performed; and I apprehend, that so much is done for each person, as to render him perfectly inexcusable for rejecting what are to him the conditions of salvation. Yet it must be acknowledged, that the same is not done for all. Deity has done far less for the salvation of pagans, than for that of nominal believers. No person, capable of reflection, would assert, that he, who has received the best, and he, who has received the worst education, are in a condition, equally favourable to present virtue and future glory.

Though the wicked will perish for obstinately resisting and rejecting the light which they have; yet it must be conceded, with regard to some, that had they possessed that degree of light and influence, which has been granted to some others, they would by repentance, have secured salvation: Woe unto thee, Chorazin! woe unto thee, Bethsaida! For if the mighty works, which were done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago, in sackcloth and ashes.

But, at the same time, another doctrine seems here to be established; viz. that equal degrees of light and influence are not at a given time necessary to effect the conversion of all sinners. That grace which was rejected at Bethsaida, would have been effectual, had it been enjoyed at Tyre and Sidon. Or, in other words, that grace, which would have been effectual at Tyre and Sidon, was rejected at Bethsaida.

It is by no means to be imagined, that in distributing variously the blessings of his providence and grace, God acts capriciously. When we say that he is a sovereign, we are far from meaning, that he is not perpetually under the influence of his wisdom. In every instance, he has the best reason for diversifying his dispensations. That these reasons are not discerned by us, can be matter of a moment's surprise to no person, who reflects on the extent of God's empire, and considers the unlimited number of interests, which must under such a government, be consulted.

The difficulties, which are often felt in view of the subject we are considering, arise, it is believed, in no inconsiderable deVOL. II.

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gree, from viewing human degeneracy, rather as a misfortune than as a crime. The account which revelation gives of the matter is this: We have voluntarily departed from God, and are so perversely inclined, that independently of divine operation, we shall never choose the path of virtue and glory. There is no impediment to the salvation of a wicked man but the want of a right inclination towards his duty. The dishonest or profane man may as well complain of his Maker, for not inducing him to relinquish his immoral habits, as the sinner can complain of God for not inducing him to repent. Nor could the latter complain of the unequal distributions of divine grace, with more justice or decency, than could the wretch, who had been injuring you through his whole life complain, that although you had very frequently endeavored to reconcile him to you, there was some other person of similar character, with whom you had been more urgent.

To cite but one additional instance by way of illustration,however detestable in the view of God were the crimes of Cain and of Judas, it is most evident, that He did not, and therefore never determined to prevent the first from slaughtering his brother; nor the second from betraying his master. We say not that they were necessitated to commit these crimes; we make no decision at present, whether their abstinence under circumstances existing would not have been more agreeable to the divine will. The extent of what we assert is this; that he never determined on his part to do that which would in fact prevent them. In like manner, He never determined to bring to salvation them who are actually lost. This is perfectly undeniable, whatever may become of those points which are at issue between the abettors of free will, and those of necessity. Some further remarks on the subject will compose the next lecture.

LECTURE XLV.

ELECTION.

AGREEABLY to what was intimated in the last lecture, the present will consist of some further remarks, designed to elucidate the subject of election.

1. In pursuance of this design, I request you to notice the two following propositions. That there is demerit in vice; or to vary the expression, that all wicked men are criminal for being such; and that the appointment of a Saviour was matter of benignity and not of obligation.

As to the first proposition, that there is demerit in vice, and that all wicked men are criminal for being such, it is so clear that every person, it is probable, will, at first sight, yield full assent. For, if there be not demerit in vice, there is either demerit in virtue, or else there is no such thing as demerit in the universe.

But, however readily the understanding may assent to the proposition, either its bearings and relations are not duly considered, or else the sentiments of the heart disagree with those of the intellect. Human degeneracy is often considered rather as a misfortune than as a crime. And sinners are viewed, as more entitled to pity, than as meriting punishment. The other proposition, viz. That the appointment of a Saviour was matter of benignity and not of obligation, usually meets a reception, much like that which has just been mentioned. In words it is allowed, but its import is not felt. The Scriptures use a language on the subject, which cannot be mistaken. They assert the justice of that condemnation, which had passed on all men ; and attribute the intervention of Christ to the compassion, the generosity, if I may be allowed the

expression, of the supreme Being. All have sinned and come short of the glory of God. All like sheep have gone astray. If thou, Lord, shouldest mark iniquity, O Lord, who should stand? Every mouth shall be stopped, and the whole world shall appear guilty before God. The Father is represented as so loving, i. e. so pitying the world, as to send his Son. Those who are saved, are said to be vessels of mercy; and their recovery is ascribed to that God, who is rich in mercy. Not by works of righteousness, which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us. Now, if all wicked men are criminal for being such, and the appointment of a Saviour were matter of benignity, and not of obligation, our race would have had no right to demand a dispensation similar to that of the Gospel, and of course no right to complain, had no such purpose been concerted. Further, if it were not a matter of obligation in Deity to provide a Saviour for any, he could not be under obligation to make such provision for all. Therefore, if Jesus Christ had died for a part of mankind only, the remainder would have sought in vain for cause of complaint. I am far however from considering, as fact, the thing which is here supposed. I am far from doubting, that Jesus Christ tasted death for every man, and that his atonement would be as sufficient for all, would all repent, as it is for those who are reduced to penitence. But even if it were otherwise, the justice of God would not be liable to impeachment. Scarce any thing can be more clear than that creatures lying under just condemnation can have no claim to redemption.

The question directly before us, however, you will observe, does not relate to the extent of our Saviour's atonement, but the extent to which God designs to render this atonement effectual. This atonement is effectual in regard to every one, who repents and obeys the Christian religion. There is no impediment to the salvation of a wicked man, but the want of a right inclination towards his duty. We are however so perversely inclined, that independently of divine operation, we shall never choose the path of virtue and glory. While such is the propensity of the heart,

while disobedience is an affair of our own choosing, can blame be transferred from us to our Maker, because he does not destroy this pernicious taste, and direct the current of our desires into a different channel? The dishonest or profane man, as was observed in the last lecture, may as well complain of God for not inducing him to relinquish his immoral habits, as the sinner can complain of not being induced to repent. Nor could the latter with more truth or decency, charge with injustice the unequal distributions of divine grace, than could the wretch, who had been injuring you through his whole life, complain, that though you had very frequently endeavoured to reconcile him to yourself and his duty, there was some other person of similar character to his own, with whom you had been more urgent.

Should it be asked, why all men are not treated with equal lenity, or equal severity, I answer, that while each creature in the universe has a right to claim justice, no one can demand a favor; and the answer which the householder is represented as returning to the querulous labourers, is precisely applicable to the case in question: Friend, I do thee no wrong: Have I not a right to do what I will with mine own? Is thine eye evil because I am good?

If persons, who believe either the Scriptures, or the moral government of God, propose this objection, they ought not to forget, that themselves are as truly concerned in its removal, as are those who believe the doctrine now under discussion. For it was shown, in the last lecture, that Deity bestows his favors with unlimited variety. Why has God given to one being the nature of an angel, and to another the nature of a man? Why has he given to some animals existence but for a few months, and to others for a hundred years? Why are talents bestowed on some men, raising them far above the standard of our species, while others are depressed as far below it? Why have the lines fallen to part of mankind in the land of darkness and shadow of death; while others enjoy the clear light of science and religion? Why have some of the wisest and most upright men been constrained to waste their lives in the damps, the