152 of the tariff as appropriate upon a mere assessment of damages, but was entitled to a counsel fee as upon a trial, as provided in item 153; the assessment referred to in item 152 being that which follows upon an interlocutory judgment. Semble per MEREDITH, C.J.C.P., that the paragraphs which follow items 152 and 153 in the tariff are intended to give the taxing officer a discretion to increase the fee for the brief both for the assessment of damages and for the trial. Order of FALCONBRIDGE, C.J.K.B., affirmed. Meredith, C.J.C.P., MacMahon, J., Magee, J.] [Sept. 17. LOUDEN MANUFACTURING COMPANY V. MILMINE. Infant-Action against, for price of goods-Acknowledgment— Ratification-Repudiation-Liability for value of goodsAmendment Costs. Held, affirming the judgment of RIDDELL, J., 14 O.L.R. 532, that the letter relied upon by the plaintiffs as a ratification, after majority, of the defendant's contract made when he was an infant, was not sufficient; but, in this reversing the judgment, that the defendant was liable for the value of the goods which he had in possession at the time he repudiated the contract; and the plaintiffs were allowed to amend by setting up an alternative claim for such value, and to enter judgment for the amount thereof without costs. McKinnon, for plaintiffs. Farmer, for defendant. Cartwright, Master.] COATES v. THE KING. [Oct. 1. Petition of right-Amendment-Consent of Crown. Held, on an application by the suppliants for leave to amend the petition of right under rule 929, that the rules as to amend ments do not apply, as the Court has no power to amend a petition of right without the consent of the Crown and that any proposed amendment must be first submitted to the LieutenantGovernor and approved of by him. F. Aylesworth, for suppliant. N. Ferrars Davidson, for the Crown. Mulock, C.J. Ex., Anglin, J., Clute, J.] [Oct. 4. RE VILLAGE OF NEWBURGH AND COUNTY OF LENNOX AND ADDING TON. Municipal law-Liability of county for maintenance of bridge. Appeal by the county from the judgment of the county judge who found that the county was required to build and maintain certain bridges crossing the Napanee River in the Village of Newburgh. The river in question, where it passes through the Village of Newburgh, divides into two channels, which re-unite, enclosing an island. These two channels at that point constitute the river. The river is more than 100 feet in width above and below the island. The road, which it is admitted, is a highway leading through the county, passes over these channels by bridges. The channel crossed by one bridge is 38 feet in width, and the channel crossed by the other bridge. is 80 feet in width. The island contains 5 or 6 acres. The question was, whether, under the Act, the county council had exclusive jurisdiction over these bridges. The statute declares that the county council shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all bridges crossing streams or rivers over 100 feet in width. Held, that the statute has reference to the width of the river, and not to the length of the bridge. The two channels of the river being together, admittedly over 100 feet in width at the place where it is crossed by the bridges in question, the matter is concluded. The case is one clearly within the purview of the statute. See Regina v. County of Carleton, 1 O.R. 277. McIntyre, K.C., for appellants. Whiting, K.C., for village corporation. Falconbridge, C.J.K.B., Britton, J., Riddell, J.] MAXON v. IRWIN. [Oct. 4. Bills and notes-Alteration-Word "renewal" in margin erased -Bills of Exchange Act, s. 145. Action in a Division Court, County of Essex, on a promissory note which had been altered by erasing the word "renewal" in the margin. Appeal to a Divisional Court. Held that as the note was in the hands of a holder in due course the plaintiff should recover under s. 145 of Bills of Exchange Act. Per FALCONBRIDGE, C.J.K.B.:-The alteration in the note was material: Pigot's Case, 11 Co. 27; Master v. Miller, 4 T.R. 320; Davidson v. Cooper, 13 M. & W. 343; Suffell v. Bank of England, 9 Q.B.D. 555; Knill v. Williams, 10 East 431; Garrard v. Lewis, 10 Q.B.D. 30. But the alteration was not apparent: Leeds Bank v. Walker, 11 Q.B.D. 84; Scholfield v. Earl of Londesborough (1896) A.C., 514; Cunnington v. Peterson, 29 O.R. 346. J. H. Rodd, for plaintiffs. Clarke, K.C., for defendant. Riddell, J.] KING V. BARTELS. [Oct. 5. Habeas corpus-Escape of prisoner-Recapture-Issue of writ. If a prisoner who has applied for a writ of habeas corpus, escape after the issue of such writ and pending the argument upon its return, and thus himself puts an end to the detention, he thereby waives all right which he might have had under the writ and no order can be afterwards made for his release. If, however, in such a case he be recaptured or surrender himself again into custody the Court is precluded from granting him another writ of habeas corpus under proper circumstances. Dewart, K.C. and Sommerville, for prisoner. T. D. Cowper, for the State of New York. Boyd, C., Maclaren, J.A., Mabee, J.] MCCLELLAN v. POWASSAN LUMBER COMPANY. Way- Private way- Easement [Oct. 22. Extinguishment by unity of ownership Revival on severance-Implied reservation— Land Titles Act. Unity of ownership or seisin in fee extinguishes all preexisting easements or private rights of way over one part of the land for the accommodation of another part; and an easement so extinguished can only be revived by a fresh grant, and then the right granted is of a new thing; the severance again of the land in respect of which an easement formerly existed over one part for the benefit of the other does not per se revive the extinguished easement, if the dominant part is first granted and the servient part retained by the owner who made the severance. Wheeldon v. Burrows, 12 Ch.D. 31, followed. Previous to 1891 two adjoining parcels of land, known as the grist mill property and the saw mill property, were in different holders, and there was on the land, well defined on the ground, a road leading from the highway to the grist mill over a part of the saw mill property. In 1891 the two properties became united in the same owners, who, in 1894, conveyed all the land, excepting certain lots, on one of which stood the grist mill. In the document of transfer there were no words to indicate that any right of way over the rest of the land conveyed was also excepted. The grist mill property was afterwards conveyed to the plaintiff, who claimed the right to use the road over the saw mill property as marked upon the ground :-- Held, that when the transfer of 1894 was made, the road was not a subsisting easement or right of way, though it was marked upon the ground as a former right of way, which continued to be used for the convenience of the owner of the whole property after he became such owner; failing an express reservation in the transfer of 1894, none was to be implied; and the fact that the title to all the lands in question had been brought under the Land Titles Act made no difference, there being nothing in the provisions of section 26 or other sections to affect the result in the plaintiff's favour; Mabee, J., dissenting. Judgment of Teetzel, J., reversed. Armour, K.C., and J. McCurry, for defendants. Laidlaw, K.C., for plaintiff. Full Court.] Province of Manitoba. COURT OF APPEAL. SLATER V. RYAN. [Oct. 1. Trade name-Imitation-Defendant using his own name-In junction. Appeal from judgment of Mathers, J., noted ante, p. 293. The Court, while expressing the opinion that the advertisement, in the form in which it had appeared, would, if persisted in, have meant an infringement of the plaintiffs' trade name, held, that the appeal should be dismissed on the ground that the action had been commenced before any complaint was made and sixteen days after the defendant had, of his own accord, withdrawn the advertisement, and that it had not been inserted by the defendant himself, but by his advertising agent, and that the defendant had withdrawn it as soon as it came to his knowledge. Under such circumstances the discretion the trial judge had exercised in refusing an injunction should not be disturbed. No costs of the appeal to either party. Hoskin, for plaintiffs. Aikins, K.C., for defendant. Full Court.] THE KING v. EDWARDS. [Oct. 8. Criminal law-Criminal Code s. 386-Summary trial by police magistrate under s. 777-Punishment-Previous conviction as ground for increasing term of imprisonment. The prisoner elected to be tried summarily before the police magistrate of the City of Winnipeg and pleaded guilty of theft of a sum exceeding two hundred dollars. The magistrate then. asked him if he had been previously convicted of theft and he admitted that he had, whereupon the magistrate sentenced him. to ten years' imprisonment in the penitentiary. There was no reference to such former conviction in the information upon |