CH. II.]

REACTIONARY FEELING OF THE COUNTRY.

49

address against the Jacobins-whose club in that city only numbered 500 members-but they had also equipped a new battalion for the defence of the frontier, and saw no possibility of carrying on the war, if they deserted the last rallying point-the National Assembly. From Orleans, the Departmental Authorities, the Municipality, and 600 citizens, had sent up addresses against the proceedings of the 20th of June; but in the beginning of August, they called on the young men to form free companies; on the 10th they bewailed the fate of the King, and at the same time sent out their recruits to fight against his deliverers. In Brest, Belval, the Procureur of the Department, before the news of the 10th arrived, declared that the deposition of the King would be not only highly dangerous, but pernicious in its consequences; "but," he added, "whether it be decreed or rejected, the National Assembly must still continue to be our common centre, or France must perish." These sentiments occur in hundreds of documents dating from this period; and they manifested themselves all the more strongly, because they were based both on the strength and the weakness of human nature, and afforded the citizens free scope for the indulgence of their patriotism against foreigners, while they relieved them from the dangerous task of opposing the Jacobins at home. All enthusiasm for a political ideal had been used up in the disorders of the Revolution. "We are free enough," cried some, "why should we excite ourselves any longer?" "We are much too free;" said others, "of what use are the rights of man, when every proletary can put his hand in every purse?" The Jacobins were perfectly aware of this feeling among the masses, and were rendered no little anxious thereby. "On the 10th of August," said a Girondist, "3,000 workmen changed France into a Republic." Another was of opinion that the great mass of the people were enthusiastic for the Constitution; that in the towns, a longing began to arise for the ancient despotism; and that people were only republican from fear of the guillotine. The Cor

déliers bear the same testimony as the Gironde. The leading organ of the Jacobins at that time-"the Revolution of Paris"-acknowledged the correctness of the above statement. They ascribe it, indeed, to the intrigues of the Court and the wealthy, but they testify that the same persons who in 1789 had done every thing for the Revolution, were ready in 1792 to devote their powers to the King; and that this was the reason why the Duke of Brunswick no longer spoke of Counter-revolution, but only of the restoration of order. Four-fifths of the nation, probably, had no more ardent desire than to see a strong government restore the country to repose, and release the citizens from political labour. But on this very account they put up with a Jacobin government, because, if they opposed it, they must themselves come forward and risk their own persons. Even if the National Assembly had committed an illegal act in suspending the King, the resistance of individuals to a decree of the National Assembly was not exactly legal. There was no organized body in any part of the country, round which the royalists could rally; the only societies which at that time possessed life and power were the Clubs, and these were in the very front of the Revolution. In these there was zeal, energy and unity; the feud between the Gironde and the Mountain did not extend to the provinces, where all worked vigorously together for one object. The Constitutionalists, on the other hand, were at variance with the adherents of the orthodox priests, and full of distrust towards the foreign connexions of the King. All parties therefore resigned themselves to what they could not alter, and derived consolation from the thought that they should now meet the foreign enemy with united powers. From every quarter the National Assembly received intelligence that the country submitted to the Revolution, accepted the fait accompli, and was preparing to hold the election for the National Convention. 1

1 Mortimer-Ternaux, the writer of the greatest research among the French, comes to exactly the same result, after a comprehensive examination of

Under these circumstances the only quarter from which the Gironde, from the very first moment, apprehended danger, was the camp of General Lafayette. Countless eyes were directed towards him, "the eldest son of freedom,” as he was called by his friends. His army was entirely devoted. to him. He had long and irreconcilably broken off all connection with the Democrats. He received intelligence of the Revolution of the 10th in 36 hours; first from a soldier of the National Guard who had escaped from the carnage, and then from an officer of his own army who, on the evening of the 10th, had forced his way through the barrières, pistol in hand. He was only a few marches distant from Paristhe Prussian army was still at Konz on the Moselle, on the other side of the frontier-he had therefore still a week before the Prussians could reach his position. Would it be possible to make use of these days for a coup de main against Paris! If he made his appearance there with only a few loyal regiments, the National Guard would in all probability rally round their old commander, 2 and after the vote of the 8th he was sure of a majority in the National Assembly. A few volleys fired on the Marseillois might perhaps suffice to restore the reins of government to constitutional hands. He would then be as sure of the approbation of the provinces, as the Revolution now was; for he too had the intention to oppose the Prussians, and to repel all foreign interference. It was an undertaking full of danger, in which the loss of an hour might expose him to defeat either from the factions or the Prussians. But there was no other way. Everything depended on the possession of the Capital-on energy and rapidity of action.

Such a proceeding was all the more urgently necessary, because he enjoyed the full confidence of the soldiers in his

the official documents both of the National Assembly and the Departments. 1 Lafayette, VI. 242. 2 On the

28th of June he came to Paris with

out troops, and had, nevertheless, for the moment, a chance of gaining over the National Guard.

camp at Sedan; while in the other armies both the Gironde and the Mountain possessed very important adherents. The old dispute on the question of offensive or defensive war was not only not extinguished, but had been enhanced by the late party struggles. The Rhine army had been since the middle of July under the command of Generals Biron and Custine; the former was an old Orleanist, from the very first prepossessed against Lafayette, and the latter had staked all his hopes on the Revolution and, the war; and both, long before the 10th of August, had placed themselves at the disposal of the most violent parties. We are already acquainted with the leader of the army of the South, General Montesquiou, and his friendly relation to the Gironde. His conscience was satisfied with having done his best to avert the late revolution, and he and his army now silently accepted the fait accompli. As the Gironde had their representative in this quarter, so the Mountain had one of still greater weight, with the army of the North, in Dumouriez. When Luckner left this army to go to Metz, Dumouriez was to follow with his division; but he took advantage of an unimportant reconnaissance which the Austrians made. against Orchies to convince his immediate superior, General Arthur Dillon, of the danger of his departure, and remained in his former position in spite of orders. Just at this time Couthon, a friend of Robespierre, was staying at a bathing place in the Department du Nord. Dumouriez made friends with this man, on the ground of their common hatred of Lafayette, and in spite of the furious indignation of the Marshal, the Parisian Jacobins prevented the War Ministry from punishing the insubordination of Dumouriez. We shall see what dangers to France sprang from these machinations; but for the moment Dumouriez was a good Jacobin, and inspired his division with the purest democratic enthusiasm.

These circumstances could not remain unknown to Lafayette. If he retreated before such dangers, no one could accuse him of timidity; if he acted in a harsh and dictatorial

CH. II.] FEEBLENESS AND VACILLATION OF LAFAYETTE.

53

manner, no one could impute to him a criminal ambition But being too self-complacent for the former course, and too indolent for the latter, be chose the most pernicious of all. He declared his wish to oppose the Jacobins, and at the same time sheathed his sword. He believed that he could not venture to leave his camp in the prospect of a Prussian invasion. He could never rise above the ideas of formal legality, although he was about to enter into a life and death struggle with those who had obtained their power in contempt of every law. His first thought was-not as to the choice of the regiments which might be most serviceable in an attack on the Parisian Sansculottes,--but under what Civil Authority he ought to place himself. For his wish was to defend the Constitution, and the Constitution declared that the armed force was always, by its very nature, bound to obey. He therefore awaited the orders of the People, at a moment when the People had no other prospect before them than to fall under the power of the quickest and strongest dictatorship. His intention was to unite the Directories of the Departments,-as the highest Civil Authorities-in a Congress, and to oppose this new representation of the People to the rebellious minority of the National Assembly. The Departments of the Northern frontier were ready to second. this movement, and the Municipalities showed a lively interest in it. When Kersaint and his colleagues arrived in Sedan, and demanded the recognition of the 10th of August, the Town Council caused them to be arrested. The Directory of the Department then issued, at Lafayette's desire, a summons to all their Colleagues, and thereupon-instead of acting and carrying the country with them-they again waited to see what the country would say. Then they learned in quick succession, that each individual authority had submitted to the orders of the ruling power at Paris, and that all the Generals, some through fear, and others with enthusiasm, had acknowledged the 10th of August. None of the Departments made any sign; the People was silent; and