Managers Vs. Owners: The Struggle for Corporate Control in American Democracy
Managers vs. Owners: The Struggle for Corporate Control in American Democracy deals with a subject of profound importance: understanding the place of the modern corporation in a democratic society. This latest volume in the acclaimed Ruffin Series in Business Ethics describes how the balance between corporate power and government regulation has changed with the interests of society as a whole. The first section examines the debates over the rules that individuals or organized groups would agree to follow in their interactions to accrue social advantages. The second section looks at management's point of view and tells how law promotes the need for managerial collective action and provides a vocabulary for articulating management as a profession. The authors conclude by looking at the impact of collective investor action - especially institutional investors - on the efforts by managers to preserve their autonomy. This examination of the inherent conflicts between the interests of corporate owners, the interests of the larger society, and the interests of managers who run corporations will be essential reading for students, scholars, and professionals concerned with the place of the large corporation in a democratic society.
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The Progressive Move from Ideology to Functional
Problems of Corporate Control
The Regulatory Making and Unmaking of
Dependencies Externalities and Corporate Social Responsibility
The Regulatory State and the Professionalization of Management
Managerial Solidarity in a Pluralist Polity
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts Co and the Investor Challenge
Themes for a Story a Model and
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