CH. IV.]

DEFICIENCIES OF THE FRENCH ARMY.

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posed to the party hatred of both Girondists and Jacobins, who, as the Prussians were still distant, did not hesitate even to weaken the defences of the country, if they could but thereby humble the hated Feuillants. The correspondence of the Ministers with the Generals leaves no doubt on this point. They vied with one another in eagerness and activity. They devised measures for new levies, repairs of the fortresses, and the instigation of an insurrection in Belgium;1 but they always end by saying, that the desired object was not to be obtained as long as their resources were crippled by anarchy, and the Parisian émeutes occupied the whole time of the Ministers. The work of entrenchment and building fortifications had been going on in every fortress since February; each succeeding Ministry gave increasingly stringent orders to this effect. But what progress could possibly be made when soldiers and workmen were equally insubordinate, and the contractors were continually left without money? Here and there, no doubt, ill-will was added to other causes, since, up to the Autumn, there was still a large number of aristocrats among the officers. But infinitely more was done by the inexperience of the new popular Authorities, who threw inumerable hindrances in the way of military operations by their unauthorized and mischievous interference. The reports of the Parisian Commissioners-who went at the end of August into the Departments, 2 and are in this respect perfectly trustworthy-afford us a multitude of proofs. The result was certain enough, that not one of the border fortresses-neither Metz nor Thionville, neither Verdun nor Sedan, neither Nancy nor Saarlouis-were in a complete state of defence.

When the German preparations began, Lafayette's corps in Sedan amounted to 19,000 men, and Luckner had about an equal number-after subtracting the garrisons-in his

Lajard empowered Luckner, on the 25th of June, formally to acknowledge the Belgian Revolutionary Committee. 2 Published in part, in the Revolutions de Paris, Sept. 1792.

Army of the Centre, in Metz. Rather more than 25,000 men, that is nearly two-thirds of these troops, were regiments of the line; the rest were National Guards, who, however, had been in the field for a year, and in the camp for four months, and were in no respect inferior to their military comrades. It was very evident, that the shock of the great German army could not be sustained by these 38,000 men. Lajard, therefore, in July ordered General Montesquiou to send off twenty battalions of the Army of the South to Metz, and had issued similar directions for Dumouriez with regard to the six thousand men in the camp at Maulde. From these two sources together, the line of the Meuse would have rereived a reinforcement of nearly 18,000 men, and the total number of forces on that river would have been raised to 56,000 men. As, morcover, all the fortresses were manned, and more than 11,000 men on the Flemish frontier and 22,000 men (besides the garrisons) of the Rhine army were disposable, the chances of the French and the Duke of Brunswick with his 80,000 invaders, were tolerably equal; and there was certainly no need of the Revolution of the 10th of August for the defence of the country.

But we have seen how the patriots of Paris, influenced by party considerations, frustrated the intentions of Lajard. To oblige Montesquiou, the Gironde prevented the sending off of the 20 battalions; to bind Dumouriez to their party, the Jacobins procured him permission to remain in Maulde. In the place of these measures they induced the National Assembly to declare that the country was in danger; and on the 24th of July, after a consultation with Luckner and Montesquiou, they caried a law for the organization of National volunteers. During these proceedings, however, the revolution of the 10th of August occurred, and universal disorder followed this grand coup of the Cordeliers and Jacobins. In Paris they had still no other resource than fresh levies of volunteers, and the enlistment of the masses. The men thus raised were collected, according to the suggestion

CHARACTER OF THE REPUBLICAN FORCES.

119

CH. IV.] of Lajard, in a camp at Soissons, for the purpose of being equipped and exercised before they were distributed among the different armies. We have the documents relating to this subject before us, which give a wretched picture of the state of affairs during the whole month of August. There was no lack of recruits; on the 4th of August there were 6,492, of whom a part was sent to Metz and Sedan; on the 21st there were 10,000 men in the camp, and of these, four battalions were sent to Metz. On the same day Servan reported 256 new companies from various districts, whereupon the General of the camp, Duhoux, replied with some consternation, that this addition would make up an army of 20,000, and that he was a lost man if he could not provide for them. The prospect in this respect was a gloomy one; for the great majority there were neither muskets, shoes nor food. They therefore lived at the cost of the peasants, as in an enemy's country; were constantly quarrelling with one another, and crying out against the treachery of the government. The Generals in command deprecated so great an addition to their numbers, which could only diminish the scanty supplies allotted to the armies. They therefore hit on the idea of dividing the camp, and quartering the larger masses in Troyes, Rheims and Soissons, and moving the best equipped to Chalons, nearer the theatre of war, and gradually drafting them off thence to the different armies. Luckner, whose unfitness for active service became daily more evident, was replaced by Kellerman in the Army of the Centre, and entrusted as Generalissimo with the superintendence of the camp. During the months of September he received, in his new capacity, about 1,800 recruits a day; reckoning all together, therefore, we find that up to the 20th of September the danger of the country produced 60,000 men,

1 Of the officers of these battalions no fewer than 46 subsequently attained the rank of Marshals and Generals of Division. Among them

were Brune, St. Cyr, Jourdan, Lannes, Massena, Moreau, Oudinot, and Victor. Mortimer Ternaux, II. 112.

1

not half of whom could be counted on for active service, and who by no means made up for the loss which the armies suffered from the disorders of the Revolution-from desertion, want of provisions and insubordination. This state of things becomes more palpable when we find that in the months of July and August, 8,000 men were missing in Lafayette's corps, 4,600 in the Army of the Centre, and 4,000 in the Army of the South, without any one being able to say what had become of them. Though these are not quite equal figures to the number of volunteers above stated, the difference was more than outweighed by the inferior quality of the new troops. In short, though the Revolution had done much to excite the feelings of the People against the enemy, it had contributed in a no less degree to render the land defenceless against a serious military attack.

Such was the condition of the opposing powers; the one was so reduced in military strength that nothing but the courage of despair could inspire the hope of a successful resistance; and the other was so weak in the means of offensive warfare, that, under ordinary circumstances, no reasonable man would have ventured the slightest aggressive operation. The Duke of Brunswick was in constant dread of a revolutionary power which had no existence; and the King relied on the alleged feelings of the French people, of which the very contrary actually prevailed. The latter illusion was dispelled quickly enough; but Brunswick adhered all the more obstinately to the former; and his own weakness prevented him from observing the gaps and flaws in the armour of the enemy. This was the course of things during the whole campaign; it was not a struggle of force with force, talent with talent, but a competition of deficiences and errors. A mistake on one side was immediately made good by a still greater blunder on the other. Hence arose

1 According to the lists, and the Correspondence of the Generals.

CH. IV.]

DUMOURIEZ'S MISTAKES.

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a number of unforeseen vicissitudes which filled the campaign with a series of critical situations; these, however, invariably ended in nothing, so that the final result was in accordance with the natural effect of the relative numbers. The longer the attacking, and, at first, superior party delayed, the weaker it became, while the defenders were strengthened by their very retreat. When both parties were in equal strength, the invaders ceased to advance, and immediately afterwards began their retreat.1

When the Prussians reached the French borders, General Dumouriez was Commander-in-chief, having been appointed on the 18th of August. Had he hastened to the Meuse with all his disposable forces, according to the instructions of Servan, he might have reached Sedan in a week, and, considering the weakness of the Austrians in Belgium, might have safely taken 11,000 men with him. He would thus have arrived in Sedan during the siege of Longwy, might have retreated without any hindrance to the Argonnes, covered Verdun, and joined Kellermann. An army of 50,000 men would have been thus collected at this point before a single German soldier had appeared on the Meuse; in which case the Duke would hardly have been persuaded to cross that river. The affair would then in all probability have resulted in a tiresome campaign for the possession of the fortresses on the Meuse.

But Dumouriez was far from considering the position of affairs on the Meuse, and of his own corps in Sedan, as particularly hazardous. His extended command only increased the ardour with which he prosecuted his favourite scheme for the conquest of Belgium. Instead, therefore, of

1 C. Renouard (Geschichte des französischen Revolutionskriegs 1792) has related the particulars of this campaign with great exactness; and

has given especially full details of the movements of the Hessian Corps, from written sources.