sieurs Cabot had the right to call themselves Marquises of Cabot de la Fare, without, however, having the power to sign or call themselves by the surname of La Fare, whether alone or preceded by the title of Marquis, unless the name of Cabot was used before it.

Ought we to be sorry that the Messieurs de la Fare have lost their cause? Ought we to congratulate the Messieurs Cabot for having gained it? Neither one nor the other, we must laugh heartily; that is all.

Legislative Decrees of Divorce.

The subject of divorce is, in some states, under the jurisdiction of the legislature, in others within that of the judicial tribunals. An application for divorce necessarily involves one of two questions; first, whether the marriage was void ab initio, or, se cond, whether one of the parties has by violating the contract forfeited all benefit under it. Both of these questions are strictly of judicial jurisdiction. When, therefore, a legislative body undertakes to decree a divorce, it acts in the capacity of a judicial court, for otherwise there would be two objections to any such proceeding by such body in the United States, the first being general, and of force in all countries, the second arising on the constitution of the United States; for it is contrary to the first principles of legislation, to legislate on private controversies in individual cases, for the will of the supreme power being previously declared, is a rule of conduct; but to determine the penalty of an act after it has been done, or to legislate in respect to past facts is a characteristic of an arbitrary government; and the constitution of the United States accordingly prohibits any law of a state in violation of contracts, or any ex post facto law, and if we consider a legislature, therefore, as enacting and not adjudicating in cases of divorce, this provision of the constitution is violated. The legislatures must therefore be considered rather as judicial tribunals in the exercise of this branch of their jurisdiction. And the question very naturally arises whether they are the best organized courts for the discussion and decision of questions arising on this particular species of contract. In our abstract of the legislation of North Carolina, in the Jurist for October last, our readers will recollect a long list of decrees of divorce. The same subject makes a conspicuous figure in some other of the States. Governor Shultze, of Pennsylvania, presses this subject upon the consideration of the legislature of that state, in his message of November last, in the following terms:

'Application for divorces to the legislature become every year more numerous, and of necessity consume, in the investigation of the concerns of individuals, a large portion of that time which

might profitably be bestowed on the business of the public. In some cases it is feared that application is made to the legislature and acted upon without sufficient evidence that the party complained against has been duly notified of the application intended. Could not all the ends of justice likely to be attained by the granting of divorces, be more certainly attained if the jurisdiction of our courts were more extended over them, and the causes of divorce more fully defined than at present?'

Summary process against tenants to compel a surrender of the demised premises at the expiration of the term.-In the same message of Governor Shultze, to which we have already referred, he recommends a provision in relation to landlord and tenant, as follows:

'If I am not much misinformed as to the operation of the laws which now regulate the relations between landlords and tenants, they loudly call for the benefits of revision and consolidation. This is more especially the case in our cities and large towns, where a large proportion of the houses are rented. I recommend in an especial manner, that a prompt and cheap remedy be devised by which tenants shall be compelled to surrender up possession, when required so to do, at the end of the period for which the premises shall have been demised. The act of the 25th of March, 1825, which was intended to remedy this evil in the city and county of Philadelphia, is complained of as almost wholly inoperative, as the tenant must voluntarily have removed from the premises before the landlord can have a writ of possession issued. How far the peculiar powers vested in landlords for the securing of their rent is founded in justice, or derived from the ancient laws of England, and adopted without sufficient examination, is a matter not unworthy to occupy a portion of the time of the general assembly.'

Tax on Law Suits. We regret exceedingly to meet with the following passage in the same message of Governor Shultze, to which we have alluded above.

'The importance of giving publicity with as little delay as possible to the decisions of the supreme court, is sufficiently obvious. It seems to be considered that the profits to be derived from the publication of reports of decisions, will hardly compensate for the labor and expense to be incurred in preparing and publishing them. I would therefore recommend that provisions be made by law for the employment of a reporter. By a small tax on writs of error, which could not operate oppressively on any one, a fund might be provided for the payment of the reporter.'

It seems to be enough to subject the parties to the costs of their

suits, without taxing them besides with the expense of publishing reports of the cases for the benefit of the public. The only apology for any such tax would be, that the public is at the expense of maintaining court houses, paying the salaries of judges, &c.; and the tax may be considered only as a reasonable compensation for those facilities afforded at the public expense towards the settling of private controversies. But this would not be a very liberal footing on which to put the question, and will not probably be considered a good reason for levying this very objectionable species of tax. Reports of decisions ought to be published, in some degree at least, at the public expense, and under public authority, for the reason that they are practically a part of the laws by which the conduct of people is to be regulated and their rights, obligations and duties determined; since the construction given to the laws by the courts, do in fact, to all practical purposes, constitute a part of those laws.

Law Drafting. We have occasionally remarked upon the unskilfulness of the drafts of some of the statutes which it has been our duty, in the course of our publication, to examine. It is indeed a little singular, that, in the practical course of our legislation, especially in the states, so many persons should be ready and think themselves quite competent to draft a law. We observe a law in the statute book of Massachusetts, the object of which was, probably, to substitute imprisonment for whipping, in all cases in which the substitution had not already been made by previous acts, but the act appears to abolish every species of punishment for all kinds of crimes, except a fine not over $200 and imprisonment not exceeding six months. The act runs thus: An Act for abolishing the punishment of Whipping within this Commonwealth. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives, in General Court assembled, and by the authority of the same, That no person, convicted of any offence, before any court of this Commonwealth, shall ever be punished by whipping; but the court, having jurisdiction of the case, may, and shall, sentence such convict to a fine, to the use of the Commonwealth, not exceeding two hundred dollars, or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months according to the aggravation of said offence. [Feb. 28, 1826.]

QUARTERLY LIST OF LAW PUBLICATIONS.

Reports of Cases argued and determined in the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. By Octavius Pickering. Vol. VI. Boston. Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 8vo.

Reports of Cases argued and determined in the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in 1827, 1828, and 1829. By Thomas Harris and Richard W. Gill. Vol. 2. Annapolis. Jonas Green. 8vo.

The Law of Executors and Administrators. By Sir Samuel Toller, Knight; with considerable Additions by Francis Whitmarsh, Esq., with references to the Statutes of Pennsylvania, and the Principal American Decisions. By Edward D. Ingraham. Philadelphia. John Grigg. 8vo. pp. 623.

The New Hampshire Town Officer. By William M. Richardson. Concord. J. B. Moore. 12mo. pp. 299.

The Law of Pleading and Evidence in Civil Actions, arranged alphabetically, with Practical Forms and the Pleadings in Evidence to support them. By John Simcoe Saunders, Esq. 2 vols. Philadelphia. R. H. Small. 8vo.

Militia Laws of the United States and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. By William Sumner. Second edition. Boston. True & Greene.

The Form Book; containing nearly three hundred of the most approved Precedents. By a Member of the Philadelphia Bar. Philadelphia. Tower & Hogan.

Condensed Reports of Cases in the Supreme Court of the U. States, containing the whole series of the decisions of the Court from its organization to the commencement of Peters's Reports at January Term, 1827, with copious notes of parallel cases in the Supreme and Circuit Courts of the United States. Edited by Richard Peters, Esq. Vol. I. Philadelphia. John Grigg. 1830. 8vo. pp. 655.

A Digest of the Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, from February Term, 1821, to January Term, 1829; and also of the Cases in the Circuit and District Courts of the United States; from the commencement of the Reports: being a continuation of Wheaton's Digest. By two Gentlemen of the New York Bar. New York. R. Donaldson. 8vo. pp. 311.

A General Abridgment and Digest of American Law, with occasional Notes and Comments. By Nathan Dane, L. L. D. Counsellor at Law. Vol. IX. Being a Supplement to the 8

vols. before published. Boston. Hilliard, Gray, & Co. Royal

8vo.

Reports of Cases Adjudged in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. By Thomas Sergeant and William Rawle, jr. Vol. XVI. Philadelphia. M'Carty & Davis. 8vo.

An Essay on Uses and Trusts, and on the nature and operation of conveyances at Common Law, and of those which derive their effect from the Statute of Uses. By Francis Williams Saunders, Esq. of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister. First American, from the fourth London edition. Revised, corrected, and considerably enlarged. Philadelphia. R. H. Small. 8vo.

A Practical and Elementary Abridgment of the Cases Argued and Determined in the Courts of King's Bench, Common Pleas, Exchequer, and at Nisi Prius; and of the Rules of Court. By Charles Petersdorff, Esq. Vol. II. New York. Gould &

Banks. 8vo.

Reports of Cases Determined in the Circuit Court of the United States, for the third Circuit, comprising the Districts of Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Published from the Manuscripts of the Hon. Bushrod Washington, late one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States. Vol. IV. Philadelphia. P. H. Nicklin & T. Johnson. 8vo.

By Joseph
Svo.

The Chancery Practice of the State of New York. Noulton, Solicitor and Counsellor. Vol. I. New York

Hilliard, Gray, & Co. have in press, No. 1, Vol. 7, Pickering's Reports.