of the distracting or scattering of it; as being entire, and not divided, it would be comprehended. An hundred pounds in heaps of five pounds will show more than in one gross heap: so as the heaps be all upon one table to be seen at once; otherwise not. As flowers also, growing scattered in divers beds, will show more than if they did grow in one bed: provided all those beds be within a plot, that they be under view at once; otherwise not. And therefore men whose living lieth together in one shire, are commonly counted greater-landed, than those whose livings are dispersed, though it be more; because of the simultaneous notice and comprehension.

A third case, wherein this appearance deceiveth, which is not so properly a case or conclusion, as it is a false appearance, being in effect, as near as possible, the exact appearance of the thing itself, is, "That every composition seems to partake of a certain want:" because, if one thing would serve the turn, it were ever best; but it is the defect and imperfection of things that hath brought in that help to piece them up: as it is said, Luke x. 41, 42. " Martha, Martha, thou art troubled about many things; one thing is sufficient." So likewise hereupon Æsop framed the fable of the Fox and the Cat: wherein the Fox bragged, what a number of shifts and devices he had, to get from the hounds ; and the Cat said, he had but one, which was to climb

a tree; which in fact was better worth than all the rest; whereof the proverb grew,

"Reynard the hounds to 'scape had shifts not small; Grimalkin only one, as good as all."

And in the moral of this fable, it comes likewise to pass, "That a good sure friend is a better help at a pinch, than all the stratagems and policies of man's own wit." Thus it falleth out to be a common error in negotiating; wherein men have many reasons to induce or persuade, so they strive commonly to utter, and use them all at once, which weakeneth them. For it argueth, as was said, a neediness in each of the reasons by itself, as if one did not trust to any of them, but fled from one to another, helping himself only with that.

"And what help'd not alone before,

Doth help full well, when join'd with more."

Indeed, in a set speech in an assembly, it is expected a man should use all his reasons in the case he

handleth: but in private persuasions it is always a great error.

A fourth case, wherein this appearance may be understood, is in the acknowledged strength of an united power; according to the tale of the FRENCH King, who, when the Emperor's Am

bassador had recited his master's style at large, which consisteth of many countries, and dominions, the FRENCH King willed his Chancellor, or other Minister, to repeat over FRANCE as many times as the other had recited the several dominions; intending that it was equivalent with them all, and more compacted and united.

There is also appertaining to this appearance another point, why breaking of a thing doth help it; not by way of adding a show of magnitude unto it, but a note of excellency and rarity: whereof the forms are, "Where you shall find such a concurrence? Great, but not complete:" for it seems a less work of Nature or Fortune, to make any thing in his kind greater than ordinary, than to make a strange composition. Yet, if it be narrowly considered, this appearance will be denied, or encountered, by imputing to all excellencies in compositions a kind of poverty, or (at least) a risk, or jeopardy: for from that which is excellent in greatness, somewhat may be taken, or there may be a decay, and yet sufficiently left; but from that which hath his price because complete in the aggregate, if you take away any thing, or any part to fail, all is disgraced.

A A

SECTION 6.

"That whose privation (or the want of which) is Good, is in itself Evil: that whose privation (or the want whereof) is an Evil, is in itself Good."

"He

THE phrases to make it conceived, that that was Evil, which is changed for the better, are, that is in Hell, thinks there is no Heaven." "Acorns were good, till bread was found, &c." And on the other side, the forms to make it conceived, that that was good, which was changed for the worse, are; that we understand the goodness of things more by wanting, than enjoying them. "Bona à tergo formosissima:" i. e. "Good things never appear in their full beauty, till they turn their back and be going away, &c.”

The argument against this appearance is, That the Good or Evil which is removed, may be esteemed Good or Evil, comparatively; and not positively, or simply. So that, if the privation be good, it follows not, that the former condition was evil, but less good for the flower or blossom is a positive Good; although the remove of it, to give place to the fruit, be a comparative Good. So in the tale of Esop, when the old fainting man in the heat of the day cast down his burthen, and called for Death;

and when Death came to know his will with him, said, "It was for nothing, but to help him up with his burthen again;" it doth not follow, that because Death, which was the privation of the burthen, was ill, therefore the burthen was good. And in this part the ordinary form of a necessary Evil aptly confutes this appearance; for the privation of a necessary Evil is Evil; and yet that doth not convert the nature of the necessary Evil, but it is Evil.

Again, it cometh sometimes to pass, that there is an equality in the change of privation, and (as it were) a Dilemma boni, of the Good; or, Dilemma mali, of the Evil; so that the corruption of one Good, is a generation of the other.

"Both chances the same equal parent have:"

And contrarily, the remedy of the one Evil, is the occasion and commencement of another; as in Scylla and Charybdis.

SECTION 7.

"What is near to Good, is Good: What is at distance from Good, is Evil.”

SUCH is the nature of things, that things contrary,' and distant in nature and quality; and also severed and disjoined in place; and things like, and con