The most dull and phlegmatic are not altogether void of it; and to poffefs it in a high degree, is to poffefs the highest honour of genius. Though the distinctive qualities of judgement, imagination, and animal fenfation, be fufficiently marked; yet, upon a near infpection, we will find these three regions of our nature fo interwoven, as never to exist feparately. Imagination is fometimes ufed as another word for feeling; and without mental images there can be no judgement. Imagination cannot be employed without afferting the qualities of the objects with which it is converfant; and this is the peculiar province of judgement. * A late eminent philofopher has probably gone too far in afferting, that there is really no difference at all betwixt judgement and imagination; that one endowed with greatnefs of mind, must have neceffarily both these faculties in equal perfection. With vigorous powers to grafp any great or exalted fubject may be faid equally of the poet and philosopher; and therefore, fays he, if the mind of Newton had been directed to the subject of Milton, he would have been a poet of the first order, and vice verfa. In this ingenious remark there is fome plaufibility; but, as I have faid, it is carried too far: for though fruitfulness of imagination may be equally afcribed to an Euclid, who invents a procefs of mathematical reafo nings, as to a Shakefpear, who brings together a group of human characters, and a feries of actions; and in other refpects there may be a fimilarity of operation in the exercife of judgement and imagination; yet the objects to which they are feparately directed, form betwixt them a decided diftinction; a diftinction which cannot be accounted for, but from an original bias of nature. On the mind of the poet is imprinted qualities of beauty, fublimity, and grandeur, which habit * Doctor Johnfon. may indeed improve, but never will fupply. A mind thus adorned, would avail nothing; nay, perhaps would be unfriendly to him who would dwell among the pure abftractions of mathematics. It is enough to fay on this fubject, that coolness, and activity of mind, constitute the philofopher; fire and feeling the poet. It is not fo proper therefore to term judgement and imagination diftinct faculties, as the fame faculty, or in general, mind impreffed with different qualities. : Invention, or the power of creation, has been commonly confidered as the distinguishing characteristic of imagination but this must be understood in a certain fense. A poet, or painter, may imagine a landfcape, which for beauty of colouring, and exact disposition of parts, will exceed whatever is to be found in nature, and produce an aggregate, or one complex idea, which in itfelf is new; but to this, creation is limited. The objects of which it is composed are all familiar; the fhepherd and his flock, the river, the mountain, and the tree. But it is not fo much the power of extending beyond the common appearances of nature, and exhibiting pictures of original defign, which characterise this faculty, as the nature of thofe pictures which it exhibits: its fphere is among what is magnificent and beautiful in matter, or what is heroic and amiable in mind; its bufinefs is to feize upon whatever is aftonishing, or melt with whatever is amiable; for judgement may also, in its own sphere, among qualities and relations, difcover many new aggregates, and many new combinations, the one however with more fplendor and extravagance, the other with more fobriety and truth. Perhaps in this refpect the work of Locke is an edifice, though lefs glaring, yet conftructed with as much fertility of invention, and confiftency of defign, as that of Homer. It has beeen afferted that the poet is at liberty to tranfgrefs the laws of nature, or contradict its.com Moun mon operations, that he may create beings which have not exifted, or which, according to the known analogy of nature, cannot exift. But this is furely founded upon a mistake; for without nature and truth, nothing can please. In the infancy of human reafon indeed, it is not to be expected that men fhould be fo much enlightened with regard to the laws of God, refpecting this earth, as to estimate with exactness all the poffibilities of things. In rude ages, the propenfity to believe whatever exceeds the common courfe of events, feems to know no bounds. tains, and rivers, and trees, have been fuppofed acting in concert with human perfonages; and it is no way furprising that the abftracted idea of fixed and immutable laws, fhould have a small place in that mind whose only gratification is wonder and admiration. As long therefore, as the bounds of nature's operations were not determined, he could not be faid to tranfgrefs them, who afferted extravagancies, which long experience with the history of the world, and philosophical reasonings could alone countervail. Homer, I make no doubt, believed, with the reft of his countrymen, the fupernatural events which he relates; and what we fometimes afcribe to his invention, was perhaps often the confequence of credulity only. Virgil, whofe more enlightened age, and philofophical principles, rendered lefs credulous of the theological fyftem of Homer, evidently enters with lefs fpirit, and with lefs nature, into the actions of fupernatural beings. The adventures of Æneas, with the principal events, were however traditionary ftories commonly believed, and which he probably also believed himself and the embellishing circumftances were what happened to Homer's heroes in fimilar fituations, and might also happen to his. The romantic imagination of Taffo and Ariofto, might very naturally delude them into the common belief of the times, with regard to the many wild tranfactions of knight-errantry which they relate; and the ghofts, the witches, and the fairies of Shakefpear, were no doubt alfo the fubject of his own belief. It is not indeed natural to fuppofe that thefe writers were fo refined, as firft coldly to fit down, and confider what actions they fhould relate that would be most acceptable to the multitude; but that rather themselves, fired with the generous love of poetry, they fung of thofe great and fplendid fcenes which moft flattered their imagination, or were most congenial with their belief. Keeping entirely out of fight the interefted idea of writing for approbation or gain, they allowed themselves, according to the bias of their genius, to be hurried along among thofe objects that were great and interesting, or detained among thofe that were calm and beautiful. They chofe a story which the obfcurity of tradition had rendered venerable, affimilating the actors, and the fcenes, to their ufual pitch of conception, and adorning the whole with those sentiments, and that colouring which is at the fame time natural and grand; and as long as the probability of thefe wonderful actions and fcenes could not be called in queftion, fo long did they remain the fame as if natural and true. But in an after age, when the light of philofophy had difpelled the vifionary phantoms of popular credulity, he would act a very injudicious part indeed, who would continue to addrefs men as if poffeffed with thefe prejudices. A ftory, however wonderful, founded on the religious notions of the ancients, with all the appendages of Fauns, of Satyrs, and of Nymphs, would have now few readers. On the fame principles, the giants, the dragons, and enchanted caftles, which amufed the dark ages, are at prefent neglected for the more natural adventures of a Crufoe, or a Jones. It is not therefore what is new, what is wonderful, or what is fictitious, which is the fubject of poetical imagination. It is only when these qualities are confonant to our knowledge of hiftory, or our feelings of truth. The frequent allufions to the fabulous tales of antiquity, with which modern poetry is interlarded, are none of its ornaments; and in the progress of taste, it has been gradually difufed. Invocations to beings. who have no existence, and the fuppofed interpofition of their power, can have little impreffion on the imagination of those who have been initiated into the rational tenets of christianity. Though Fenelon has made nse of the mythology of the ancients with confiderable fuccefs, yet the artifice is too obvious to impofe upon us;" and were it not for the eminent merit he poffeffes of difplaying what is amiable in manners, and what is refpectable in virtue, and the many beautiful rural scenes with which he charms the fancy, the poem of Telemachus would be displeasing to every reader of taste. A poet therefore may decorate and heighten, but he must never lofe fight of nature: he may defcribe fcenes and actions which never exifted, but which may exift. It would not be proper at this day to talk of castles removed to diftant places inftantaneously, and all the aftonishing adventures ofeaftern relations. How prepofterous would it be, when we are taught to think more worthily of the government of the univerfe, to fuppofe that the ruler of the main would create ftorms in order to difconcert petty undertakings, or which is ftill worse, to introduce Neptune, Boreas, and Eolus, with all their kindred train affifting at the operation? Had Ceres been admitted an actor in the harveft fcene of Thomfon, our thoughts would have been diftracted betwixt nature, and the poetical notion of the ancients; an abfurdity however of this kind an inferior writer would have very readily fallen into. As inti mately connected with the fubject of thefe remarks, we fhall conclude with a few obfervations on what is called tafte. VOL. I. 1 Kk |
