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One of the first principles of contingent truth is, that the things which we distinctly perceive by the senses, do really exist, and are what we perceive them to be. This is a maxim that was not made to serve a religious theory, and depends not on reasoning, but is the immediate dictate of the human constitution. As soon as the terms are understood, it will find acceptance with all unprejudiced men, whether savage or civilized, whether learned or illiterate. Even by those who in a particular instance refuse to admit its application, it is acted upon in all other things with the most implicit confidence. In the excepted instance itself, the devotee does violence to his own nature.

When we examine the grounds of our belief in the testimony of our senses, we find no other reason for our faith, but that it is the law of our constitution. To seek further evidence, or attempt to support this testimony by argument, is equally vain and absurd. Really, to doubt it, is to be mad. If, then, God be the author of human nature, those convictions that are the immediate dictates of our constitution are the oracles of heaven. By our senses we have, in a way utterly unknown to us, the conception of external objects, and the immediate belief of their existence: the testimony of our senses, then, must be the testimony of the God of nature. If we are deceived, our Maker is the deceiver; for he has not only commissioned the messenger, but has impelled us, by our constitution, to give him implicit credence.

Now the doctrine of Transubstantiation overturns the evidence of the senses, violates the human constitution, and gives the lie to the Maker of man. In the Mass, we are told, there is a conversion of the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ; and after consecration there remains neither bread nor wine. Four of our senses solemnly declare that this is false. The eye looks at the wafer and says, it is not flesh; at the cup, and declares it is still wine. We apply the organ of smell, and the nose unites its testimony with that of the eye. We taste them, and the mouth cries, So help me God, there is neither flesh nor blood here. We next appeal to the sense of touch,

and the hand unites its testimony with that of its sisters. If we have not suffi cient evidence that Transubstantiation is false, the apostles had no evidence of the resurrection of Jesus; and we have no evidence of the existence of the objects around us.

It is said that we ought to believe the sense of hearing, under the authority of the Church, in opposition to the testimony of the other senses. But there is no discrepancy in the testimony of the witnesses on this point. The ear does not give its verdict in favour of Transubstantiation, more than the eye. The only way in which the ear can be supposed in any measure a witness in this matter, is by the sound of the elements when struck against another body. If any man's ear is so good as to testify any thing in such an experiment, the result will coincide with that of the other senses. When the priest pronounces the words of consecration, there is not the testimony of the sense of hearing, that the alleged Transubstantiation takes place. The ear testifies merely that such words were uttered; but as to the fact it cannot judge. When the apostles heard Jesus Christ himself pronouncing the words, "This is my body," they had not the testimony of the sense of hearing as to his meaning: their ears testified merely that he uttered such words. Nay, if the elements themselves would speak, it would not afford the evidence of the sense of hearing. In that case the ear would testify that such a voice was heard, and as far as it could judge, proceeded from the elements in the eucharist; but of the truth of the assertion the ear would not pretend to judge. Such a voice might be from an infernal spirit; and even were it from God, it would not be the sense of hearing testifying to the Transubstantiation. The ear can give its testimony as to the nature of any substance, only by the sound of the substance.

In judging of the testimony of the senses, it ought always to be considered in what way each of them can witness, and how far the testimony of each can legitimately extend. In some cases one of the senses can witness, and others are from their nature entirely excluded. In

judging of colour the ear does not pretend to offer an opinion, and cannot be said to agree with the eye, or to differ from it. But there are cases in which several of the senses can judge in the same matter, though not all with equal certainty.

But what is wanting in the testimony of the ear, may be supplied, it seems, by the authority of the Church. The voice of the Church must be heard in opposi tion to four of the senses! Since your creation, O heavens and earth! have you ever witnessed such extravagance of arrogance in impious mortals? Shall the work of the Almighty be slighted? Shall it be believed that religious phrenzy would influence any body of men to pretend a power of setting aside the testimony of God in the constitution of man? Can any other proof be wanting, that this body, under its head, is the man of sin pointed out by the Apostle Paul? This is not only to usurp the throne of God, but is an exaltation above all that is called God, or that is worshipped; for God, the author of the testimony of sense, is made a liar.

On what evidence does this authority of the Church rest, that it claims so high a station? A full examination of this question would be a most important work, but as in this essay I choose to confine myself to one point, I will notice it only so far as to show that it can have no solid foundation. We are told that it is founded on the Scriptures and tradition. What evidence can we have of the truth of either the Scriptures or tradition, without implicit credence in the testimony of the senses? Are the senses to be proved liars, by two witnesses, the proof of whose veracity depends on the testimony of these very senses? Stupid nonsense!

But it is said we ought to believe what God tells us, however incredible it may appear. Jesus says, "This is my body," and we must believe the Scriptures in opposition to our senses. Before I close this essay, I shall show that the words of Scripture do not necessarily nor naturally import such a sense. In this place, as I am reasoning independently of the Scriptures, I shall merely reply, that if the Scriptures were really in opposition to

the testimony of the senses, they could not be the word of God. The actual proof of such a contradiction would not affect the authority of the testimony of the senses, but would entirely subvert the authority of the Bible. If the Scriptures be from God, they cannot contradict the testimony of a witness incontestably commissioned by God. Two witnesses inspired to testify to man what his Maker designs to communicate, must be in perfect accordance. The one may be instructed to go much farther than the other -nay, to make discoveries which the other cannot fathom; but as far as their testimony touches on the same points, they must agree. If God makes different revelations of his will to the same people, every subsequent revelation must be subjected to the preceding. The latter cannot be understood in any sense contradictory to the former. We see from fact that this was actually the case. Jesus himself submits his pretensions to the judgment of the law and the prophets, and often appeals to the natural light of human understanding. The Scriptures are a revelation from God; so are the truths collected from the testimony of the senses. The latter is the prior revelation, and, if there be an appearance of contradiction between them, must be allowed to interpret. I appeal to the common sense of all mankind for the propriety of these observations. I ask common sense how is it possible that the Scriptures could overturn the testimony of the senses, when they are themselves founded on the testimony of the same witness?

Were it at all necessary, it might be shown at great length, that the Scriptures recognize the authority of the testimony of the senses. The Saviour constantly appeals to this testimony in favour of his claims. But to add the support even of Scripture to the authority of truths communicated by the senses, is itself an absurdity.

Of what advantage, then, to Transubstantiation would be the concession of this opposition between the senses and the Scriptures? It would destroy both Bible and Transubstantiation. The authority of the senses cannot submit even to a trial by any subsequent revelation,

but all subsequent revelations must submit to be tried at the tribunal of the senses, as far as their authority extends.

It is argued, that the senses, since the fall, are corrupted, and therefore are not worthy of implicit confidence. Well, if the senses are corrupted in such a sense as to justify us in withholding our implicit confidence, they are equally liable to suspicion in every thing. All the consequences noticed above must be admitted. But the charge of the corruption of the senses, as respects their testimony, is founded in ignorance of sound philosophy, as well as of sound theology. In every operation of sense, there are two distinct but conjoined acts of the mindperception and sensation. By the former we have the conception of external objects, and an immediate and irresistible conviction of their existence; by the latter, we have certain feelings corresponding to the nature of the object of sense. Now it is sensation only that ministers to the corruption of the mind; perception merely testifies, and cannot be morally affected by the depravity of human nature, in whatever extent that may be supposed to exist. In sensation, the mind and body may mutually minister to each other's corruption; but as in perception there is nothing but the mere conception of external objects, accompanied with a belief of their existence, there cannot be moral depravity. It is God's testimony, as pure and unsullied as the light of heaven. The human mind has no power in modifying any of its dictates. Now in this matter we have nothing to do with the senses, in any point of view in which they are tainted with moral corruption. We have to attend only to the meaning of our own perceptions; and that they are perfectly impartial is proved by this, that the testimony of the senses of our opponents entirely coincides with that of our own, notwithstanding their minds are so deeply interested on the other side., No stronger evidence can be required that the perceptions of sense are unbiassed, than that since the introduction of this absurdity, no sober friend of Transubstantiation has ever ventured to allege that his senses testify in favour of his beloved doctrine. If ever the perceptions of sense

yielded to the inclinations of the mind, this would be the instance. The whole world have been for many ages dotingly attached to this opinion, yet with all the raptures of a crazy lover, they have never been able even to fancy that they perceive the object of their idolatry.

The abettors of this doctrine, in adverting to the testimony of sense, affect to speak of the senses as limited, with a view to discredit their authority. But the limitation of our senses is no proof of their corruption either moral or natural. The senses were limited even in Adam, when he came from the hand of his Creator. Limitation is implied in the very nature of perception by sense. The senses were given, not to enable us to perceive every thing that is perceived by beings of a higher order, or yet may be perceived by ourselves without senses, but to make us acquainted with the nature of God's works, as far as he has commissioned them to reveal his will. The limitation of the senses does not imply that we are not fully to rely on what the senses actually testify. I look at the moon; am I to doubt the existence of what I see, because I cannot discover at such a distance, how the inhabitants are employed? It is possible that the fall of man may have increased the limitation of the senses without at all affecting their authority in what they testify. Yet that there has been any such additional limitation is not in evidence, so far as I have been able to discover, either from the light of nature or revelation. I am inclined to think that some of Adam's degenerate sons are as nice judges of the distinguishing quali ties of wine, as their great progenitor, even in the innocence of Eden. But let the limitation of sense be what it may, it cannot affect the evidence of the decided dictates of perception. Many may be unable to distinguish one kind of wine from another, or good wine from that of an inferior quality, but there is no man who has the sense of taste, that will not distinguish between wine and blood.

There is a sense in which I will admit the corruption of the senses, even as it affects their testimony. This, I think, is the result of the fall of man. They are now liable to disorders, as well as all the

other human faculties, which incapacitate them for discharging the office assigned them by the all-wise Creator. A man in jaundice perceives white objects as yellow. This, and all similar facts, are philosophically accounted for by those acquainted with the physical constitution of man. Instead of invalidating the testimony of sense, such instances, viewed in connection with their cause, only serve to establish more firmly the truth of things testified by sense. They show that the testimony of sense is regulated by fixed laws, over which the mind has no control. Instead of urging us to general incredulity, they merely admonish us, that in weighing the testimony of sense, we must be careful to have the senses in a sound and natural state. If all mankind, except a few jaundiced enthusiasts, perceived the body of Jesus in the eucharist, the exception would have no force. But all mankind, without the exception of one sane individual, see nothing in the eucharist but bread and wine.

"I will suppose, for a while, sir," says Mr. D. Gallitzin to his correspondent, "that I am wavering, perplexed, uncertain what to believe, on the subject of the eucharist; and that I apply to you as a minister of Christ, in order to have my doubts resolved, my difficulties removed, and certainty fixed in my mind, what would you tell me; what security could you offer, in order to induce me to reject the tremendous weight of authority, which undoubtedly favours the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist, and to persuade me that I ought to believe there is nothing in the sacrament but bread and wine?"

Here it is supposed as an undoubted fact that there is a tremendous weight of authority in favour of this doctrine, whatever weight of evidence may be against it. Now, whatever weight Roman Catholics themselves may choose to attach to this supposed authority, it is not admitted by any well-instructed Protestant as of any weight at all. What is this tremendous authority? As respects the grammatical import of the words, "This is my body," to any unprejudiced mind, in the smallest degree above idiocy, there cannot be even a difficulty. Viewed through

the prejudice of ages, it found a difficulty even to the masculine mind of Luther. Give up prejudice, Mr. G. and the tremendous weight of authority becomes light as air. With respect to the authority of the Church, and the opinion of the individuals mentioned by the writer, this surely is not undoubted. In the estimation of every consistent Protestant, it weighs nothing at all.

Let us hear, however, the estimate that this writer makes of the opposite evidence. "You will appeal," says he, "to my senses-my eyes, my taste, &c. I confess, indeed, sir, that the senses of my body discover nothing in the sacrament but bread and wine, and that I do not see, nor taste the flesh and blood of Christ. But, sir, Christ tells me, 'Blessed are they that have not seen, and have believed.' John xx. 29." Here Christ's authority is alleged to contradict the senses. But let any man, not intoxicated by religious frenzy, use his understanding in considering the meaning of the words, and he will see that they cannot bear any such import. To believe upon testimony, without seeing, is one thing; to believe, in contradiction to the senses, is another. The first is the part of a rational man; the second is a degradation below the brutes; for they give implicit credence to their senses. The demand of Thomas, referred to in the passage quoted, was utterly unreasonable. Few of Christ's disciples were favoured with the evidence of sense, with respect to his resurrection, and the testimony of others, well established, is a sufficient ground of conviction. Thomas then is reproved, though his incredulity was satisfied with the kind of evidence he wanted. Millions since have believed on the evidence rejected by Thomas. To this faith a blessing is promised. But there is no blessing promised to that absurd, frantic faith, that makes men renounce common sense, and blaspheme the testimony of the Creator of man. Jesus does not say, "Thomas, you would not believe that I was risen, except you could yourself see me, and handle my very wounds, but blessed shall be those millions of good credulous. Roman Catholics, who shall give up both their senses and their reason to the

Church, and, contrary to every principle in human nature, shall believe that a bit of bread is my true body." Had he said any thing like this, it would have been to your purpose. But it is impossible that Jesus would confer a premium on absurdity, and pronounce a blessing on those who should reject the testimony of witnesses, commissioned as the senses are, by himself.

"I would then," continues this author, "incline to say, with St. Thomas of Aquinas,

In touch, taste, sight, although deceived we be, The word of God is quite enough for me; What God declares is true, I must believe, The word of Truth itself cannot deceive.

With nearly all Christendom, for eighteen centuries, I will sooner believe the testimony of my divine Saviour, than the testimony of my senses," &c.

Here it is taken for granted that the testimony of Scripture and the testimony of the senses contradict each other. This I have shown to be inadmissible. Both these witnesses are commissioned and inspired by the same God. Their testimony then cannot be contradictory. If the God of the Scripture be the God that made man, there is every security that he would not give one revelation to prove himself a liar in another. Such an opinion might very well suit with the eastern philosophy, or those systems that suppose two opposite and independent principles, the one of good, the other of evil. But it is utterly inconsistent with the supposition that the God of nature is also the God of grace. If the devil, or any other malignant demon, had power to communicate any thing like human faculties, he might be suspected of giving deceitful senses to his workmanship. But I have no name for the blasphemy that would ascribe such a work to the benevolence and truth of the Lord God of the Bible. Shame, shame, my Roman Catholic brethren, your very God is a cheat.

But the manner of expression employed by those writers is very silky, and well calculated to deceive the unthinking. It has an appearance of abasing human nature, and of transcendently honouring Jesus Christ. It is artfully insinuated

that the opposition is not between the Church and the senses, but between Jesus Christ and the senses; their attachment to this doctrine results from their respect for the authority of the divine word: they cannot believe otherwise without making Jesus Christ a liar. But tell me, Mr. G., how you know that your divine Saviour has contradicted your devilish senses? Oh, Sir, quite easily don't I read it in the Bible? "This is my body." There is clear Scripture for you. Well, good friend, I am glad that even that much Scripture is clear. But I ask again, how do you know that these words are in Scripture? "I see them there: will I not believe my eyes?" Hold, Mr. G., your eyes!-those' perjured villains that deceived you about Transubstantiation! If they have deceived you in one instance, they are worthy of credit in nothing. I maintain that a Roman Catholic, on his own principle, has no evidence, that there is such a thing as a Bible.

But, Mr. G., well-founded as is the belief of the authenticity of the Scriptures, the belief of the thing testified by sense is still more strongly founded. The evidence of sense is to every man an immediate revelation. A revelation, whose evidence is founded on human testimony, is not to all men an immediate revelation, and however satisfactory it ought to be, it is not so overwhelmingly convincing as the immediate knowledge communicated by the senses. Every man having the use of his senses, has an immediate revelation from God that Transubstantiation is a lie.

Facts are alleged to prove the fallaciousness of the testimony of sense. The Holy Spirit descended on Jesus at his baptism, in the form of a dove; and the angels at different times appeared as men. Here, however, there was no deception of sense. In both these instances, the eyes of the beholders gave a true testimony. The testimony of the eye can legitimately go no farther than the appearance. Identity, however, is often inferred from similitude, with the utmost certainty. In courts of law, life and death depend on no stronger evidence. A man swears that he is the owner of the horse found with the thief. He swears that such a

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