d engagement by any parliamentary act, I hope our minifters have no thoughts of aBy thing but to affift her to defend herself. If this be their fole defign, fuppofing it neceflary to aflift her with troops, our minifters may get troops to hire, that, by their fituation, and upon feveral other accounts, are more proper for the fervice than either British or Hanoverians. Pruffans or Saxons may in a few days march into her dominions; the Swifs may in a few weeks: and, though it is late in the year; tho' our minifters have, I believe, on purpofe, put off bringing this motion before us; yet we have ftill time enough to negotiate a treaty for the hire of other १ troops, and to conclude that treaty foon enough for the troops to march, fo as to be ready and in the proper place of action by the opening of the campaign. As the articles of fuch treaties are but few, and all of them fixed by precedent, we cannot doubt of being able to conclude fuch a treaty, even with the Swifs cantons, in a few days, when we have fuch an able and experienced negotiator amongst us as the Hon. Gentleman who spoke laft. But, Sir, as I am convinced of the truth of what I said at firft; as I am convinced, that, if the Queen of Hungary had money enough, the could raise men enough within her own dominions, for her defence againft the most numerous armies that can be brought against her, as long as the thinks of nothing but a defenfive war, I am for calling home our troops, difmiffing the Hanoverians, and fending the money, or a great part of the money they coft us, to the Queen of Hungary, and King of Sardinia; for, I am fure, neither of them has ever yet given the leaft ground for the infinuation thrown out by the Hon. Gentleman, that great part of the money might be applied by them to other purposes. If the money, or any part of it, were to be applied to our fervice, or to a common caufe in which they had no particular concern, there might perhaps be fome reafon to think fo: but, when the whole is to be applied to their own immediate defence, if neither of them had ever given any proofs of a prudent e conduct, it would be natural and reafonable to think, that the whole would be applied, by them, to the beft ufe, and with the utmoft œconomy. In a defenfive war, therefore, we muk conclude, that our money and our navy will be fufficient for enabling the Queen of Hungary, and King of Sardinia, to defend themselves against all the armies that France, Spain, and the Emperor, can'a tack them with; and, while they continue upon the defenfive, neither of them has any other enemy to fear: but, if they begin to act offenfively, they may ftir up new enemies, and more than we fhall be able to defend them against, even tho' Hanover fhould affift us with all its troops, and at its own expence; which is what I shall never expect; for, whatever broils that electorate may involve us in for the accomplishment of its own views, I believe it will take care not to involve itself in any upon our account. I know, Sir, it may be faid, that, even in a defenfive war, it may be neceffary to attack the enemy, in order to prevent their attacking us. But this can never be the cafe, where it is vastly difficult for us to attack the enemy, and still more difficult for the enemy to attack us; which is the very cafe at prefent. It is extremely difficult for the Queen of Hungary to attack France, because of the long way her army muft march, the great river it muft pafs, and the many fortified towns it must befiege and take, before it can make any confiderable impreffion upon that kingdom: but it is ftill more difficult for the French to attack the Queen of Hungary in Bohemia or Bavaria, because of the long march their army must make to come at thofe countries, the difficulties it would meet with to get subsistence, and the danger it would be in of being totally deftroyed, in cafe of a defeat, by having no place of fafety to retreat to; and, principally, by reafon of the jealoufy it might excite in the German princes, if they faw fuch numerous armies of French marching into their country, as would be neceflary to make a fuccefsful attack upon the Queen of Hungary in Bohemia or Bavaria. In like manner, Sir, it is difficult for the King of Sardinia, tho' affifted by the Queen of Hungary, to make an attack upon France, France, because of the ruggedness of the French country upon that fide, and the many fortified towns by which their frontier is guarded: but it is much more difficult for the French to attack him, because his country is still more rugged, and because of the many infurmountable mountains, and long narrow defiles, their armies muft pafs thro'; and, when they had, with infinite lofs, forced their way thro' all of them, which would be almost impoffible, if the paffes were well fortified and guarded by a numerous army; I fay, when the French had forced their way thro', in or der to attack the Queen of Hungary's dominions in Italy, it would be impoffible for them to fubfift their army there, unlefs they were masters of the Mediterranean; which they can never be, as long as we have fuch a fuperior navy. Does not every one fee, Sir, that, in thefe circumstances, it is the bufinefs both of the Queen of Hungary and King of Sardinia to provoke, rather than make an attack? For what purpofe fhould either of them make an attack upon France? To compel the French and their allies, it is faid, to agree to reasonable terms of peace. Sir, they must do fo in a fhort time, if no attack were to be made upon them. I am perfuaded, they would do fo now, and will do fo, if we defire nothing more than to fecure the Queen of Hungary in the poffeffion of what now properly belongs to her. I have fhewn how difficult and dangerous it is for the French to make an attack either upon the Queen of Hungary in Bavaria, or the King of Sardinia in Piedmont; yet, difficult and dangerous as these attacks are, the French muft make them both, if they are refolved to continue the war. If they do not attack the Queen of Hungary in Bavaria, the Emperor will think himself abandoned, and will come to an accommodation with the Queen of Hungary upon any terms, in order to recover his hereditary countries. On the other hand, if they do not fupport the Spaniards, and join with them in attacking the King of Sardinia, and after him the Queen of Hungary's dominions in Italy, the court of Spain will think itself abandoned, and will come to an accommodation upon any terms both with us and the Quee Hungary. Nay, both the Emperor Spain may, out of revenge, refolve join in an offenfive alliance against Frat if it fhould be thought proper to form ny fuch alliance. When I confider these things, Sir cannot help wondering, what put in our wrong heads to fend our troops Flanders, or to form an army in t country. Flanders is, of all others, place where France may, with the gre eft eafe, and most benefit to itself, n and moft prejudice to this kingdom, tack the Queen of Hungary. It is t country, where, of all others, we oug to have been most cautious of provoki an attack. Flanders would have been cured by the Dutch neutrality, if we h formed no army there; but, by forming army there, we furnifh the French wi an excufe for attacking it; which w be admitted as a good one by, at lea all their friends in Holland: and, aft being thus provoked, the conquefts th may make there, will not give near much umbrage to the neutral princes Europe, as they would have done, h the attack been begun without any pr vocation. Our army in Flanders has therefore, my opinion, Sir, done much more har to the common cause, than it ever ca do fervice; whereas, if we had nev thought of forming an army there, or taking any foreign troops into our pay f that purpose, but had fent the money thi army has coft us, to the Queen of Hung ry, and King of Sardinia, their armi would by this time have been fo num rous, and the ftrong places and defiles the country of the latter, fo well fortifie that the French would have found it in poffible for them to think of making fuccessful attack upon either; and, co fequently, would have been glad to hav agreed to a peace, upon fuch terms their ally the Emperor, as even we ou felves muft have thought reasonable. An if the Queen of Spain had found it impo fible for her to accomplish her views upo Italy, by the means of France, and the hopes that have been given her, thereb difappointed, her refentment would hav * induced her to agree to the best terms of peace with us, that we could with any hadow of reafon infift on. For this reafon, Sir, if France and the Emperor have not already offered terms of peace, or fuch as may serve as preliminaties for treating and concluding a general peace, I am convinced, that the moft effe Qual way we can take for inducing both of them to accept or offer fuch terms, is, to put a negative upon this motion, to come immediately to a refolution to add 5 or 600,000 1. to the fubfidies allowed to the Queen of Hungary and King of Sardinia, and at the fame time to address his Majelly to call home his troops from Flanders. I fhall grant, Sir, that, to difband our army, in order to obtain a speedy and honourable peace, feems at first view to be a little paradoxical: but, when we confider, that our army never did, nor ever can ferve for any thing, but to exhauft that treasure which may be usefully employed another way; that the difmiffing of an ufelefs army will very much increase those armies that can alone be ufeful; and that our army may divert the war from that channel where it is our intereft to have it carried on, and turn it into that channel where it is the intereft of the common enemy to have it carried on: Ifay, when we confider these things, the paradox disappears, and reafon and true policy refume their place. Thus, Sir, we may fee, that our rejefting this motion, and difmiffing thefe Hanoverians, inftead of diffolving the alliance, as the Hon. Gentleman was plea fed to call it; tho', like the productions of the Nile, it feems to be as yet but half formed: I fay, inftead of diffolving the alliance, it would cement it, as to every one of the parties concerned. The Queen of Hungary and King of Sardinia would at first have chose to have had our money rather than our troops; which, from the reafon of things, I may affert, and have ground to affert, from what I have heard has been dropt by fome of their minifters; tho' their minifters are as cautious in their expreffions as poffible, because both are certainly willing to take our affiftance, in any manner our minifters will please to give it: and, if our minifters refolve, that VOL. VII. Hanover fhall be a gainer by any part of the affiftance we give, our allies muft accept of it in that manner, tho' they fee that it can be of little or no fervice to them. It is therefore evident, that this change of measures will cement the alliance between us, and the Queen of Hungary, and King of Sardinia; and, as to the Dutch, it will not only cement our alliance with them, but unite us in the fame measure. The Dutch, Sir, have always been for affifting the Queen of Hungary with their good offices for obtaining reasonable terms of peace, and with their money for fupporting the war, till fuch terms can be obtained. They never thought of affifting her with troops, till our mad fchemes made them afraid, left France fhould obtain fuch a fignal advantage over us, as might encourage her to enlarge her views, and form defigns that might really be of dangerous confequence to the liberties of Europe. The affair of Dettingen gave them the alarm: they were afraid, left France might again catch our army in fuch a trap, as they had like to have caught it in at that place; therefore they fent a body of their troops to the Upper Rhine, not to join with us in attacking France, but to prevent the French from attacking our army. I must not conclude, Sir, without taking fome notice of the terrible hobgoblin the Hon. Gentleman was pleafed to frighten us with: I mean, that of our being enga ged in a war with the united power of France and Spain, and without one ally to affift us; by which, he said, the war would be tranflated from the continent to this ifland. Sir, from the whole tenor of negotiations and treaties that Gentleman was engaged in for twenty years together, I have fome reafon to think, that he and his friends have but a mean opinion, both of the ftrength and courage of their country. Thank God! I have a better opinion of both; and therefore I have the pleafure to think, that, if our marine were put upon a good footing, and the beft ufe made of our navy, we have nothing to fear from both these nations combined together againft us. Their land-armies, in which their ftrength confifts, could be of no fervice to them against this nation, unless D they they were mafters at fea: which they ne ver could be, if we managed right; be cause we have three times more fhips of war already built, and thrice as many feamen as both put together; and, I am fure, we can build and refit fafter than they can. But of all things I fhould be glad to know, how they could tranflate the war to this ifland? Can they march an army over from Calais to Dover? can they waft it over in cockle-fhells? I am fure, they cannot in fhips, at least fuch an army as would be fufficient for conquering this ifland; and, if any of their troops fhould be landed by ftealth, they must conquer, or be made prifoners of war. The Hon. Gentleman must therefore, and I wonder he did not, call the pretender and the Jacobites to his aid, in order to make his hobgoblin any way terrible. In cafe of fuch a war, Sir, I will fay, it would be right in us, not to feek for any ally upon the continent, unless we could form fuch a confederacy upon the continent, as would be able, with a very little affiftance from us, to engage in a land-war against France and Spain, with a probable view of fuccefs: for a landwar, which must be fupported almost entirely at our expence, will always do us more harm than good; because it diverts us from profecuting the war in that manner which is most natural to us, and which is the only manner of profecuting a war, by which this nation can expect to reap any advantage for itself in particular. To conclude, Sir, what we have moft to fear, may be brought upon us, by our prefent method of affilling the Queen of Hungary. The danger we have moft to fear is, our being left engaged, by ourfelves alone, in a war against France and Spain, after our treasures have been exhaufted, and our publick credit funk, by an unfuccefsful land-war, to fuch a degree, as to difable us from fitting out, or keeping our navy at sea. This may real ly tranflate the war from the continent to this island, and this may probably be the confequence of our pursuing any longer the fcheme we now feem to be engaged in. By our taking a wrong method for affift ing the Queen of Hungary, both the and the King of Sardinia may at laft be overpowered, and forced to conclude a fepa rate peace, upon any terms France an her allies fhall please to prescribe; an this, after we have ftretched our public credit to its utmost length, in giving then an useless, but expenfive fupport. Car we think, that fuch an event would no have a fatal effect upon our publick credit when fo ftretched to its utmost length Sir, it would certainly ruin it at once, and reduce all our paper-currency to its primi tive nothing; fo that we should be lef engaged in a war, by ourselves alone, a gainft France and Spain, at a time when our government could not perhaps raife or borrow 50,000l. to fit out a fquadron. This, Sir, is no imaginary, it is a real danger; a danger we may very probably be thrown into, if we continue to purfue the fame measures: and therefore, to prevent, as far as lies in my power, our being brought into this danger, I fhall give my negative to the motion. [This Journal to be continued.] UNIVERSAL SPECTATOR, Jan. 12. A tranflation of three letters to a young Gentleman in love, and one to bis Lady after marriage, written by M. de Fontenelle. To Mr O. OU puzzle me much, dear coufin, Yo in afking my advice upon your affairs. On one fide, you are very much in love; and, on the other, your father threatens seriously to difinherit you, if you marry the young Lady you are in love with. What fhall I fay to you? Here are two parties to take; the heroick party, which is, to prefer the fair to every other confideration; and the prudent party, which is, not to lofe a thoufand pounds a-year for a mistress. Now, between these two you are to make your election. You have doubtless moft inclination to play the hero; but the difficulty is not so much how to be a hero at prefent, as how to continue fo for the future. I fhould counfel you to follow the greatness of your foul, if you were fure it would never abandon you; but you cannot put any dependence upon it, nay perhaps you may never find it again after this business is over. In a word, a man grows weary of being a hero; but he never grows weary of being rich. You never knew a thousand pounds pounds a year make inconftant lovers, as all the beauties have done. These arguments, I know, appear to you very unpolite, and contrary to all the metaphyficks of love. But I am forry, the experience I have had of the world will not fuffer me to preserve those ideas, which I, as well as you, could look upon as mare noble and more delicate. It is not my fault, if I cannot believe that love aLane is fufficient to make the happiness of any individual; no man can have more defire to believe it than I: but why has Love, before my face, deceived fo many thousand people, whom he had promised to put in a condition fuperior to all miffortune? And, if Love be fuch a common deceiver, how much ought we to fufpect him when he will be obliged to become an economist, You image to yourself, perhaps, a thousand charms, a thousand complaifances, in the perfon you propose to wed, because the will owe every thing to a man who has facrificed his fortune for her fake. But take care that this be not the very reason that ruins your felicity. It may eafily happen, that the Lady may not anfwer the idea you had formed of the obligation fhe is under to you. I should be very forry to have a wife, over whom I had a right to make the fame kind of reproaches as you will have over your's. It seems to me a great misfortune, to have other causes of complaint, befides thofe which marriage naturally furnishes. A wife at the best owes but too much to her husband: why then would you have one that should be more indebted to you than ordinary ? not deprive myfelf of the liberty of fcold- My dear coufin, reflect a little feriouf- of a lover. According to the portrait you have made of your mistress, Venus would be very happy to resemble her. But that which touches you the most in her, is the very qualification of which I fhould be the moft fufpicious; I mean her wit, If fhe had lefs of this than you affure me, I could even pardon you for being attached to her as much as you are; but I tremble for fear, that, with all this fine fenfe, the perceives too well the advantages fhe may draw from your passion, and is too intelligent in her own interefts. You must always be rich, let what will happen; at leaft rich enough for her, who has nothing: may not this infpire love to a woman of good understanding? Believe me, coufin, you ought to unravel her real fentiments. Does the govern you? does the feem to affume any empire over you! does the make use of her power Confider with yourself, that she will to difpofe you to marriage, and confirm by this means be more married to you than you in your generous refolution of being The would otherwise have been, and that difinherited for her fake? I am a fool, I confequently the will render you lefs hap must own, to afk you all these questions. it A woman may lead as the pleases a man fo much in love as you, and he know nothing of the matter. But cannot you, for a moment, quit the eyes of your love, and examine the conduct of your mistress? Be not in raptures when you hear her fay, that the is very unhappy to be the caufe of divifion between you and your father; that he has not fufficient merit for you to facrifice to her a good eftate; that you had D & You know not what a punishment will be to you, that you must never dare complain against her, how great foever you may think is the caufe. This is very contrary to the ideal power you expect to have over her: for, in order to juflify with honour what you have done ein marrying her, you must always feem charmed with her behaviour towards you, tho' you rage against her at the fame time in your heart. For my part, I would ། better |