seize a favourable opportunity to go to war with us again. But is that an argument why we should not hold our hand until we have completely crushed our adversary, and is that any reason why we should pursue a policy of extermination with regard to a barbarous nation with whom we happen to be at war? That is a policy which I hope will never be sanctioned by this House.

It is, of course, possible that we may again be involved in war with the Zulus, but it is an equal chance that in the development of circumstances in that part of the world the Zulu people may have to invoke the aid and the alliance of England against some other people, and that the policy dictated by feelings and influences which have regulated our conduct with regard to European States may be successfully pursued with regard to less civilised nations in a different part of the world This is the policy of Her Majesty's Government, and therefore they cannot be in favour of a policy of annexation, because it is directly opposed to it. I will not enter into any minute discussion of the various questions which by means of their association with the main question have been imported into the debate. They have really nothing to do with the single issue that is now before your lordships, and upon which in a very short time you will record your opinion. It is not the policy of England with regard to South Africa now for some years past that is called in question. Different cabinets and different schools of political opinion are equally interested in maintaining that policy. It is not, in fact, the annexation of the Transvaal province upon which you are now called to decide. It is not, in fact, any of the matters that have been treated in detail to-night, but which really do not branch out of the resolution which is on the table, and to which if their correctness is questioned the noble lord will have a legitimate opportunity of calling your lordships' attention.

The question we have before us now is whether Her Majesty's ministers have acted with policy in retaining the services of Sir Bartle Frere in the circumstances in which they have been retained. On the part of the Government, I give my opinion here publicly that in taking that course we took one for the

public welfare; that we were influenced by no personal considerations; that we were influenced by none of those feelings which it is difficult for even honourable men when they find a distinguished public officer in difficulty or disgrace to be free from; that we divested ourselves from any other sentiment but doing that which in a most difficult state of affairs was for the public advantage. And if you wish the public advantage to be first considered, and not the triumph of a party, you will to-night give your decided negative to the motion of the noble marquis.

EVACUATION OF CANDAHAR.

March 4, 1881.

[One of the first acts of the new Government which acceded to power in April 1880 was to make preparations for relinquishing the positions in Afghanistan which we had acquired by the war of 1879. It was still hoped, however, that they meant to retain Candahar, a fortress commanding the only route by which an invading army could approach India. When it was found that this was not the case, and that Candahar, too, was to be abandoned, Lord Lytton, on March 3, brought forward a motion in the House of Lords to the effect that there was nothing in the information laid before their lordships to justify the abandonment of Candahar. After two nights' debate the Resolution was carried by a majority of 89, the 'contents' being 165, the non-contents' 76. The speeches of Lord Lytton and the Marquis of Salisbury, taken together with Lord Beaconsfield's, complete the case of the Opposition. It was to this speech that Lord Granville referred in his graceful tribute to the memory of Lord Beaconsfield when he said he had seen him swallow drugs to allay the pain from which he suffered in order that he might be able to place his views before their lordships' House.]

HE question really before your lordships is whether it is or is not wise to evacuate Candahar, and I shall endeavour to confine my observations strictly to that subject, or at least with one exception of a very slight character. I see no use in reviewing again the history of the Afghan war or of the proceedings which preceded it. Your lordships, having been appealed to on that subject, have given your opinion in great numbers and after long and deep discussion. It would, therefore, in my opinion be unnecessary for me now to enter upon a consideration of that matter in detail. There are one or two salient facts to guide us in coming to a conclusion on this matter, and which it occurs to me to allude to at this moment, owing to the tone which the debate has taken. It is on record that the Ameer of Afghanistan appealed for succour some years ago to

the Viceroy of the Queen in India, who is now First Lord of the Admiralty, and the Viceroy thought it his duty to reject the overtures made to him. It also stands upon record that this rejection was the origin of all the misunderstandings and misfortunes which have since occurred. It also stands upon record that about three years afterwards, panic-stricken, I suppose, by the rumour that the Russians were approaching Merv, the then Viceroy decided on the plan which, in his opinion, should be then adopted to meet the difficulties and dangers of such a proceeding, and he proposed an offensive and defensive treaty in Afghanistan, and the establishment of a resident minister on the British side of Herat. These are great salient truths, and I must say that I am quite surprised, remembering these historical facts, at the tone which the noble lord the First Lord of the Admiralty took with reference to my noble friend the late Viceroy of India. One would suppose that the noble earl was not only a pupil of the peace at any price school, but that he was also graduating for higher honours in the more refined school which would wage war and at the same time negotiate, more especially if our arms had been defeated. I was very much disappointed, my lords, at the reply the noble duke the Lord Privy Seal made to my noble friend near me. I had listened, as a very full House had listened, with pleasure to that speech, and a speech more exhaustive, more animated, more completely touching everv point of the subject I have rarely heard. Well, I knew that my noble friend was to be followed by one whose ability was equal to any emergency-one who is an ornament of this House, and invariably delights the audience which he addresses. Well, my lords, what did we hear? Was there any answer to the speech of my noble friend? On the contrary, we had a series of biographies of Indian worthies, and when the list closed it was, as usual, flung at the head of my noble friend the late Viceroy. Under these circumstances I think we have had enough of recurrence to the past, and that we may confine our consideration to the point before us.

My lords, there is one point only, before I touch upon the question of Candahar, on which I would like to make one or

two remarks, and that is about our relations with Russia, which have formed so important a portion of our discussion to-night as on previous occasions. Now, my lords, when my noble friend and myself were commissioned to proceed as plenipotentiaries to Berlin nearly three years ago, our instructions were to achieve, if possible, two great objects. One, of course, to secure and guard the interests of our own country, and the other to combine with the other Powers if possible for some general arrangement or some unity of feeling which might secure, if not the perpetual, at least the lasting, peace of Europe. Well, my lords, when we came to consider our interests in this subject it was quite obvious that it was quite impossible to arrive at any arrangement which would give a fair probability of a lasting European peace if there was not sympathy on the part of Russia, and the time seemed to have arrived, when a Congress was called upon to settle the affairs of Europe, to make some efforts to come, if possible, to some direct understanding with Russia which might tend to the beneficial results we had in view.

I must say that before we could take any steps we were anticipated by the illustrious Chancellor of that Empire, who expressed a desire on the part of Russia that some attempt should be made to put an end to that chronic misunderstanding which seemed always to be recurring between the two countries of Great Britain and Russia. I do not, my lords, mean to say that there was at any time an intention of an alliance or a treaty, or a convention, but what we all seemed to desire was that, if possible, instead of hostile distrust, there should be, at least, some approximation to confidence, and that when any occurrences of a controversial character took place in those parts of the world where the interests of Russia and England clashed, there should be, at least, a friendly and candid communication of views between the two Powers which might remove causes which were not at all adequate reasons for misunderstanding. Well, my lords, when we returned to England, I think I expressed the sentiments which my noble colleague would have expressed on this matter. I took the earliest opportunity of declaring in this House that those circumstances