use and defence to the mind, than the discovering and reprehension of these colours, shewing in what cases they hold, and in what they deceive: which as it cannot be done but out of a very universal knowledge of the nature of things, so being performed, it so cleareth man's judgment and election, as it is the less apt to slide into any error.

TABLE

ΟΙ THE COLOURS, OR APPEARANCES

OF GOOD AND

EVIL, AND THEIR DEGREES, AS PLACES OF PERSUASION AND DISSUASION, AND THEIR

SEVERAL FALLACIES, AND THE

ELENCHES OF THEM.

1. Cui cæteræ partes vel sectæ secundas unanimiter deferunt, cum singulæ principatum sibi vindicent, melior reliquis videNam primus quæque ex zelo videtur sumere, secundas autem ex vero & merito tribuere.

tur.

SO Cicero went about to prove the sect of Academics, which suspended all asseveration, for to be the best; for, saith he, ask a Stoic which philosophy is true, he will prefer his own. Then ask him, which approacheth next the truth, he will confess the Academics. So deal with the Epicure, that will scarce endure the stoic to be in sight of him, so soon as he hath placed himself, he will place the Academics next him.

So if a prince took divers competitors to a place, and examined them severally, whom next them. selves they would rarest commend, it were like the ablest man should have the most second voices. The fallax of this colour happeneth oft in respect of envy, for men are accustomed after themselves and their own fashion, to incline unto them which are softest, and are least in their way, in de

spight and derogation of them that hold them hardest to it. So that this colour of meliority and preeminence is a sign of enervation and weakness.

2. Cujus excellentia vel exuperantia melior, id toto genere melius.

Appertaining to this, are the forms: let us not wander in generalities: let us compare particular with particular, &c. This appearance, though it seem of strength, and rather logical than rhetorical, yet is very oft a fallax.

Sometimes because some things are in kind very casual, which if they escape prove excellent; so that the kind is inferior, because it is so subject to peril, but that which is excellent being proved is superior, as the blossom of March, and the blossom of May, whereof the French verse goeth:

Burgeon de Mars enfans de Paris,

Si un eschape, il en vaut dix.

So that the blossom of May is generally better than the blossom of March; and yet the best blossom of March is better than the best blossom of May. Sometimes because the nature of some kinds is to be more equal, and more indifferent, and not to have very distant degrees, as hath been noted in the warmer climates, the people are generally more wise, but in the northern climate, the wits of chief are greater. So in many armies, if the mat

ter should be tried by duel between two champions, the victory should go on the one side, and yet if it be tried by the gross, it would go on the other side: for excellencies go as it were by chance, but kinds go by a more certain nature; as by discipline in war.

Lastly; Many kinds have much refuse, which countervail that which they have excellent, and therefore generally metal is more precious than stone; and yet a diamond is more precious than gold.

3. Quod ad veritatem refurtur majus est quam quod ad opinionem. Modus autem & probatio ejus quod ad opinionem pertinet hæc est: quod quis si clam putaret fore facturus non esset.

So the Epicures say of the Stoics felicity placed in virtue That it is like the felicity of a player, who if he were left of his auditory and their applause, he would straight be out of heart and countenance; and therefore they call virtue bonum theatrale: but of riches the poet saith ;

Populus me sibilat

At mihi plaudo.

And of pleasure,

Grata sub imo

Gaudia corde premens, vultu simulante pudorem.

The fallax of this colour is somewhat subtile, though the answer to the example be ready, for

virtue is not chosen propter auram popularem. But contrariwise, maxime omnium teipsum reverere; so as a virtuous man will be virtuous in solitudine, and not only in theatro, though percase it will be more strong by glory and fame, as an heat which is doubled by reflection: but that denieth the supposition, it doth not reprehend the fallax, whereof the reprehension is a law, that virtue (such as is joined with labour and conflict) would not be chosen but for fame and opinion, yet it followeth not that the chief motive of the election should not be real and for itself, for fame may be only causa impulsiva, and not causa constituens, or efficiens. As if there were two horses, and the one would do better without the spur than the other: but again, the other with the spur would far exceed the doing of the former, giving him the spur also ; yet the latter will be judged to be the better horse, and the former as to say, tush, the life of this horse is but in the spur, will not serve as to a wise judgment: for since the ordinary instrument of horsemanship is the spur, and that it is no matter of impediment or burden, the horse is not to be recounted the less of, which will not do well without the spur, but rather the other is to be reckoned a delicacy than a virtue; so glory and honour are the spurs to virtue and although virtue would languish without them, yet since they be