fuch a project: but it is certainly neceffa ry for us, and for moft of the other po tentates of Europe, to prevent the house of Auftria's being too much reduced, and, in particular, to prevent its being in the power of France, by means of the troubles which she has excited in Germany, make any addition to her own, already too extenfive, dominions. Etive fervice. As this depends upon cal- potentate in Europe to join with him in culation, and may eafily be calculated by every Gentleman prefent, it can admit of no doubt, or difficulty; therefore the only question that can come properly under our confideration, is that relating to the number of men neceffary for each fervice and in this too, confidering the dangerous fituation Europe in general, as well as this nation in particular, is in at prefent, I hope we shall be pretty unanimous. As the nature of the office in which I have the honour to serve his Majefty, makes it more particularly incumbent upon me to explain the nature of the feveral fervices mentioned in those estimates, and to make the proper motions, I fhall begin with that which was in courfe first referred to the committee, and which in its own nature stands most in need of an explanation,, I mean the estimate of the charge of maintaining the body of troops which his Majefty hath fent to Flanders, and which he thinks neceffary to be kept there for this enfuing year at least. I am fure, Sir, I need not take up much of your time in explaining the danger to which the liberties of Europe are expofed, by the numerous armies which France has fent into Germany. This danger is fo evident to the whole nation, that the only complaint feems to be, why his Majefty has not long before this time given more effectual affiftance to the Queen of Hungary. This complaint, 'tis true, can only be made by those who do not know or confider the difficulties which his Majefty had to furmount, before he could give any fuch affiftance; but as fuch ignorant or inconfiderate perfons are by far the moft numerous, this, like most other popular complaints, tho' without any foundation, has become very general. Thank God! moft of thofe difficulties are now removed, and his Majesty is left at liberty to give more openly, and I hope more effectually, an affiftance to that magnanimous princefs. I am far from faying, I am far from fuppofing, that his Majefty has it in his view, to restore the house of Auftria to as great power and splendor as it was lately poffefied of; this is not, I think, neceffary for fecuring the balance of power, and I doubt much if he could get any one This, Sir, is the great danger Europe is at prefent exposed to; this is the dan ger which we are, if poffible, to prevent and in this we shall probably get most of the potentates of Europe to join with Can we fuppofe, Sir, that France has been at fuch vaft expence of blood and treasure, merely for the fake of the house of Bava ria? Can we suppose, she has no private view of getting fome addition to her own dominions? She may declare, the may protest, she may fwear fhe has no fuch p vate view; but late experience muft com vince us, that there is no truft to be pat in fuch proteftations. In the laft war the got Lorrain, notwithstanding a moft fo lemn proteftation at the beginning of that war, That bis Moft Chriftian Majefty did not defire to enlarge the bounds of hisdamizions; and further, that his Majefty, content with what he poffeffed, and far from defi ring to turn the fuccefs of his arms to the co largement of his borders, did not fcruple to declare folemnly, that he had it not at all view to make conquests, nor to keep fettlements, wherein the safety of the Germanich terry tories might be concerned. Yet, Sir, not withstanding this folemn and exprefs de claration, as foon as the Emperor was fo ced, by the neutrality of the Dutch, fubmit to French terms, his Moft Chr ftian Majefty appropriated to himself th whole dominions of Lorrain, fome of which are within the territory of the Germant body; and all the German territories this fide the Rhine became thereby exp fed to an immediate invafion, whenev France fhould be prompted by her amb on, intereft or refentment, to invade the This, Sir, may fhew us, how much declarations of France are to be truffed and if the Queen of Hungary fhoul again difpoffeffed of Bohemia, and for deferted, or fo feebly affifted, whi much the fame, by her allies, as to be forced to fubmit to fuch terms as France should prefcribe; can we fuppofe, that, in order to have Bohemia, and thereby a vote in the electoral college, reftored to her, the would not yield up the Austrian Netherlands to France? Can we fuppofe, that the Emperor would not agree to fuch an exchange, if, in lieu of Bohemia, he should have the Tirol and Trentine, and all the Auftrian dominions in Swabia, fecured to him by the ceffion of the Queen of Hungary and the guarantee of France? Can we fuppofe, that Spain or Sardinia would oppofe fuch a treaty, if a part of the Milaneze fhould be given to the latter, and the reft, together with the Mantuan, and with Parma and Placentia, to the son of the Queen of Spain, now married to a daughter of France? The Dutch, 'tis true, would then have reafon to repent of the late and prefent pufillanimity of their counils: but durft they attempt to oppose fuch in exchange? Would not they be glad to lo as they did in the year 1700? Would ot they be forced to approve, in the most olemn manner, of thofe ufurpations and reaches of faith in the French, in order o get their troops back, who, as they were in 1700, would then be impounded n the heart of Flanders, and destitute of ny communication with their own counry? Could we then propose to form a conderacy against the power of France? ould we be fure of being able to defend urselves? We may talk, Sir, of our being an iand; we may now boast of the fuperioriof our naval power; we may now in great measure depend upon it as a fecuity against our being invaded: but, in is ftate of things, which Europe may robably be reduced to, if we do not owerfully interfere, I am afraid we should of long have reason to boast of the fupeority of our navy. If France were aain in poffeffion of the Netherlands, and reed from all apprehenfions of an attack y land, fhe would certainly apply herself ith the utmoft diligence and application the increase of her navy, and might in very few years be able to fit out a moft rmidable fquadron. We know what Owerful fquadrons fhe fitted out in K. William's time; and in how many feaengagements victory flood for fome time in fufpenfe, tho' we had at that time both the Spaniards and Dutch to affift us; tho' France had not then near fuch a trade, or fuch a number of feamen, as she has now; tho' fhe was then obliged to keep up numerous land-armies, to carry on the war, or to defend herfelf, in Flanders, in Spain, in Italy, and upon the Rhine; and tho fhe was then in poffeffion but of a very fmall part of the Low Countries. Have we not then great reason to apprehend her becoming fuperior at fea, if every one of thefe circumftances should be altered in her favour; especially if, in her war against us, the should be affifted by Spain, which probably would be the cafe, and we without any one friend or ally that dared give us the leaft affiftance? When we confider thefe events, which are at leaft poffible, and, in my opinion, Sir, highly probable, we must be convinced of its being abfolutely neceffary for his Majefty to form a confiderable army in Flanders, in order at least to prevent its being in the power of France, to model out the kingdoms and provinces upon the continent of Europe, according to her good-liking, and to take what part of them the pleases to herself. This, inftead of leading us into the war now carrying on in Germany, may prevent its becoming neceffary for us to engage in it; because, when France fees that we are refolved to interpofe in the prefent contefts in Germany, and have a numerous army upon the continent to protect fuch of the potentates of Europe as fhall join with us in defence of publick liberty, or even to carry the war into her own dominions, in cafe by her conduct she should force us to do fo, fhe will then fet bounds to her ambitious views, and will fubmit to fuch terms of peace as may be thought proper for restoring the balance of power, and establishing it upon a folid foundation. The very arrival, Sir, of our troops in Flanders, has already had a great and good effect. Both the Emperor and France are already become much more moderate in their demands, and have offered to reftore the peace of Germany upon conditions which a few months ago they would have have rejected with indignation. Therefore every one muft, I think, approve of his Majefty's having fent a body of his troops thither; no one can fuppofe, that a lefs number would have been fufficient for the purposes defigned; and every one muft agree, that they ought to be kept there till thofe purpofes are fully answered. For this reafon, I need not, I think, take up any more of your time upon this particular branch; but, as feveral other branches of publick expence are this day to come under our confideration, and as the motion I am now to make, will confequently be followed by feveral others, now I am up, I fhall beg leave to explain a little the other estimates this day refered to us, and to fhew the neceffity of each. As we are now in an open war with Spain, and as we have now, I may fay openly, undertaken to fet bounds to the ambitious views of France, both these powers will certainly watch for, and as certainly embrace the first opportunity for disturbing our domestick tranquillity; and therefore we ought now to be more cautious than ever of affording them any opportunity for this purpose. As we have now a fea-force fuperior to any that both thefe powers united together can fend against us, we can truft to it for our defence againft any formidable and forefeen invafion; but we cannot truft to it for preventing a small, fudden and unlooked for invafion and tho' a fmall number of troops actually landed in any part of Britain or Ireland could not pretend to make a conquest of either ifland, yet, confidering the great number of difaffected perfons we have ftill amongst us, even the landing of a fmall number of foreign troops might very much difturb our domeftick tranquillity, if we had not a fufficient number of regular troops to fend againt them at their firft landing. If they fhould be allowed time to march from one place to another, and thereby afford the difaffected, not only time, but an opportunity to join them, their army might be fo increafed as to involve us in a civil war amongst ourselves; and, before we could extricate ourselves out of this domeftick danger, Spain might have an opportunity to conquer or destroy fome of our belt co lonies in the Weft-Indies, and France to compel the Queen of Hungary, and all the other powers of Europe, to fubmit to fuch terms as the fhould prefcribe: fo that, at this critical conjuncture, unless we have a number of troops fufficient to repel an invading enemy, at, or soon after their firft landing, a fmall invafion may be as fatal in its confequences as the most formidable and moft fuccessful invafion at another time; because, as foon as the French and Spaniards had reduced the other potentates of Europe to their terms, that fmall invafion would certainly be followed by an invasion which we, with all our power either by fea or land, could neither prevent nor repel. Thus, Sir, every Gentleman muft perceive, that, in the prefent critical fituation of the affairs of Europe, it is more ne ceffary to keep a great number of troops at home, than ever it was upon any for mer occafion; and yet, fuch is his Ma jefty's regard for the ease of his people, as will appear by the estimate, that he defres but a very few more than was thought neceffary the first year of his reign, and not fo many as was thought neceffary in the year 1735. But, befides the necefty of keeping a large body of troops at home for fecuring our domestick tranquil lity at this dangerous conjuncture, his Ma jefty may perhaps find it neceffary to fend a few more of his troops abroad; and if this fhould happen, which is not impro bable, we ought to be provided with a few more regular troops than are abfolutely neceflary to be kept at home; especially if we confider, that it is every day beco ming more and more difficult to raife new regiments, or even to recruit or augment the old, than it was heretofore: for, in this country, the government cannot do as it does in France; it cannot compel men to enter into the service of their coun try, or to draw lots for that purpofe; and most of those who seem willing, have been already inlifted. From these circumstances, Sir, I hop it will be generally agreed, that the num ber of troops propofed by the estimate guards, garrifons and other purposes, lating to G. Britain, is the least numbe that can be thought fufficient for that FICE vice: and with regard to the forces to be maintained in Minorca, Gibraltar, and America, as the number is not propofed to be augmented, I think I need fay nothing for explaining, or for fhewing the neceffity of that expence; for furely no man would be mad enough to advise diminishing the number and strength of any of thofe garrifons in a time of fuch foreign danger. For the fame reason, I think I need not fay much upon the marine estimate, fince the estimate does not propofe, hat they should be augmented, and no man tan fuppofe, that they are lefs neceffary, r that the fame number is not neceffary or the enfuing year, that was thought ne effary for the year now near expiring. Confidering the danger we are in at preent of having France for a declared eneay, as well as Spain, I fhould not have een at all furprised, if the number of our narines had been proposed to be augmentd to near double of what it is; for, if a apture fhould happen between us and rance, it will be impoffible for us to et near a fufficient number of feamen to an the great number of fhips of war we hall be obliged to fit out for fquadrons, nvoys, cruisers, and guardships, without acting an entire ftop to our mercantile naigation. It will be neceffary for us to at as many marines on board every ship f war, as the nature of the fervice will Imit of; and if this should happen, doule the number of marines now propofed ill fcarcely be fufficient: but as to this, is Majefty trufts to the wisdom, affection id juftice of his parliament, not doubt g but that they will enable him to take ch measures as may upon any new emerncy appear to be neceflary for the publick rvice! non-commiffion officers included) to be employed in Flanders, for the year 1743; and after this motion is agreed to, which I hope it will without oppofition, I fhall then take the liberty to make fuch other motions as of courfe arife from the other eftimates this day referred to the confideration of the committee. The fpeech of P. Furius Philus. houfe, and how thort a time may be have not been long a member of this decreed me, I do not know +: but, while I have the honour to fit here, I am determined to speak my mind freely, and to declare my averfion to a standing army: an averfion not taken up on any distaste or distrust of the officers that have the command of it, because I believe them to be men of great honour and abilities; but founded on a maxim I have early imbibed, That a ftanding army is abfolutely inconfiftent with the liberties of G. Bri tain. Our naval force is our natural strength, and by means of that we have in former reigns been the terror of Europe. I would not be understood to mean, that we are to have no troops at all: a small number may perhaps be always neceffary for guards and garrifons at home, and in time of war a larger number to be fent abroad. The question now before you is, Whether you fhall grant 534,763 1. 5 s. for maintaining 16,359 men, to be employed in Flanders? but, as the Hon. Gent. who made you this motion, opened to you the whole number of national troops propofed to be employed this year, I fhall beg leave to confider them all together; and that under two heads; the neceffity of the troops, and the ability of the nation to maintain them. The number of national troops propofed to be employed is 63,246, viz. 16,359 in Flanders, 23,610 for guards and garrifons at home and in the Weft-Indies, 11,727 in the Plantations, Minorca and Gibraltar, and 11,550 marines. The neceffity of keeping up fo great a number of troops, muft arile from fome danger the nation would be in without them; for no other argument can justify the measure. Having now, Sir, explained, in as few ords as poffible, the nature and neceffity the feveral branches of publick charge hich, in confequence of the eftimates rered to the committee, muft this day me under our confideration; and hang in particular fhewn the wisdom and pediency of our keeping such a body of Cops in Flanders as has been lately fent ere, I fhall conclude with a motion, to folve, That the Sum of 534,763 l. 5s. be anted to bis Majefty, for defraying the charge 16,359 effective men (commiffion and + There was a petition against his election, If If we are in any danger from Spain, the As every nation is circumfcribed within certain bounds, so there is a certain degree of expence that every nation can with afety bear, and should never exceed; and it is the opinion of fome very wife men, that whenever the expences of G. Britain exceed five millions a-year, I mean the or dinary expences voted by parliament, the goes beyond her ftrength, and confequent ly muft fall. During all the laft war in Q. Anne's time, when we had so great an army on the continent, and fo many allies, and contracted a great debt, our ex pences, one year with another, did not a mount to 5,300,000l.; in the year 1741, our expences were above 5,267,000l.; la year, above 6,137,000l. The troops now propofed (I mean the 63,000 men) will coft us above 1,655,000l. which, with the feamen and other expences of the year must come to above fix millions. The na tion is in debt 48,915,000l. (which debe is every day increafing), and grones under a heavy load of taxes; and tho' many Gentlemen in this houfe may not feel the weight of them, the poor daily do, and call aloud for redrefs. These are ferious thing and deferve the mature confideration parliament. For my own part, I fhall al ways think it my duty, while I fit here, to oppofe laying on any of my fellow-fub jects a greater burden than they are able to bear; and therefore shall heartily give my negative to the maintaining fo grea a number of unneceffary troops. I The fpeech of L. Junius Brutus. Mr Prefident, Find, the Gentlemen who oppose the queftion, carefully, I shall not lay artful ly, drop the prefent neceffity we are un der, and talk only of the danger and en pence of maintaining and keeping up great number of land-forces, and the ability of the nation to fupport that e pence. I have as great an averfion to numerous standing army, kept up in time of peace, as any Gentleman can have; an fhall readily admit of the maxim, Thatt numerous ftanding army, kept up in tim of peace, is abfolutely inconfiftent with th liberties of G. Britain. But I have no verfion to a standing army in time of wat however numerous it may be, provided be no more numerous than is neceffe for putting a happy and speedy end to war: nor can I think, that a numera ftanding army in time of war is any inconfiftent with the liberties of G. tain; especially when a confiderable of that army is fent abroad to the |