town talk or by inflammatory newspaper articles or the clamour of aldermen. The mere hint of such a possibility shews the necessity of having an appeal to judges who admittedly could not be swayed by local influences. In a subsequent article the same newspaper accuses the judges of the Privy Council of deliberately wresting from the City of Toronto its rights under the contract. It charges the. Court with having done "its best to strip the city of any standing or right in connection with the Toronto Railway Company." A cartoon published in the same paper added point to the libel. Anything more discreditable to Canadian journalism than the baseless charges in the newspaper referred to has never appeared in this country. The only end served by such writing is anarchy. Nothing is more potent for evil in that direction. than slanderous imputations of injustice to those who are called upon to dispense justice. When once the public has lost confidence in the judiciary of a country, that country has lost its greatest safeguard for law and order. Happily the daily press of Toronto, referring especially to those journals which most abuse their powers, has ceased to wield the influence it once did, and people are more and more beginning to think for themselves, and to criticise rather than to accept, as either weighty or conclusive, the foolish or extravagant or misleading utterances of individuals, who, whilst claiming the dignity of the editorial "we," too often exhibit either their ignorance, or their desire for the applause of the least worthy element of society. But "Slander meets no regard from noble minds. Only the base believe what the base only utter." REVIEW OF CURRENT ENGLISH CASES. MORTGAGE CONSOLIDATION OF MORTGAGES-PUISNE MORTGAGEEEXPRESS CONTRACT-CONTRARY INTENTION-CONVEYANCING AND LAW OF PROPERTY ACT, 1881 (44 & 45 VICT. c. 41), s. 17. In Hughes v. Britannia Permanent Building Society (1906) 2 Ch. 607, Kekewick, J., decided that even where there is an express agreement (which is now necessary under the Imperial statute 44 & 45 Vict. c. 41, s. 17) entitling a mortgagee to consolidate his mortgage, such an agreement will not prevail as against a subsequent mortgagee of any one of the mortgaged premises, of whose mortgage the first mortgagee has notice, so as to compel the subsequent mortgagee to redeem other mortgages created by the mortgagor in favour of the first mortgagee after such subsequent mortgagee acquired his rights, but, of course, the right of consolidation extends to all mortgages existing at the time of the taking of the subsequent mortgage. POWER SPECIAL POWER-EXERCISE OF POWER BY WILL “APPOINT"-INDICATION OF CONTRARY INTENTION. In re Weston, Neeves v. Weston (1906) 2 Ch. 630. Under a settlement made in 1863 a testator had a power to appoint in favour of his children certain leasehold property; by his will after making bequests of a watch, picture and organ, he devised bequeathed and "appointed" all the residue of his estate, real and personal, to trustees upon trust to convert into money, such part of the trust estate as should not consist of money, and out of the proceeds pay funeral expenses and debts and divide the residue of "such trust moneys and premises" equally between two of his sons (declaring that he made no provision for his other children as they were already sufficiently provided for). The testator then empowered his trustees to postpone the conversion of his "real and personal estate" for so long as they should think proper, and, during the postponement, to manage, lease or let his "real and leasehold estates" and out of the capital or income to provide for improvements, repairs, insurance for the benefit of his "real or personal estate," but declared that no part of his property not actually producing income which should form part of his estate, should be treated as producing income. The testator also declared that the trustees might invest the trust representing the shares of his said two sons during their respective minorities in certain specified securities, and that the whole income of their shares should be paid to their guardian during their minorities for maintenance. Buckley, J., held that, notwithstanding the use of the word "appointed" in the will, the whole tenor of the will shewed that the testator was only dealing with his own property, and that the dispositions he had made were inconsistent with any intention to exercise the power of appointment and therefore that the will was not an exercise of the special power of appointment. 66 LANDLORD AND TENANT--COVENANT BY LANDLORD TO PAY RATES- In South of England Dairies v. Baker (1906) 2 Ch. 631 the plaintiffs were underlessees of certain premises for an unexpired term, and brought the action against the assignee of the reversion of the superior landlord, who had covenanted with the plaintiffs' lessor his "executors, administrators and assigns" to pay the rates assessed on the demised premises; for breach of the covenant, and Joyce, J., held that the action would not lie on the ground of want of privity, an underlessee not being an "assign" of the original lessee within 32 Hen. VIII. c. 34, s. 2 (R.S.O. c. 330, s. 13), and that there was no principle of equity by which the action could be maintained. VENDOR AND PURCHASER TITLE DEEDS-CUSTODY OF DEEDSDOCUMENTS SHEWING EXISTENCE AND EXTINGUISHMENT OF EASEMENT APPURTENANT TO LAND SOLD- RETENTION RY VEN DOR OF FORMER SERVIENT TENEMENT. In re Lehmann v. Walker (1906) 2 Ch. 640 was an application under the Vendors and Purchasers' Act to determine the right to the custody of certain title deeds. The deeds in question shewed the existence of an easement appurtenant to the land sold, and also its extinguishment, the vendor retained the former servient tenement and claimed to be entitled to retain the deeds in question, and Eady, J., held that his claim was well founded. DISENTAILING DEED-PROTECTOR OF SETTLEMENT LEGAL ESTATE IN TRUSTEE-VOID TRUST FOR ACCUMULATION-BENEFICIAL OWNER-HEIR FINES AND RECOVERIES ACT, 1833 (3 & 4 WM. IV. c. 74) ss. 22, 27—(R.S.O. c. ss. 23, 15) THELLUSSON ACT (39 & 40 GEO. III. c. 98) s. 1-(R.S.O. * c. 332, s. 2). In re Hughes and London and North Western Ry. Act (1906) 2 Ch. 642. This was a petition for the purpose of obtaining a declaration of the Court that a disentailing deed affecting moneys in Court was effectual to bar the entail absolutely. The question turned on whether or not there was a protector of the settlement. The entail had been created by will whereby the testator who died 3 April, 1854, devised the land in question to three trustees during the lives of 3 persons and the survivor of them to pay certain annuities and accumulate the surplus rents and profits and hold them for the trusts therein mentioned. In 1879, and after the termination of the trust estate the testator devised the land to his grandson in entail, the Court by order declared that the trust for accumulation after 3 April, 1875, was void under the Thellusson Act, s. 1 (R.S.O. c. 332, s. 2), and that thereafter the heir at law was entitled beneficially to the surplus rents and profits. The land in question having been expropriated by a railway the purchase money was paid into Court, and in July, 1875, the tenant in tail executed a disentailing deed of the land and the purchase money, and in this deed the surviving trustee of the will joined as protector of the settlement. In these circumstances Eady, J., held that the entail had been effectually barred, and that there was in fact no protector of the settlement, because the trustees under the settlement from and after the 3 April, 1875, became bare trustees of the inheritance, and as such could not be protectors under the Fines and Recoveries Act, s. 27, (R.S.O. c. 122, s. 15), and that the heir at law who was beneficially entitled was also, by the same section, precluded from being protector. REPORTS AND NOTES OF CASES. Dominion of Canada. SUPREME COURT. Que.] [March 13. MONTREAL STREET RY. Co. v. MONTREAL CONSTRUCTION CO. Vendor and purchaser-Sale of securities-Interpretation of contract-Railways-Debtor and creditor-Right of way claims-Legal expenses incurred in settlement. The plaintiff's sold the defendants stocks and bonds of the P. & L. Ry. Co. with an agreement in writing which contained a clause stipulating as a condition that the vendees might declare the option of paying a further sum of $30,000, in addition to the price of sale, in consideration of which the vendors agreed to pay all the debts of the P. & I. Ry. Co., except certain specially mentioned claims, some of which were in respect of settlement for the right of way. The final clause of the agreement was as follows:-"After two years from the date thereof the Montreal Street Railway Company will assume the obligation of settling any right of way claims which the vendors may not previously have been called upon to settle and will contribute $5,000 towards the settlement of any such claims which the vendors may be called upon to settle within the said two years. Any part of the said sum not so expended in said two years or required by the purchasers so to be, shall be paid over to the vendors at the end of the said period, it being understood that the purchasers will not stir up or suggest claims being made. The vendees exercised the option and paid the $30,000 to the vendors who reserved their right to any portion of the $5,000 to be contributed towards settlement of the right of way claims which might not be expended during the two years. An unsettled claim for right of way, in dispute at the time of the agreement, was subsequently settled by the vendors within the two years. The question arose as to whether or not this existing claim and legal expenses connected therewith was a debt which the vendors were obliged to discharge in consideration of the extra $30,000 so paid to them, and whether or not the $5,000 |