That doctrine, however, has ceased to be law; and under a more enlightened system of public policy, it is now rendered unnecessary to delay until the death of the individual, before his acts done under the influence of unsound mind can be avoided. Mere mental weakness alone, without aberration, furnishes at law no sufficient reason in avoidance of an act. It is considered, however, as laying a very proper foundation from which fraud and imposition may be the more easily inferred. The proof of aberration lies always with the party who alleges it. Once established, its continuance is presumed; and an entire restoration, or a lucid interval is necessary to be proved, before any acts done can be valid. Much has been said and written in regard to what constitutes a lucid interval. The proof of it is now required to be direct and clear. It must be shown to be something more than a mere cessation or suspension of the symptoms of disease. It must be a partial restoration; an interval in which the mind, having thrown off the disease, has recovered its general habit. Not merely one, but a succession of rational acts are required to be shown. The evidence in support of a lucid interval, should be as strong and demonstrative of that fact, as where the object of the proof is to establish the aberration. It should be constantly borne in mind, that the cerebral organs, through the medium of which the mental faculties are exercised, may retain an irritable habit for some time after the removal of the primary cause of the disease; and this should present a strong claim for consideration, whenever extraordinary acts or crimes have been preceded by a diseased state of any of the organs. One singular feature in the law, relative to the insane, cannot fail of exciting the surprise of reflecting men, and that is the difference made in its application to criminal and civil responsibility. The same degree of mental aberration will not excuse criminal, which is allowed to civil acts. Why, if any difference was to be made, property should come to be regarded more favourably than life, and more worthy of protection, is hardly conceivable. Another anomaly in jurisprudence, is the different kinds or degrees of force that are attached to the same kind of evidence in civil and criminal cases, viz. the evidence derivable from the act itself. In civil cases, a "rational act rationally done," is regarded as evidencing the rationality of its source. An act, on the contrary, which the common sense of mankind condemns as irrational, is allowed to furnish a presumption of mental aberration. Judicious or unnatural dispositions, in a last will and testament, go far to establish or invalidate it. In criminal cases, the enormity and unnatural character of the act, as that of a parent's killing his child, is often insisted on as affording evidence of the greatest possible degree of guilt, instead of being regarded as the offspring of insane impulse. Some leading cases have occurred in the progress of jurisprudence, which furnished the occasions for laying down principles relative to the insane. In the case of Arnold, which occurred as early as 1723, Judge Tracy affirmed the law to be that a madman, in order to be exempt from punishment, must be totally deprived of his understanding and memory; so as not to know what he is doing any more than an infant, a brute, or a wild beast. According to this case, the lowest degree of idiocy alone would exempt from punishment. A more rational doctrine came to be entertained in the year 1800, as exemplified in the celebrated trial of Hadfield, for shooting at the king of England. The speech of Lord Erskine, on that occasion, furnishes a fine specimen of judicial eloquence, and is eminently successful in establishing some great and important truths in relation to the insane. The following are among the most essential of the positions established : 1. That it is the reason of man that renders him accountable for his actions, and that the deprivation of it acquits him of crime. 2. That the law will not measure the sizes of men's capacities, so as they be compos mentis. 3. That a person is accountable for his criminal acts in cases in which he is not for his civil. This doctrine, a more enlightened period cannot fail of essentially modifying. 4. That a total deprivation of memory and understanding is not required to constitute insanity. 5. The important principle then, for the first time, brought distinctly into view; viz. that there is irresponsibility where there exists hallucination, and that punishment should not be administered where the act is derived from, or is based upon, an unfounded delusion-the baseless assumption as true of what really does not exist. And, 6. That the act complained of, should be the immediate unqualified offspring of the disease. The great merit of this case consists in extending the protection of law, as well to embrace the delusions of the insane, as the intellectual destitution of the idiotic. From the earliest periods in the history of jurisprudence down to the most recent, the great desideratum has been the establishment of certain tests, by means of which the fact of insanity could be certainly ascertained, if it existed. The test, which seems to have been among the first adopted, and which has certainly been the most undeviatingly adhered to, is that which consists in the capacity of distinguishing right from wrong. The great importance of this capacity, considered relatively to the elements that go to constitute crime, renders it but little surprising that it should have been so early adopted, and so pertinaciously adhered to. To those, however, who reflect, it must be obvious, that as this is entirely dependent upon a primitive faculty of the human mind, which, like every other, possesses independence in the exercise of its function, it cannot really be considered as evidence in proof of any thing beyond its own healthy or deranged action. A knowledge of right or wrong implies two things : 1. A perception or recognition by the mind, of those actions or things, in regard to which right or wrong may be predicated. 2. The feeling of what is right or wrong in reference to such actions or things. The first is the work of the intellectual, particularly of the perceptive, faculties; the second is the special function of the faculty of Conscientiousness. The conclusions, upon which I think we may safely rely, in reference to this test, are the following : 1. That it is to be regarded as one, but not the only, test. 2. That its absence, either from an original lack, or from an idiocy in that particular, renders the individual so imperfect, as to divest him of the elements of accountability. 3. The perversion of that special faculty by disease, or derangement, produces the same result, by acting in the same general manner. 4. An original want, or material lack, of the perceptive faculties, by rendering it impossible that the facts, actions, or, in more general terms, the material, should be furnished upon which man's moral nature was framed to act, renders the mental constitution so defective, as to take away all accountability. And, 5. The perception of the perceptive or reflective faculties, or of both, by derangement, in consequence of which mental delusions exist, possessed of such strength that the moral faculty is utterly powerless when applied to them, also absolves from all responsibility for crimes. Another test, upon which much reliance has been placed, is the design and contrivance sometimes displayed in the commission of a criminal act. The peculiar trait of character denominated cunning has often been noticed prevailing, to a great extent, among the insane. The degree of confidence, we may safely attach to this test, will not appear very considerable, when we remark, 1. That designs and contrivances, so far as relates to the adoption of means calculated to accomplish an end, is the work of the intellectual faculties, and is, therefore, perfectly consistent with the exist ence of moral mania. And, 2. So far as cunning, secrecy, adroitness of manœuvre are concerned, they are referable to the special faculty of Secretiveness, which, like all the other special faculties, possesses its own separate states of health and disease. Another test, which has been assumed as infallible in determining the existence of insanity, is the presence of delusion or hallucination, by which is meant the assumption by the mind of things as realities, which in fact have no existence as such. To estimate properly the value of this criterion, we must consider its source. It is referable solely to the intellectual faculties, because they only form ideas. Its presence, therefore, indicates intellectual mania, either partial or general. The affective faculties, however, never form ideas, and hence are subject to no delusions. Their action, therefore, may be perverted and insane, and yet there would be no delusion. The just inference from all this is, that its presence furnishes proof of the existence of some form of intellectual mania, while its absence affords no evidence to negative the existence of moral mania. From all this, we are enabled to conclude that there is no certain, infallible test, by which the presence or absence of insanity can be determined. It is a disease of the material organs of mind, and the aberration of mind is symptomatic of that disease. It is to be judged of, therefore, from a careful consideration of all the symptoms, and an attentive examination of the phenomena of mind, both in its states of healthy and deranged action. ARTICLE IV. THE NECESSITY OF REVEALED RELIGION, PHRENOLOGICALLY ILLUS TRATED. In an address by James Shannon, President of the College of Louisiana, delivered before the Philomathic Society of that Institution, on the 9th of February, 1839, Jackson, La. FELLOW-MEMBERS OF THE PHILOMATHIC SOCIETY,— Called by your politeness to the honour of appearing, on this occasion, before the public as your orator, I surely need not apologise for selecting a subject of a grave and instructive character. To those who are engaged, as we all are, in the development and training of the human mind, whatever is calculated to throw light on its fundamental faculties cannot be uninteresting. The pre-eminent value of self-knowledge, in its various departments and practical bearings, has long been admitted. All our enjoyments originate in harmony with the laws of our organisation; and the infraction of those laws is the fruitful source of human suffering. Hence, whoever would advance the perfection and happiness of the human race, must do it in accordance with unchanging laws, to which all nature, rational as well as irrational, has been subjected by the Creator of the universe. Every pang that is alleviated, every tear that is wiped from the eye of misery, indicates, on the part of the intelligent agent, a knowledge, to a certain extent, of the curious mechanism with which, and upon which, he operates for the accomplishment of his benevolent purpose. How important, then, is the study of man to all, who either seek happiness themselves, or nobly aspire to the god-like honour of promoting to the utmost the happiness of their fellow-men. These principles are equally applicable to man, whether we consider him as a physical, organic, intellectual, or moral being. All, however, will admit, that some of man's faculties rank higher than others in the scale of relative importance. To the perfection of man, as man, all his faculties are alike essential. But it will hardly be contended by any reflecting mind, that those powers, which we possess in common with superior natures, are not relatively more important, than those which we possess in common with the brutes. None, perhaps, will question the propriety of classing some sentiments as superior, and others as inferior. Nor will any deny, that intellect and the moral feelings are superior to the animal propensities; and, consequently, that the former should regulate and control the latter. The paramount importance of a correct knowledge of the human organisation is beautifully exemplified, and impressively admitted, in the great attention which, in all civilised nations, is now, and for many centuries has been, most justly paid to the various branches of the healing art. What benevolent mind could contemplate, without pangs of unutterable distress, the total extinction of all those lights which, even within the last century, have been thrown on man's physical organisation by the votaries of medical science, in order to alleviate animal suffering, and to promote animal enjoyment. Dark, unutterably dark and gloomy, would be the night of hopeless misery by which such an event must inevitably be succeeded. If, then, a correct knowledge of our organisation, so far as the mere animal nature is concerned, be of unquestionable importance, how vastly more important is the knowledge and cultivation of our highest faculties! Strange! passing strange! that, in all ages, so much care should have been expended on man's animal, and so little on his |