touch, but that which I have mentioned. Burke says, there is a pleasure in feeling smooth and soft bodies; but I suspect this pleasure arises, not so much from smoothness, as from association. The fair sex possess both these qualities, and our natural attachment to them, inclines us to suppose, that whatever is soft and smooth, must also be pleasing. Without entering, however, into specnlative ideas on the subject, one thing is obvious, that in the sense of feeling, as in all the other senses, the bodies most pleasing to us are those which impart a sensation that confines itself not to the external organ, but pervades the entire frame by a certain inexpressible, though communicable impulse.

But it will be said, that all true pleasure and happiness consist in moderation, that beauty itself, which is the most pleasing of all objects, is a medium between extremes, and that pleasures verging upon extremes are always dangerous. All this I admit; but while it is certain, that pleasure verging on pain is dangerous, it is equally certain, that the higher pleasures are the more exquisite while they last, and the most sensibly enjoyed. The enjoyment of ardent pleasures, however, cannot last long; and hence we very justly praise moderate enjoyment. This tempered pleasure is always more pleasing to a well-regulated mind; but the extreme of pleasure is always more agreeable to

the natural man, to him who never thinks on the consequence of indulging the desires of the moment, but enjoys whatever he finds most pleasing while he is capable of enjoying it. The great enjoyment we derive in abstaining from these pleasures arises from the reflection or consciousness, that we are fulfilling a moral duty, that by tempering our enjoyments, we render them more permanent, and retain the power of renewing them whenever we will. These, however, are mental pleasures, not the pleasures of sensation, which derives all its enjoyments from yielding instinctively to every pleasing impulse.

Emotions and Passions, whatever be their Nature and Character, universally pleasing to those by whom they are felt. Objections answered.

WHAT I have said in the foregoing chapter chiefly regards the pleasures arising from strong sensations, and though these sensations are intimately allied with our emotions and passions, it will still be proper to treat of the latter by themselves, as there is this difference between them and our sensations, that the latter are painful whenever they reach to a certain degree of intensity, whereas our emotions and passions are universally pleasing. It matters not, whether they affect us as individuals, or as men in general; whether they be moderate or intense; whether they be momentary or permanent: in all cases, and under all circumstances, pleasure is the inseparable attendant of our emotions and passions. This will appear evident from the following view of their nature, and modes of operation.

All the phenomena of mind and its affections, of life and its enjoyments, may be traced, as I have already observed, to three distinct sources-abstrac

the natural man, to him who never thinks on the consequence of indulging the desires of the moment, but enjoys whatever he finds most pleasing while he is capable of enjoying it. The great enjoyment we derive in abstaining from these pleasures arises from the reflection or consciousness, that we are fulfilling a moral duty, that by tempo.. ing our enjoyments, we render them more per... nent, and retain the power of renewing t whenever we will. These, however, are me pleasures, not the pleasures of sensation, whic rives all its enjoyments from yielding instin to every pleasing impulse.

matter, the fire which at by which it is confore, as much a faculty and will, though unilonging to the material enly difference is, that Ave faculties of the soul, perfectly passive. The sensible of an impresand merely perceives the acts upon it. It cannot Zon, whether it wills it sensation is produced by abstraction, as an act of tual perception, reflection, g, analyzing, &c. The soul eye that grass is green: this perceives by comparison and ne is preferable to vice, and that a part is not equal to the è are not sensations, but intellec

The soul has no power over called its sensations, while the which it feels them are acted upon objects. If I prick my finger with t help feeling pain, the soul having which it can repel this sensation, or 3 it. The only faculty which it ́s case, is that of informing me,