and of these proximate causes they had consequently clear and distinct perceptions; but as these causes were mere effects resulting from the primary cause, they only saw a part of the object of which they were in pursuit, and of this part they had clear perceptions. Not being able to perceive the part which was concealed from them; it was therefore impossible for them, as I have already shewn, to form any idea of it, and, consequently, they never dreamt of its existence. The part they saw, necessarily stood in their minds for the entire of the object of which they were in pursuit, and consequently each of them substituted that secondary cause beyond which he could not travel, for the primary cause of which it was merely an effect, so that of the primary cause, they consequently knew as little as those who had never treated on the subject.

Their failure has, therefore, arisen from confining themselves to effects, instead of tracing these effects to their primary source. But, as I have already observed, the business of a critic is to watch effects with a diligent and discriminating eye, not to travel up with the philosopher to the primary causes of these effects; and the writers of whom I speak have treated this question as critics, not as philosophers.

From Hume, however, I expected a more philosophic solution of this problem, as he seldom traces

any effect to a secondary, where a primary cause can be discovered. As a critic, perhaps, he is inferior to Du Bos, Dr. Johnson, and Dr. Blair; but as a philosopher, however dangerous may be the tendency of some of his writings, he is evidently above them all. I cannot help saying, however, that his philosophy has failed him in discussing the present subject, and that the source of the pleasures resulting from Tragic Representations, has hitherto eluded the acumen of criticism, and the generalizations of philosophy. Hume has added little to what had been already written on the subject; and that little is the worst part of his " Essay on Tragedy."

What he has quoted from Du Bos and Fontenelle, is worth a thousand of the theories which he has adopted himself, but he must be allowed the merit of perceiving that their theories approached nearer to the truth than any of the rest. They are, however, imperfect, as will hereafter appear, though they have made so near an approach to the truth. As Schlegel, an eminent German critic, is the latest writer on dramatic criticism, a subject which he has treated at very considerable length; and, as he has examined and rejected the most popular theories on the source of Tragic Pleasure, and substituted one of his own, shall first enquire into the philosophy of these theories, and of that which he has substituted in

C

I

their stead. Schlegel is the ablest commentator on Shakspeare, as Mr. Hazlett very justly observes, in his criticisms on that poet; and it would seem, that we owe these criticisms more properly to Schlegel himself, than to Mr. Hazlett ; for he acknowledges, in his preface, that "some little jealousy of the national understanding was not without its share in producing the undertaking." "We were piqued" (he says)" that it should be reserved for a Foreigner to give reasons for the faith which we, English, have in Shakspeare; certainly, no writer among ourselves, has shewn such enthusiastic admiration of his genius, or the same philosophical acuteness in pointing out his characteristic excellencies." Such is the critic, with whose theory, on the source of Tragic Pleasure, I shall commence the following inquiry. After examining what he has written on the subject, and the various hypotheses which he quotes and rejects, I shall offer some observations on the theories which have been adopted by other writers. My own theory shall follow, in which I shall examine those of Du Bos, Fontenelle, and Hume.

CHAP. III.

Examination of Schlegel's theory, and of the various hypotheses which he has quoted on the source of Tragic Plea

sure.

TRAGIC representations, according to Schlegel, please us, either from a " feeling of the dignity of human nature, excited by the great models exhibited to us," or from "the trace of a higher order of things impressed upon the apparently irregular progress of events, and secretly revealed in them," or from "both these causes together."

Now, this is a mere assertion of the learned critic, and assertions require to be supported either by facts or by proofs. I admit, that bare, unsubstantiated assertions, resting on high authority, are considered by many readers, sufficient data for reasoning; but our credulity must range far beyond the boundaries of truth, before we can be made to believe, that two propositions which contradict each other, can both be true at the same moment, on whatever authority they may happen to rest. Now, if this hypothesis of Schlegel be disproved by himself, or if the arguments he has advanced against

other theories, be equally conclusive against his own, his theory derives no value from his authority; for if we admit it, we must reject his principles of reasoning, which, in other words, is rejecting his authority. Besides, if we reject his principles, his theory can be of no value: when our principles are erroneous, the hypotheses we rest upon them, are only castles in the air.

The first theory examined by Schlegel, is that which makes Tragic Pleasure arise from a comparison between the tranquillity of our own situation, and the distress to which the victims of Tragic Representation are exposed."

To this theory he objects, that when we are warmly interested in a tragedy, we never think of ourselves; and, therefore, we can enter into no comparison on the subject. Schlegel did not perceive, that this argument totally subverts his own hypothesis; for if, while we are warmly interested in the tragic pictures of distress which engage our attention, we never think of ourselves, and are totally engrossed by what passes before us, neither can we think of the abstract dignity of human nature, nor of the still more abstract providence by which the irregular progress of events is directed. If our attention to what passes before us, prevent us from thinking of ourselves, it must, certainly, prevent us from thinking of any thing else. I will readily allow, however, that we may wander, for a