possible to treat of fiction without treating of ideal presence, as all fiction is ideal presence in the strictest sense of the expression. Consequently, Du Bos, and all writers on the subject of fiction, have treated of ideal presence, differing only in the use of the term. Except where the objects imitated are present, what are all paintings, descriptive poems, and imitations of every description, no matter whether of real or imaginary beings, but ideal images, or, in other words, portraits of those images which were present to the mind of the poet, painter, &c. at the time he produced them; and what is all this but ideal presence? With regard to the difficulty of explaining ideal presence, I cannot perceive to what difficulty his lordship alludes, for the entire of what he says on the subject amounts simply to this, that ideal and real presence produce similar emotions in the mind, differing only in degree; but why they do produce similar emotions he never pretends to explain. There could be no difficulty then in mentioning a fact which almost every one knows, and which so many writers have mentioned already. The entire of this section reminds me of what Dr. Johnson says, in his Rambler, of those who suffer their imagination to run away with their understanding. "Many," he says, "impose upon the world, and many upon themselves, by an appearance of severe and exemplary diligence, when they, in reality, give themselves up

to the luxury of fancy." Lord Kaimes imagines he has discovered something which no man ever dreamt of before himself, simply because he invented a new name to express an old idea; for "ideal presence" means nothing but what is generally understood by ideal images, both being present images of absent objects. To explain, therefore, ideal images by ideal presence, is to explain one mystery by another. I do not mean to say, that either is mysterious, mystery being only a term which we apply to things which we do not understand; but the moment we come to understand them, we no longer call them mysteries; and even at the moment they are mysteries to us, they are obvious perceptions to others. What are now so plain as to be called truisms, would be all mysteries if we were still in the state of nature; and what are at this moment mysteries to the unlettered part of mankind, are truisms to the literary world. It is not things that are mysterious, but we that are ignorant. I do not mean, therefore, to assert, that either ideal images or ideal presence are mysterious: I only mean to say, that both are the same, and, consequently, that he who regards one of them as mysterious, should look upon the other as a mystery also.

Granting, however, that the doctrine of "ideal presence" explains what it pretends to explain, the pleasure resulting from Tragic Representations

remain still as mysterious as ever. To say that fiction pleases us, because the reality pleases us, explains nothing, for the question still remains, why does the reality please? Until we are told why real distress pleases, why we take pleasure in witnessing a shipwreck, an execution, &c. we gain little by knowing that the imitation of these distresses pleases us because their originals do.

Besides, it should be recollected, that no person derives pleasure from supposing Tragic Representations to be real, simply because every one knows they are not real: all we expect from such representations, is, that they give a correct and natural imitation of the passions, circumstances, and events which they represent; for, however exact the imitation may be, we still know it is but an imitation. Lord Kaimes, therefore, leaves the question where he found it, so that we must seek elsewhere for the source of the pleasures of which we are in pursuit.

As he claims, however, the merit of originality in all that he has written on this subject, it is but doing justice to Locke and Du Bos to say, that the whole of it is taken from them. Locke distinctly observes, that an idea of reflection, or memory, produces the same impression upon the mind with the real object which it represents to itself, with this difference, that the latter impression is fainter than the former; and Du Bos has the same doctrine in other words, "La copie

de l'objet," he says, doit, pour ainsi dire, exciter en nous une copie de la passion que l'objet y auroit excitée." To this doctrine Lord Kaimes has not added a single idea, though he wishes to make us believe that his doctrine is all his own, because he has expressed this idea in other words. Neither is he very accurate in saying that an "idea is fainter than an original perception," for this is saying, in other words, that an idea is fainter than an idea, as perception is an idea in the strict and original ac*ceptation of the term, coming from the Greek verb Eldew, to see. It therefore more properly expresses an original perception than a reflex act of the mind; but, as it is used to express both, we naturally divide ideas into two branches, namely, ideas of sensation, and ideas of reflection. should therefore have said that an idea of reflection, or of memory, is fainter than an idea of sensation or actual presence.

He

CHAP. V.

Whether Tragic Pleasures may be traced to the Vices and Inhumanity, or to the Virtues and Sympathies, of Human Nature.

THE doctrine of Helvetius, on the source of Tragic Pleasure, is not very "refreshing." It holds out a gloomy prospect of our original nature, and, consequently, of our final destination. Man, according to him, is naturally cruel. "What does the prospect of nature," he says, "present to us? A multitude of beings destined to devour each other. Man, in particular, say the anatomists, has the tooth of a carnivorous animal. He ought, therefore, to be voracious, and, consequently, cruel and bloody... Flesh, moreover, is his most wholesome nourishment, and the most conformable to his organization. His preservation, like that of almost all other animals, is connected with the destruction of others."

"If the stag at bay affect me ;-if his tears excite mine, this object, so affecting by its novelty,