the external conduct that is supposed to refult from it. The law which requires the love of mankind, fupported by wisdom, courage, and temperance, likewife requires every external action that is fuited to this affection, and to thefe qualifications. The law that prohibits malice, remiffnefs, cowardice, or intemperance, prohibits likewife every external effect of thefe characters. Sect. IV. Diversity of opinions concerning the morality of external actions. THE difference of moral good and evil cannot be ascertained in the defcription of mere external actions. Cafes are varied indefinitely; and rules of action being general, cannot provide for all the peculiarities of any case whatever. The only direction on which men can rely in every particular cafe, is the difcernment of a wife and benevolent mind. Sect. VII. Difference of choice. THE different choice of parties interested in the effect of any action, arifes from opinion. There is no external effect of which men may not entertain contradictory opinions, even of life and of death. One perfon believes that to be good for himself, which another perfon believes to be evil. In their requifition of beneficent actions, they differ accordingly : One man requires as a favour what anoActions materially the fame, are in one-ther would refent as an injury. cafe morally good, in another cafe morally evil. Men are not universally agreed concerning the actions which they require or prohibit in any cafe whatever. What is reckoned innocent or praifeworthy in one country, is reckoned a heinous offence in another. The defini.. tions of theft, murder, or treafon, are different in the laws of different countries. The terms of expreffing the external duties of men in one language, have not a precise equivalent in another. Sect. V. Caufes of this diversity. THIS diverfity does not arife from any difference of opinion, or experience, concerning the nature of good or ill affections and difpofitions. All mankind are agreed, that benevolence and courage are pleasant, that malice and cowardice are painful; and if it fhould be alledged, that any number of men are of contrary opinions, yet every individual may, from his own experience, correct the error. This diverfity proceeds from three diffe rent caufes : The father among the Esquimaux requires, at a certain age, that his own children should put him to death. The widow in Europe defires to have a good fettlement made by her deceafed hufband: in India, the defires to be burnt on his funeral pile. In every cafe, actions are required as the effects or expreffions of kindness and regard. Sect. VIII. Difference of interpretation. IN many inftances, external actions are, in their own nature, indifferent, or of no effect; but are the established figns and expreffions of neglect or attention, of good or of ill will, or of fome affection or difpofition. Such are many religious rites in every in common life. Even actions of more country, and many ceremonies observed confequence, are frequently more regarded on account of their meaning, than on account of any other effect. So far as actions are mere expreffions, the choice of them, like that of words, is perfectly arbitrary; and nations may differ from each other in their external obfervares, as they do in their speech, without any inconvenience whatever. One nation commends what another condemns, merely because they interpret the fame, or a like action, differently. The diverfities of manners arising from difference of choice or interpretation, render it difficult to judge of the merits or perfonal qualities of men, in ages or nations remote from each other. The vulgar are able to interpret only the the manners of their own condition and country; they commonly mistake those of a different rank, or of foreigners. There is in fact nothing in external manners which opinion may not render agreeable or disagreeable; and the opinion of one country is not the rule or ftandard by which to judge of the manners of another. The definitions of crimes vary in the Jaw of different countries; because different overt acts are specified as the marks of guilt. Terms of praife or blame, have not their precife equivalent in different languages; becaufe men combine varioufly, under different terms, the circumstances from which they infer merit or demerit. This is confiftent with a perfect agreement of opinion concerning any of those circumstances apart. Se&t. IX. Fundamental laws of external action. I. IN matters indifferent, we ought to obferve the manners of our country, as we speak its language, or wear its drefs. 2. In matters of importance, we ought to chufe what is for the good of mankind, in oppofition to opinion and cuftom. Thus we ought to do whatever tends to promote goodness, to prevent corrup tion, and to fecure the rights of mankind; and to avoid whatever tends to corrupt or to feduce, and whatever tends to make way for oppreflion. When the habits or affections of men change for the better or the worse, they improve or degenerate. When their customs change from what is innocent, or beneficial to mankind, to what is pernicious, they are faid not to undergo a change of manners merely, but to be depraved. If they should be ignorant of the tendency of their own pernicious customs and manners, even this ignorance would be an article of depravity. Sect. X. Of the different fanctions under which external actions are required or prohibited. THE fanction of any law, is the good or ill annexed to the oblervance, or to the neglect, of it. The fanction of the fundamental law of morality is, that the obfervance of it is happiness, and the neglect milery. The fanction of this law in every ap- plication is, that to obferve it is to act the part of a happy man; to negle& it, is to act the part of a wretched man. These fanctions, when referred to external actions merely, come under two heads : 1. The fanction of compulfory law. The fanctions of compulfory law are, any forcible means employed by men to vindicate their own rights, or those of others. The fanctions of duty are, any confderations that determine men, from choice, to act properly. Sect. XI. Of parties to whom the laws of morality refer. THE law of morality may be referred to the conduct of fingle parties, or to that of collective bodies. The conduct of fingle parties is requi red, or prohibited, under the special fanctions of compulfory law, or under the fanctions of duty. Conduct required or prohibited under the fanction of compultory law, is the fubject of jurisprudence. Conduct required or prohibited under the fanction of duty, is the fubject of cafuiftry. Conduct prohibited or required of men in what affects the ftate and form of their community, is the fubject of politics. Communities ftated in their relation to each other, are to be confidered as fingle parties. The Speech of a Rt Hon. Gentleman, [Mr G-ge Gr-lle], on the motion for expelling Mr Wilkes, Friday Feb. 3. 1769. 1 s. Almon. MR Wilkes was first elected for the county of Middlefex on the 28th of March 1768, and was expelled on the 3d of February 1769, the day on which this speech was made. The motion was made by Lord Barrington, and feconded by Mr Rigby, as follows. "That John Wilkes, Efq; a member of this boule, who hath at the bar of this houfe confeffed himself to be the author and publisher of what this house has refolved to be an infolent, fcandalous, and feditious libel, and who has been convicted in the court of king's-bench, of having printed and publifhed a feditious libel, and three obfcent and impious libels, and by the judgement of the faid court has been fentenced to undergo 4 E twenty I cannot agree with those who urged in behalf of Mr Wilkes, that this motion ought not to be complied with, because he is already the most unhappy, as well as the most oppreffed and injured man of the age. He is indeed unhappy, because he is guilty; but confidering his repeated offences, he has been more fortunate than his most fanguine withes could have expected. To juftify what I have faid, let me ask a few questions. When he wrote that feditious libel against the King and both houfes of parliament, could he forefee, that he fhould be taken up by a general warrant, against the declared opinion and defire of the two fecretaries of state, who repeatedly proposed to have his name' inserted in the warrant of apprehenfion, but were overruled by the lawyers and clerks of the office, who infifted they could not depart from the long established precedents and course of proceedings *? Could Mr Wilkes forefee, that after an hundred years practice, under the eye of the great eft lawyers, before the fupreme courts of juftice, without being ever questioned in one fingle instance, that this irregula. * [Here we can with the highest degree of authority affirm, that the Rt Hon. Gentleman has been misinformed, though (if we are not mistaken) he himself once filled the fame department [xxiv. 284.]. That general warrants were too frequently iffued from the office, is without doubt; but it is equally certain, that special warrants, defcribing the author's name, and place of abode, were if fued likewife. The Rt Hon. G-therefore must have been moft egregioufly impofed upon by the lawyers and clerks of office; which we ate the rather inclined to believe, as the printed publication of precedents of warrants which was handed about at that time, omits fome fpecial warrants during the late reign; and therefore the practice of general warrants could not be called the long established precedents and course of proceedings. How unfortunate is it for men in fuch high ftations to receive their information from underlings! and yet the practice has been too common, in courts of law, as well as offices of ftate. Crit. Rev.] rity and illegality would be first found; exactly the fame sentence as for the for- Mr J Mr Wilkes, therefore, is not intitled to any extraordinary favour on the prefent occafion, from the plea of his having been the object of extraordinary severity; he is, however, moft certainly intitled to that justice which is due to every man; and which we ought to be more particularly careful to preferve, in an inflance where paffion and prejudice may both concur in the violation of it. In confe. quence of these principles, I oppose the motion; and if I did not, I fhould commit a capital injuftice. I know that the house has a right to inquire into the conduct of its members, and to expel them, according to the law of parliament, which is part of the law of the land; but, in my opinion, the propofition before us is not conformable to the law of parliament, to the practice of any other court of justice, nor to the unalterable principles of natural equity; nor fupported by any precedent in the journals of the house, or the records of any other court. The charge contained in this motion confifts of four articles, and upon the charge, thus complicated, the houfe is called to give judgement; but it is a rule of the houfe, that when a question, even of a trifling nature, is complicated, each member has a right to have it feparated, that he may not be obliged to approve or difapprove in the lump; and not a fingle inftance can be produced from the journals in which this right has not been preferved. It has appeared during the courfe of the debate, that great numbers of gentlemen approve of fome parts of the charge, and difapprove of others, and fo vice verfa; what then may be the confequence of blending the whole together? Is it not evident, that by this unworthy artifice, Mr Wilkes may be expelled, although three parts in four of thofe who expel him, fhould have declared against his expulfion, upon every one of the articles contained in the charge feparately taken? If an indictment was framed confifting of four distinct offences, each capital, charging, that the prifoner committed treafon in June, murder in July, robbery in Auguft, and forgery in September; three jurymen might find him guilty of murder, and innocent of treafon; three might find him guilty of treafon, and innocent of murder, and fo of the reft; in which cafe, if he had been tried for the offences feparately, he would have been deemed innocent by nine out of the twelve, and confequently acquitted; but being tried upon the complicated charge, he is condemned under the fallacious appearance of concurrent opinion, but in fact by three only, and acquitted by nine *. But I will now confider the parts of the charge feparately., The firit is, the libel relative to Lord Weymouth's letter. It was complained of in the other houfe as a breach of privilege, and as a grofs and impudent libel against a peer of the realm; and such it certainly is: but when it appeared to have been written by Mr Wilkes, it was new chriftened, and changed, not only its name, but its nature; it was now matter of fedition against the state. Then the Lords, instead of addressing the King to have it profecuted by the AttorneyGeneral, as was done with respect to the obfcene and impious libels which were written by the fame perfon, and likewise complained of as a breach of privilege against a Lord of Parliament, they tranfmitted the jurifdiction of it to us, to be punished by an unprecedented extenfion of our judicature and will this houfe, which has always looked with the most jealous eye upon every act which has the least tendency to exempt the peers and their caufes from that jurifdiction which is common to all, lend its name to fuch an evafion, and extend its judicature for fuch a purpofe? If this attempt fhould fucceed, and so easy and fummary a me thod fhould be marked out for the pu nifhment of those who thall libel minifters of fate, this, probably, will not be the last application which we shall receive of this nature. The next article is the feditious libel the North Briton, for which the author and publisher were defervedly profecuted and convicted five years ago, and for which Mr Wilkes is now fuffering punifhment, having been alfo punished by expulfion from the last boufe of Commons, for the indignity offered to them, by one of their own members, of which they only were the judges; a cafe widely different from that of a libel against a minifter. Now there is no rule more facred in the jurifprudence of this country, than that a man shall not be tried or punished again by the fame judicature, for the fame offence. It was but a few days ago, that I fpoke and voted to restrain Mr Wilkes from entering into the greater part of his petition, upon this very principle, his complaint having been fully heard, and the parties fully acquitted by the laft houfe of Commons. After long debate, the houfe adopted the reafoping, and Mr Wilkes was reftrained accordingly. And fhall we declare, without fhame, that the fame rule of law which was conclufive in behalf of his adverfaries, fhould, in the fame cause, be of no avail in his favour? The third article is the printing and publishing the three impious and obscene Jibels. This crime I am by no means difpofed to palliate; and it appears manifeftly from the examination which the house has lately made, on Mr Wilkes's petition upon the fubject, that there is not the leaft foundation for all that calumny which has been propagated with regard to the manner of obtaining them. But this offence alfo the law has punished already. The laft houfe of Commons, as they were not particularly concerned in it, did not think it right to interfere; and it may therefore be thought a hard-. fhip, to transfer it to another parliament, and referve it five years in fo unusual a manner for a fresh cenfure. The last article is, that Mr Wilkes has been fentenced by the king's-bench to twenty-two months imprisonment, and that he is now in execution under that fentence, and confequently difabled from taking his feat for fixteen months to come. But I think I can fhew to demonftration, that by the law and conftant ufage of parliament, the inability of attending his duty for a year or two, has never been deemed a fufficient reafon for expulfion. The pofition is, That whenever a member is reftrained from doing his duty here, and the house cannot compel his attendance without the interpofition of the crown, the parliament is bound by its law and practice to expel the member fo disabled. To fupport this position, not one precedent has been produced; but against it, the examples are innumerable, many of them in our own time, or fresh in memory, particularly that of Sir William Wyndham. Sir William was imprifoned in the tower two years: the times were violent, many wifhed to get rid of abilities which gave them fo much trouble; yet no man dared to maintain the doctrine now laid down, and propose to expel him because they could not compel his attendance. Do gentlemen remember, how many officers in the land and sea fervice, members of this houfe, were abfent many years together during the late war? Do they reflect that many are in the fame fituation at this very time? or will it be contended that they are. difabled from ever returning among us, and their feats vacated? If abfence without interpofition of the crown is a reason for expulfion in one cafe, it is fo in all; for the merit or delinquency of the party is wholly out of the question. As to Mr Wilkes, it has been faid, that if the last parliament thought him unfit to fit among them, the present has an équal right to make the fame judgement. But whatever has been advanced, or believed, concerning the rights of this house, it has not a difcretionary power of excluding all those whom we think improper to fit among us. There is not a fingle precedent of our having pretended to exercife any fuch general authority. Whenever the houfe has expelled, it has affigned fome particular offence; and by the fundamental principles of this conftitution, the right of judging upon the general propriety or unfitnefs of their reprefentatives is intrufted with the electors; and when chosen, this house can expel only for fome difability established by the law of the land, or for fome fpecific offence alledged and proved. If it were otherwife, we fhould in fact elect ourselves. Let not your just refentment against the conduct and character of the man who is now the object of your deliberation, prevail upon you to ground any part of your proceedings upon fuch destructive and fatal principles. Confider that precedents of this nature are generally begun against the odious and the guilty, but when once established, are easily applied to, and made use of, against the innocent and meritorious. I fhall now confider the propriety and wisdom of this measure, fuppofing it to be warranted by law and juftice, the contrary of which I think I have manifeftly thewn. Is it intended to restrain the fpirit of faction and diforder that is gone |