The Philosophy of Human Knowledge: Or a Treatise on Language. A Course of Lectures, Delivered at the Utica Lyceum

Cover
G. & C. Carvill, 1828 - 200 Seiten
0 Rezensionen
Rezensionen werden nicht überprüft, Google sucht jedoch gezielt nach gefälschten Inhalten und entfernt diese
 

Was andere dazu sagen - Rezension schreiben

Es wurden keine Rezensionen gefunden.

Ausgewählte Seiten

Andere Ausgaben - Alle anzeigen

Häufige Begriffe und Wortgruppen

Beliebte Passagen

Seite 42 - But another man, who never took the pains to observe the demonstration, hearing a mathematician, a man of credit, affirm the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right ones, assents to it, ie receives it for true.
Seite 118 - For, if the triangle ABC be applied to DEF, so that the point A may be on D, and the straight line AB upon DE ; the point B shall coincide with the point E...
Seite 187 - Our senses inform us of the color, weight, and consistency of bread, but neither sense nor reason can ever inform us of those qualities which fit it for the nourishment and support of the human body.
Seite 118 - ... shall be greater than the base of the other. Let ABC, DEF be two triangles, which have the two sides AB, AC, equal to the two DE, DF, each to each, viz.
Seite 119 - DF : but the point B coincides with the point E ; wherefore the base BC shall coincide with the base EF^ because the point B coinciding with E, and C with F, if the base BC does not coincide with the base EF, two straight lines would inclose a space, which is impossible».
Seite 73 - To express, shortly, what appears to me to be the only intelligible meaning of the three most important words in physics, immediate invariable antecedence, is power, — the immediate invariable antecedent, in any sequence, is a cause. — the immediate invariable consequent is the correlative effect.
Seite 114 - One design prevails throughout the whole. And this uniformity leads the mind to acknowledge one author ; because the conception of different authors, without any distinction of attributes or operations, serves only to give perplexity to the imagination, without bestowing any satisfaction on the understanding.
Seite 181 - A WHITE BEAR! Very well. Have I ever seen one? Might I ever have seen one? Am I ever to see one? Ought I ever to have seen one? Or can I ever see one? Would I had seen a white bear! (for how can I imagine it?) If I should see a white bear, what should I say?

Bibliografische Informationen