ment and farther developement of a Belgian Republic might be patiently observed and watched; but a permanent occupation of Belgium by the French was sufficient to rouse any English government to take up arms. Such an event touched England in many respects more nearly than a Russian occupation of the Danubian territories would affect Austria. The French Ministers by no means deceived themselves as to the state of things in Europe. Pitt, on his part, had stated to several of their envoys that he was very desirous of peace; that he was willing to dispense with all diplomatic formalities, and-in spite of the non-recognition of the Republic-to treat with their Ambassador Chauvelin, and even with their secret agents, directly they produced definite powers of negotiation; but what he could not allow, was an aggressive policy of conquest on the part of France, and a violation of the rights of English allies. This language produced a great impression in Paris; for however bravely the Ministers had talked of overthrowing the English despot they saw all the evils of a war with England the more clearly, the nearer they approached it.2 There were even some who spoke and acted in favour of peace. Lebrun's principal Chef de bureau, Maret, had endeavoured to come to an understanding with Pitt in personal interviews. Even the secret London agents, Noël and Benoît, began to make their reports in a conciliating tone;3 and de Maulde, the ambassador at the Hague, in consequence of his leaning towards peace, was unceremoniously recalled from his post. The intrigues and despatches of Chauvelin, on the contrary, produced the very opposite effect. This Marquis, who had once belonged to Talleyrand's clique, had been sent to London 4 1 Lord Grenville in the House of Lords, Feb. 1. 1793. Brissot's report to the Convention, Jan. 12. Pitt's words to Maret in Miles's Authentic correspondence, 94. 2 Morris. CH. V.] CHAUVELIN'S ATTEMPT TO FRIGHTEN PITT. 303 in February to bring about an alliance, and if possible a change of Ministers. In his high and splendid post he indulged his vanity and independent spirit to the utmost, and left the business of the embassy to the superior dexterity of Talleyrand. But the 10th of August deprived him of this valuable assistant (who would probably have been ready enough to accept the Republic, but was inexorably rejected by it), and at the same time stripped his position of all its official splendour; since England did not immediately recognize the Republic, nor, consequently, its ambassador. Chauvelin however lost no time in recommending himself to the new powers at Paris. As quondam aristocrat he took care to display a double amount of coarse and arrogant patriotism, and determined, above all things, to force Lord Grenville to acknowledge the Republic, and himself as its representative. He still placed some hope on the London democrats, was convinced that Pitt would not dare to go to war, and continually exhorted the French Ministry to energy, as the surest means of extorting peace. Such exhortations, as we may easily suppose, found a welcome hearing from the French Ministers. Lebrun forbade all the other agents from entering into any kind of negotiation with Pitt; and informed the latter that communications from England were only to be made through Chauvelin. All that Pitt had said about his desire for peace was regarded in Paris as a proof of weakness and fear. The French rulers resolved to act with tenfold energy, and by louder and more terrible threats to frighten the English Minister away from all interference in continental politics. With this view Chauvelin delivered a despatch to the Ministry in London, on the 27th of December, in which he discussed all the complaints made by England against France; the decree of November 19th-the opening of the Scheldt-and the threatened invasion of Holland. He declared that Holland was quite safe, but that the other two questions were irrevocably settled. He called on England to lay aside her unworthy wavering, and to declare whether she chose to begin a war with France on such insignificant grounds. To increase the effect of this note, the Minister of the Marine issued a public circular, on the 30th, to all the Jacobins of the maritime towns, stating that King George wished for war, and that he should therefore effect a landing in England, throw 50,000 caps of liberty on her shores, and raise the ́ English republic on the ruins of the throne. On the following day the Convention decreed the appointment of a Committee for general defence, with open reference to a war with England; "which," said the member who brought up the report "we have no reason to fear, since our fishing boats are ready to carry 100,000 men across the Channel, who will put an end to the contest on the ruins of the Tower." It was in connexion with this that Lebrun at this time drew up instructions for Genet, who was to go to North America as ambassador. This envoy was directed to negotiate an alliance with a view of punishing by exclusion those Powers which aimed at commercial monopoly-especially, Lebrun went on to say, as France had a special interest in protecting herself from England and Spain. The state of things in Paris therefore was that the Ministers did not exactly wish for war with England, but were determined to keep Belgium and the Scheldt, and therefore endeavoured, in the first place, to intimidate England by a harsh demeanour. Unfortunately this course of conduct was by no means well adapted to the actual state of things. Pitt was far from wishing for war, and still less to undertake an expedition for the punishment of the regicides. On the contrary, he was in many respects more peaceably inclined than even Lebrun supposed; but his willingness to yield had its fixed limits, and his firm, austere and logical mind was utterly inaccessible to intimidation. Chauvelin's threats, which brought the possibility of war so close before his eyes, had no other effect than to make him look about for means of increasing the warlike resources of his country, and to CH. V.] PITT'S STRENUOUS EFFORTS TO PRESERVE PEACE. 305 inquire of Spain, in the first place, whether she would make common cause with England in the coming war. In Madrid the liberal Aranda had been succeeded in the conduct of public affairs, on the 15th of November, by the ex-lifeguardsman Godoi, now Duke of Alcudia, the favourite of the Queen. The latter, partly from fear of the French arms, and partly from a desire of interceding for the deliverance of Louis the XVI., had offered neutrality to the French government on the 15th of December, and therefore declined the proposal of an armed alliance with England. What tended in a still greater degree than this failure to increase the inclination for peace in England, was the simultaneous communication of the Austrian ambassador in London, from which Pitt received the first official intelligence of the plans for the Partition of Poland and the Bavarian Exchange. Both these schemes appeared to him prejudicial to the stability of Europe, and the interests of England; but he considered the Partition of Poland as by far the worst and most pernicious of the two. Now it was evident that England could offer no effectual resistance to this measure, if she herself had a great war upon her hands; and she therefore hastened to take the most energetic steps in every direction towards the maintenance of the peace of Europe. Pitt held out to Austria the prospect of English assistance in the matter of the Bavarian Exchange, if that country would consent to make terms with France under his mediation. He declared in Berlin and St. Petersburg that a counter-revolution in France was not to be thought of; and that, in his opinion, all ground of war would be removed, if France gave up her conquests, and respected the rights of other States.1 He made no mention of the French Constitution, nor even of Louis's personal fate; he demanded nothing but the observance of the principle which the Con 1 Grenville to Lord Whitworth in St. Petersburg. Goltz to the Prussian Ministry, Jan. 24. stituent Assembly had so solemnly proclaimed, that France did not aim at conquest. Only one thing was wanting, to which the wishes of the French would naturally be directed -a formal recognition of the Republic by the Powers. Pitt had only too much reason not to lay any stress upon this in Vienna and St. Petersburg for the present; but this recognition was virtually comprehended in the proposed conclusion of peace; and with regard to England herself, he took care to let it be known, that, provided always France gave up her conquests, he was not averse even to this concession.1 The answer which Lord Grenville returned, on the 31st of December, to the note of the 27th, was in full accordance with these views. He repeated that Chauvelin, whom the new government of France had not accredited, could only be regarded as a private person; but that England gladly seized the opportunity of making known, even through him, that she earnestly desired peace, and would never take up arms as long as France abstained from violating the security and independence of foreign States. The policy of England was clearly and unequivocally comprised in these simple propositions. But the French Ministers either continued to found their hopes on the weakness of England, or overcame the dread they had hitherto entertained of an English war; at all events they adhered to the course which they had already adopted. It was in vain that de Maulde, who had just arrived in Paris, assured them, as the result of his communications with the Grand Pensionary Spiegel and the English Ambassador, Lord Auckland, that peace with the Maritime Powers was certain, if France did not incorporate Belgium, and war just as certain if she did. The French Cabinet resolved to increase the intensity of the crisis, and to go as near to a declaration of war as was possible without an open attack. They had again received favourable intelligence 1 Miles to Lebrun, Jan. 2; with comments by H. Marsh, 377. - 2 From the Protocols of the Cabinet Council. |