1 France and the Emperor were willing, in the fummer 1742, to agree to thefe terms, as the preliminaries towards a general peace, I should be glad to know, what we have been fince fighting for; (ar I should rather say, spending our money; for of fighting we have had very tle, and fhould have had none at all, if we had not been attacked). For nothing, Sur, fo far as I can comprehend, but either to get some bishoprick added to Hanover, or to furnish our minifters with a pretence for taking, and keeping 16,000 Hanoverian troops in British pay. That both France and the Emperor were then willing to agree to these terms, we had e often repeated in our publick gazettes; and, from a declaration delivered by the court of France, in September 1742, to e the Marquis de Stainville, the Great Duke's minifter at Paris, which was publifhed in our news-papers, we may be convinced of it; for, in that declaration, the French court offer to restore Bohemia entire to the Queen of Hungary, and to recal M. Maillebois, on the fingle condition, that the Queen fhould reftore Bavaria to the Emperor, and evacuate Paffau. Nay, farther, it appears from that declaration, that the court of Vienna were once willing to accept of these terms; but, as was binted in fome other news-papers, were diverted from it by the folicitations and high promifes of a certain court, meaning that of G. Britain. I beg pardon, Sir, for arguing from common news-papers; but, as our minifters will not furnish us with any other lights, I muft argue and muft judge from fuch as I have. I I know, Sir, it will be faid, that nothing was offered with regard to Italy. But I must obferve, that these were of fered as preliminaries only to a general peace. The French court, in the declaration I have mentioned, faid, they could anfwer for it, that the Emperor would agree to what they propofed: but very probably they could not anfwer for the court of Spain; and therefore they were fo fair as not to offer any thing with regard to Italy; tho' I am convinced, that, if these terms had been accepted, and the tranquillity of Germany thereby restored, the French court would not have been fuch fools, as to join with the court of Spain in carrying on a war in Italy; and, without the affiftance of France, the Spaniards might in one campaign have been drove out of Italy and Savoy, by the King of Sardinia and the Queen of Hungary, without any affiftance from this nation, or from any other power in Europe. But, fuppofe the French court had refolved to give Spain their utmost assistance against the Queen of Hungary and the King of Sardinia; if the former had been fecured upon the fide of Germany, by a treaty with the Emperor, and upon the fide of Flanders, by the Dutch neutrality, fhe, and the King of Sardinia, with the affiftance of fuch fubfidies as we might eafily have spared, if we had not taken it into our heads to form a land-army; I fay, the Queen of Hungary and King of Sardinia might, in this cafe, have brought at least 150,000 men into Piedmont, more than they have there at prefent; and fuch a number of good troops properly difpofed in that country, where there are so many difficult paffes, would have made it impoffible for an army of 500,000 men to force their way into Italy: and, fuppofe they had, they could not have fubfifted after they had got thither; for it would have been impoffible to supply them by land with provifions, especially for their horses; and it would have been ftill more impoffible to fupply them by fea, had we made the Queen of Hungary miftrefs of the Mediterranean, by means of our navy. From thefe confiderations, it is evident, Sir, that the re-establishment or fecurity of the balance of power, was not the true caufe of our inftigating the court of Vienna to refuse the terms offered by the French in the fummer 1742; which, as I have reason to believe, were again offered laft fummer, and offered with very material additions. What then was the caufe? Had we then formed a scheme for enabling the Queen of Hungary to make conquefts upon France? If we had, it was a very ridiculous one. We could not hope, that even the fate of war could render it reasonable. The fate of war may ruin this nation, as well as the house of Auftria; but, in the prefent circumstances of of Europe, we cannot hope, that even the fate of war can render fuch a fcheme fuccefsful; for, if the fate of war fhould declare very much in our favour, it would only produce a new confederacy amongst the princes of Germany, whofe jealoufy of the House of Auftria would make them join with France and Spain, for pulling down, or at least for preventing any increase of power in the houfe of Auftria. The enabling the Queen of Hungary to make conquefts upon France, could not therefore be the true reason, why our minifters perfuaded her to reject the offers made by France in the year 1742. They could have no reason, but that of furnishing themselves with a pretence for taking the Hanoverian troops into British pay. Perhaps the fuccefs of the Queen of Hungary's arms has fince given them hopes of being able to procure fome other advantages for the electorate of Hanover: but I can fee no reason, why this nation fhould be at any expence, or run any rifk, upon that account; and I am fure, no real friend to our prefent Royal family will advife it. I must confefs, Sir, the Hon. Gentleman has found out a very new, and a moft ingenious reason, for our encouraging the Queen of Hungary to continue the war. He fays, we have no other way for compelling the Spaniards to come to any reasonable terms of peace with us. I am glad to find, Sir, that the Hon. Gentleman and his friends have not entirely forgot our being at war with Spain; but I fhould likewife be glad to know, how we can, by this means, bring Spain to agree to reasonable terms of peace with us. We may, by promifing the Queen of Hungary more than we are able to perform, encourage her to continue the war: but I believe our minifters, with all their rhetorick, will hardly be able to perfuade her to give up any part of her Italian dominions to Don Philip, upon condition of Spain's coming to reafonable terms of peace with us; and I can fee no other way of inducing Spain, by her means, to come to any peace with us, unless we fhould prevail with her to attack Don Carlos, in order to drive him out of his new kingdom; which would probably bring new enemies upon her back as well ours, and might induce the King of S dinia to declare against her. But, fupp she should fucceed; if fhe had once poffeffion of the Two Sicilies, can we fi pofe, fhe would yield them up again, the fingle condition of Spain's agreeing reasonable terms of peace with us? Su pofe then the Spaniards were drove qu out of Italy, could we then, by the Que of Hungary's means, compel them to fu mit to reasonable terms with us? or, in c der to induce them to it, muft we chan fides, and declare against the Queen of Hu gary? for, unless we should do fo, the might for ever continue the war agair this nation, if what the Hon. Gentlema fays, be true, that we have no other wa of compelling them. But, thank God, Sir, we have several ther ways. I fhall not fay that we oug to think of making any cor quefts in Ŏ Spain; but we might make fuch frequen and fuch formidable incurfions, and fo ha rafs both the people and armies of Spain that that court would foon find themfelv obliged, by the clamours of their own pec ple, to fubmit to reasonable terms of peac with us. And I muft here observe, that by employing our troops in this manner we fhould have done much more fervic both to the Queen of Hungary and our felves, than by fending them to Flanders But then our minifters could have had n pretence for taking Hanoverian troops in to British pay, which was what they re garded more than the fervice either of the Queen of Hungary or their native country The Hon. Gentleman fays, we know by experience how difficult and dangerou it is, to make any attempt against the Spa nifh fettlements in America. Sir, are w to form any judgment from our late ridi culous and ill-concerted expedition? an expedition which was provided neither with troops, provifions, artillery, nor offi cers that were proper for the purpose; an expedition that was fent to a place, where of all others, our men were in the greate danger from the climate; in fhort, an ex pedition that, I believe, was defigned, by thofe that fent it out, to mifcarry. Si instead of forming a judgment from that expedition, I am convinced, that, by a expedition wifely concerted, properly provided, and directed to proper places in the Spanish West Indies, we may at any time force the court of Spain to fubmit to reafonable terms of peace. And as to the future profecution of the war at fea, we are not to judge of it from our late condaft: for, when our ministers say, it is the merchants war, and therefore they ought to fuffer by it, we cannot wonder at the great fuccefs the Spanish privateers have met with; nor can we wonder at the Spaniards having got fo many register fhips home, when it has from many inftances appeared, that our minifters had no intelligence as to their squadrons, and much leis as to their register ships. I hope, Sir, I have now fully fhewn, that we can have no English reason for continuing the war, or for advifing the Queen of Hungary to continue the war; and, if we have no English reafon for continuing the war, furely we can have no reafon for continuing to give English money for Hanover troops. But it may be faid, that thofe troops must be continued in our pay till peace be actually concluded. Sir, I have two reafons, which I think pretty fubftantial, even against this. The one is, That our minifters will never, I believe, confent to the Queen of Hungary's accepting of any terms of peace, as long as they are allowed to keep Hanover troops in British pay; and the other is, That I am fully convinced, that our land-army, more especially these troops, have never been, nor can be, of any service to the Queen of Hungary; therefore the keeping them in our pay can have no fuch effect upon the court of France, as to induce them to of fer better terms, or fooner, than they would otherwife do. On the contrary, I believe, our difmiffing them, and calling home our own troops, would have a very great effect for both these purposes; because the court of France would from thence fuppofe, that we had refolved for the future to take the best and most effectual way for fupporting the Queen of Hungary, which is, by our money and our navy. I was really furprised, Sir, how the Hon. Gentleman could be so weak, as to make afe of any memorial drawn up and publifhed by the court of France, for proving, that our land-army was of fervice to the common cause, by difabling France from fending proper reinforcements to their army in Germany, or to the Spaniards in Italy. If they had fincerely thought fo, they would not have faid fo; at least they would have guarded against its being published: but, as they knew the contrary, they said fo, and published what they said, in order to encourage us to spend our money in maintaining an ufelefs army upon their frontier, instead of sending that money to the Queen of Hungary and King of Sardinia, for enabling them to increase their armies, which, the French knew, might be of great use, and would be made the beft ufe of for preventing the execution of their defigns. This, Sir, our minifters could not but fee, as well as the French; for from the eftimates it appears, that our land-army has, and will coft us above a million Sterling yearly. If this money had been sent to the Queen of Hungary and King of Sar dinia, it would have enabled them to add 50 or 60,000 men to their armies; and this would have been more than a counter-balance for all the reinforcements the French could have fent either to Germany or Savoy: for, tho' they might, and did easily affemble a body of 40 or 50,000 men to face our army upon their own frontier, they could not have fent near that number into Germany or Savoy, because they could not leave their country quite deftitute of troops. Common sense must therefore inftruct us in what was the defign of the court of France, when they drew up and publifhed that memorial: and befides, it contradicts itself; for it fays, the troops defigned for the affiftance of the Spaniards were actually quartered in Dauphiny and Provence, which border upon Savoy, from whence they might have marched to oppose any attack in Flanders, with as much eafe, and in as fhort a time, as they could have marched from the provinces in which they were quartered. But that memorial hints at the true reafon why no French troops marched to the affiftance of the Spaniards. It fays, the alliance between Hungary and Sardinia was then fo flightly cemented, that it might be easily diffolved. This, Sir, was the the true reafon, I really believe: for the French had no inclination to break with the King of Sardinia, as long as they had any hopes of gaining him by fair means; but, as thofe hopes feem now to be cut off by the famous treaty of Worms, we fhall next year fee, whether our army in Flanders will prevent the French from joining with the Spaniards in an attack upon his Sardinian Majesty's territories. But now fuppofe, Sir, that our land-army could be of fome fervice; yet, in order to keep up that army, I do not think it neceffary for us to keep the Hanoverians in pay. The court of Hanover are certain ly in the right to take our money as long as we are willing to give it; but, if we fhould put a stop to our generofity, they have, I hope, the common cause and the intereft of the Queen of Hungary fo much at heart, that they would keep their troops in the army at their own expence: confequently, if the court of Hanover be fuch friends to the Queen of Hungary as they pretend, the allied army can be no way Jeffened by our difmiffing their troops out of our pay; and, if their friendship for the Queen of Hungary be pretended only, in order to intitle them to have their troops maintained by us, I am afraid, we have laid out, and fhall lay out our money in that way to very little purpose: for, if the Elector of Hanover be indifferent about the fupport of the Queen of Hungary, I much fear, that the King of England will not be very fanguine; in which cafe, it is not to be expected, that our land-army will do much fervice either to that princefs or the common caufe: therefore I should be for difmiffing thefe Hanover troops, if it were for no other reafon but to try the fincerity of the court of Hanover, and confequently I must be againft the motion. The speech of T. Pedanius, in the character occurring to every Gentleman in house. In the last year, there were fuch inftances of Hanoverian pufillanis ty, infolence, and difobedience, which now fo glaring in the eyes of the wh world. We have now, in an affair of laft importance to this country, grea perhaps than ever came before this hot experience for our guide: and shall we contrary to experience itself; to experien which teaches even fools? Shall we ta troops into our pay, who want perfor courage; who are fure to be wanting their duty in the day of battle; and wh inftead of being an affiftance, will betr us into misfortunes, by disappointing of that ftrength, which we vainly rely u on, by difordering our army, instead fupporting it? But, Sir, fhould this m tion pafs in the affirmative, what a dam what dejection of fpirit, muft it caft our men, when they find themselves fc ced, by their own countrymen, by th houfe of Commons, to bow their neck the Hanoverian yoke, and to fubmit thofe grievances which they have fo lou ly complained of?-The only colour pretence which I have heard alledged, this, that it is now too late to hire othe troops. But will the miniftry, who pr tend it is too late to hire other troop pretend too, that they were the only pe fons in the world, unacquainted with th behaviour of the Hanoverians, during th laft campaign? If they cannot pretend thi too, as well as that it is too late, wha do they other than acknowledge, tha they impofe a neceffity which they migh have prevented, and premeditately forc a wrong measure on the nation? But thi fuppofed neceffity from the lateness o the time, is abfolutely falfe, is a funda mental mistake; for it is always too ear ly to engage in a wrong measure: no can any thing be fo terrible to an enemy as good management; which, tho' flow in its execution, is always more certain in voted lat our we 16,000 Hanoverians into British pay, I beg leave to offer my reafons why I cannot agree with the Hon. Gentleman who has made the like motion this year; tho' the cafe of Hanoverian troops, this year, is fo widely different from what it was the laft, that the diftinction cannot fail our part, is what the foe muft wish to fee Good God! what joy will it give the e nemy, when that important piece of news is carried to them abroad, that it is the refolution of a British house of Commons to take confufion into their army. Sir Sir, we have invited here the Electors of Hanover, with great rewards; we have given them kingdoms to rule over: but I hope, fenfible as I am of the great benefits which have arifen from their good go. vernment; I hope, I fay, we fhall never be fo paffionately fond of Hanoverians, as never to reft fatisfied, never contented, till we have hired their whole people to be lords over us. The Speech of Pomponius Atticus, in the character of Horatio Walpole, Efq; Mr Prefident, alliance lately concluded between him, his Majefty, and the Queen of Hungary. This fituation requires therefore, inftead of a diminution, rather an increase of our forces, in order to make the utmost efforts to finish the great work that is happily advanced fo far; and to oblige the Emperor and his allies to come to a general pacification on reasonable terms; to which, at prefent, they feem not at all difpofed. On the contrary, if we may judge by outward appearances, France is making greater preparations than ever, both by fea and land; and has, 'tis faid, con is, clude new offenfive and defenfive Hanoverians fhould be employed in our fervice abroad the next campaign? or, in other words, Whether we should furnish 16,000 men lefs; and, in confequence of that, have 22,000 men lefs for the fupport of the common cause, than we had last year? If we confider the fituation of affairs with respect to the motives of the war, and the fuccess of it, it must be owned, without canvaffing whether more might not have been done than was done laft year, that the affairs of the Queen of Hungary, by the operations of the campaign, are in a better, and a more hopefal ftate, than the most fanguine defires or expectations could have promised at the opening of it. Prague, Egra, and all her dominions, have not only been cleared of the enemy; but the Emperor himself, the principal aggreffor, has been driven out of his own territories, and the French, in a great measure, out of the empire: and altho' the active part of these advantages, is owing to the conduct of Pr. Charles of Lorrain, and the courage of the troops under his command; yet the allied army having kept M. Noailles in Echec, and prevented his making any detachment in fupport of Broglio and C. Seckendorff, to which he was most earnestly folicited, joined with the glorious battle of Dettingen, must be confeffed to have greatly Contributed to the fuccefs of the Auftrians on the other fide of the Rhine, and have obliged the French to retire into their own country. Add to this, the advantage that may be expected from the activity of the King of Sardinia, by the VOL. VII. ance with Spain and the Emperor; by virtue of which, befides a great augmentation of her own armies on the continent, fhe has engaged to enable the Emperor, by fubfidies, to put his fcattered troops in a condition to act; who is accordingly taking the proper measures for that purpofe: fhe is alfo to furnish a confiderable number of men and fhips to fupport Don Philip, in renewing his enterprizes against the King of Sardinia. The late Cardinal's pacifick, half paced, genius, balancing between peace and war, is buried with him; and the ancient spirit of domineering, has refumed the reins of government in France: confequently, the least abatement of our zeal and force, in fupport of the common caufe, muft prove, at this juncture, of the most dangerous confequence: and that must be the case, should we refufe to continue the 16,000 men any longer in our fervice; for it is impoffible to fhow, as will be made appear by and by, that the fame number of troops, to fupply that defect, can be had, in time, any where elfe; or that that defect can be made good by any other means. But it is pretended, that the Hanoverian troops can be of no ufe, because those of G. Britain are fo incenfed against them, that it is impoffible they fhould ever act together again. Now, to imagine that the fervice of foreign troops in the pay of G. Britain fhould be incompatible with the service of the troops of the nation that pays them, feems at firftto be very extraordinary, and indeed an abfurd fuppofition; contrary to C the |