires of the various parts of the empire to the general benefit. This is a difficult task, but with the traditions of the British Monarchy it is not too much to hope that it will be met and fulfilled. It is reasonable to suppose that the powers and duties of the Crown, in administration of the Imperial Government, and as a part of the Imperial Parliament, would remain as at present; the Crown possessing a veto in legislation, and exercising its power in according with the advice of Imperial Ministers.

English experience has shown forcibly the stability and permanence which is given to the constitution and to government by the hereditary principle, and in spite of the arguments which may be brought against it, the majority of observers are still of opinion that where, as is here the case, a nation is fortunate enough to have a wide-spread aristocracy in sympathy with popular aspirations, an hereditary legislative body composed of its chiefs, is a means of government not rashly to be discarded. It is necessary to consider what part the House of Peers should play in any revised scheme of Imperial Government. At present that House is an integral part of the Imperial Parliament; and it certainly occupies itself in far greater proportion than is the case in the House of Commons with subjects of Imperial interest. Discussions upon foreign policy are frequent in the House of Lords, and in these there is a marked tendency to lay greater stress on the principles on which that policy should permanently be based, than on the passing phases of every question. This tendency to look below the surface of a problem, and to discover the true principles on which it rests, is also to be seen in most of the debates of the House of Lords on other subjects. It is to be remarked that since the days of Canning every Minister for Foreign Affairs, except Lord Palmerston, who might, if he had chosen, have

sat in the House of Lords as a representative peer for Ireland, has been a member of that House, or has subsequently become one; and since the creation of the Colonial Office as a separate department of State, almost every Colonial Secretary has also been a peer. These and other facts tend to show that there is something in the calm atmosphere of the House of Lords, where the members hold positions unaffected by the turmoil of popular elections, peculiarly suited to the discussion and supervision of Imperial affairs. That House also contains the representatives of many of the men who have done most to place England in her present Imperial position. To take away, therefore, from the House of Lords its place as part of the Imperial Parliament, would be a revolutionary act, not demanded by the public interest.

At the same time, it would probably be necessary, if the Imperial bond should endure, to add to that body persons who should not necessarily belong to the local Parliament of Great Britain. This could be done by appointing as peers some of the most conspicuous members of the families of hereditary wealth, which are certain to arise in the colonies as their resources become more developed; and by the nomination by the Crown, as life members, of men such as past governors of colonies, diplomatists, and others, whose opinions may be valuable in Imperial politics. By this means, one of the greatest defects of the constitution of the United States, in which the richer and territorial classes are habitually excluded from political influence, would be avoided. It might also prove a politic measure to create the great subject feudatory princes of India peers, by tenure, of the Imperial Parliament, with a view to blend their interests, ¡n a more marked manner, with those of the empire generally. There are, however, dangers in this step which might render it impracticable.

It may perhaps be objected that the numbers of the present hereditary House would form too large a proportion in a reformed Imperial House of Lords; and that the colonies would not consent to the preponderance to home interests which such an arrangement would give. I do not believe that this would be the case. It is not to be expected that the Upper House would exercise a larger or more stringent control over the Imperial policy than it does at present, and there would be no fear that its wishes would over-ride those of the representative House, in which the colonies would be directly represented, in any matter where the latter took a strong interest. But there would be this great benefit to the empire, that the traditions which have guided us so far in safety would be retained, or rendered less liable to be forgotten, during the time that change and expansion might be altering its whole appearance. There would, moreover, be great difficulty in devising any plan for diminishing the number of peers who should sit in the Imperial Upper House, which should leave it in any way the same as it is at present. Certainly the mode of election of representatives by the hereditary peers of Scotland and Ireland has not been successful,

But there is one body of men with most useful functions in the present House of Peers that we could not look to see included in a future Imperial House. I mean the bishops of the Church of England. Thirty years ago there seemed still a chance that this Church might have gone hand in hand with each community of Englishmen taking root in our colonies, recognized by each local government, and aiding it in spreading over a willing people the blessings of religion and civilization. That prospect has now vanished for ever. I believe there is a great future before the English Church in the colonies, but it will not be connected with that of the State. The principle that no one form of religion shall be specially assisted and protected has finally been recognized by almost all of them, and it would not be possible to organize an Imperial Legislature in which the colonies are represented, where any religious body should possess, as of right, certain seats in either chamber, although the appointments to fill these were made by one of the local governments acting under that Imperial Legislature. But, of course, the present restriction preventing the clergy from sitting in the House of Commons would be done away with, and bishops might be properly nominated to sit as life peers. There could be also no objection to their continuing to sit in the local House of Lords. Should such an Imperial House, as I have imagined, ever be created, the position of a member of it would be as dignified and influential as that of the holder of a seat in any legislative body which has ever existed.

I now approach the most interesting part of the question I have been considering, the pivot, in fact, upon which any scheme of Imperial reform must turn, namely, the constitution of the Imperial House of Commons. Unless it be possible to reform the present House by such an addition to or arrangement of its members, that it may be regarded with confidence and respect by all parts of Her Majesty's dominions, any change in the present state of things must be for the worse. The change here proposed, though a radical one, rests, I believe, on an equitable basis, and follows nearly the lines which natural growth has pointed out; and, I hope, will not offend any person's sense of justice. However, it may prove that even the most equitable plan may fail, either because the cohesion and common interests and sentiments of the various component parts of the empire are less than they appear to be, or because individual ambitions, the product of present want of unity, prevent the adoption of reform at the proper time.

In the first place, the essence of my proposition would be that this representative House should be the same as the old House of Commons, a continuation of its existence, but so reformed as to be better fitted to perform its Imperial functions. There are obvious advantages in continuity with the past, and they have been recognized in every great reform carried out by the English people. There is a strong analogy between the admission of the colonists to share in the

government of the British Empire, and the respective unions of Scotland and Ireland with England and Great Britain, in 1707 and 1800. In both these cases, the position of the Parliament, meeting in England, remained unaltered; the only change made was to place Scotland and Ireland under its control, and add fresh representatives from these countries. The same care to preserve continuity with the past was shown in the reform of the Church of England in the sixteenth century, and in the change of dynasty in the revolution of 1688. The effect of maintaining the legal existence of the House of Commons would be to preserve unimpaired the status and the traditions and customs of the present House, which would have these advantages: (1) That no fresh powers would be needed to give it, with the other branches of the Imperial Parliament, supreme authority in every part of Her Majesty's dominions; (2) That its present great prestige, which is most necessary to secure the consideration and respect of those it controls, would remain; and, (3) That the constitutional maxims as to its relation with the other branches of the legislature, together with the privileges and rules which are the fruit of six hundred years of national experience and development, would continue.

Undoubtedly very large reforms would be needed to make the House of Commons a representative legislative assembly for the empire. I shall endeavour to treat them as they group themselves under two heads; the delegation of the control of purely local affairs in England, Scotland, and Ireland to a subordinate legislature, and the admission of representatives from colonies having representative local government.

The first of these heads, relating to the formation of a local legislature, I propose to consider subsequently.

The admission of representatives into the House of Commons from all parts of the wide empire of England would doubtless cause many changes in its constitution and its course of business, which it is difficult to foresee, and which will have to be left to experience to settle; but there are some which depend upon principles that it is necessary should be agreed upon at the outset, as the basis upon which the lines of reform are to be set. And the foremost of these principles follows upon the answer given to the question: How is the number of representatives which each province or local unit shall send to Parliament to be fixed? Is this to depend upon some general rule to be applied to each of these units alike, or upon some arbitrary arrangement, such as may appear temporarily expedient? I would reply, without hesitation, that if the work is to be permanent, and not carry within itself the seeds of its own dissolution, it must proceed on the principle of giving relative equality to every part of Her Majesty's dominions included in its scope. To order otherwise would be to create jealousies fatal to public spirit, and perhaps never to be appeased, which