I go upon the supposition, that some corps of a national army, may not possess sufficient patriotism and virtue to resist a tyrant, and that such a king might find it as easy to lead the French against the French, as Cesar did (and Cesar was not born a king) to prevail upon a few Gauls to pass the Rubicon. But let me ask you, whether this objection be not applicable to all the systems, and whether we shall never have need to arm a numerous publick force, because the exclusive exercise of the right of war and peace, shall be vested in the legislative body?

Let me ask you, whether, by such an objection, you are not precisely introducing into monarchies, the inconveniences peculiar to republicks? For it is chiefly in popular governments that such successes are to be dreaded. It was amongst nations which had no kings, that such successes paved the way to royalty. It was to Carthage, it was to Rome, that such citizens as Hannibal and Cesar, became dangerous. Whether the hopes of ambition dry up her sap, or blast her, let a monarch have nothing to sigh for, but that in which the law can gratify him; make his majesty what it ought to be, and indulge no further fears, that a royal rebel, abdicating his crown, may run the risk of hurrying from a victory to the scaffold.

It were difficult and even useless, to continue a debate, already but too long, amidst applause and disapprobation, alike extravagant, alike unjust. I have spoken, because I deemed that it was not for me to dispense with speaking, upon an occasion of such importance. I have spoken according to my conscience and my opinion. I owe to this assembly only what I consider as truth, and I have uttered the truth. I have uttered, it perhaps, rather boldly, while wrestling with potent adversaries. I were unworthy of the office wherewith I am intrusted; I were unworthy of being numbered amongst the friends of liberty, should I dissemble my sentiments, while inclined to a middle party, between the opinion of those whom I love and hold in honour, and the counsels

of men who have been most at variance with me since the commencement of this assembly.

You have grasped my system. It consists in assigning a concurrent exercise of the right of making war and peace, to the two powers which have been sanctioned by the constitution. I think I have combated with advantage, the arguments likely to be adduced upon this question, in favour of the exclusive systems. There is but one unanswerable objection, which hath place in all their systems, and equally in mine, and which will ever embarrass the various questions, that shall touch upon the confusion of the powers; and that is, how to determine upon the means of obviating the last degree of the abuse. I know of but one: one, and but one, will be discovered, and I shall denote it by this trite, and perhaps inelegant allusion, which I have already allowed myself to make use of in this place, but which describes my idea exactly. It is the alarm-bell of necessity, which alone can give the signal, when the moment is arrived for fulfilling the imprescriptible duty of resistance; that duty ever imperious when the constitution hath been violated, ever triumphant when the resistance is just, and truly national.

I am now going to read to you my plan of the decree it is not good; it is incomplete. A decree upon the right of war and peace, will never truly become the moral code of the law of nations, until you shall have constitutionally organized the army, the fleet, the finances, your national guards, your colonies. It is my earnest desire, then, that gentlemen will perfect the scheme which I have drawn out, it is my desire that they will propose to us a better. I will not attempt to conceal the sentiments of diffidence, with which I present it to you; I will not conceal, too, my profound regret, that the man who hath laid the foundation of the constitution, and who hath contributed the most to your immortal work, that the man who hath revealed to the world the true principles of representative government, condemns himself to a silence which I deplore, which I esteem

criminal, however ungratefully his immense services may have been repaid, that the Abbé Sieyes-I ask his pardon for naming him-does not himself advance to insert in the constitution one of the greatest springs which actuate the state of civil polity. I am the more grieved at this dereliction, since, crushed under a weight far above my strength of intellect, incessantly called away by that recollection and meditation, which are the prime powers of man, I had not directed my attention to this question, accustomed as I was to rely upon that illustrious thinker, for putting his last hand to his own admirable workmanship. I have pressed him, conjured him, entreated him as a suppliant, in the name of that friendship with which he honours me, in the name of patriotism, that sentiment otherwise so sacred and full of energy, to endow us with his ideas, not to leave such a vast chasm in the constitution. He refused me; I tell it openly. I conjure you, however, to call upon bim for his opinion which ought not to be kept secret; to tear, at length, from the arms of discouragement, a man whose silence and inaction I consider as a publick calamity.

After this declaration, for the candour of which at least you will give me credit, if you will dispense with my reading my plan of the decree, I shall be grateful for the indulgence. [Read, read.] You are determined, then, that I shall read it: bear in mind that I do so in obedience to your command, and that I have not the courage to risk your displeasure, in my zeal to do you service.

I move you to decree the following as constitutional articles:

Article I. The right of making war and peace belongs to the nation.

II. The care of watching over the external security of the empire of maintaining its rights and its possessions, belongs to the king; accordingly, for him alone shall it be lawful to keep up political connexions with foreign powers; conduct negotiations; make choice of the proper agents to be employed in

such affairs; make warlike preparations proportioned to those made by the neighbouring states; distribute the forces by sea and land, in such manner as he shall deem expedient, and regulate the direction of them in case of war.

III. In the case of hostilities impending or commenced, of an ally to be supported, of a right to be asserted by force of arms, it shall be incumbent on the king to notify, without delay, such circumstance to the legislative body, to make known the causes and the motives and to ask for the necessary supplies: and should the necessity of such notification arise during the recess of the legislative body, that body shall be immediatety reassembled.

IV. If upon such notification, the legislative body deem, that the hostilities commenced by a criminal aggression on the part of ministry, or of some other agent of the executive, the author of such aggression shall be impeached as guilty of treason against the nation; the national assembly declaring, to that end that the French nation renounces conquest, of what kind soever it be, and that it will never employ its force against the liberty of any state.

V. If in the case of the said notification the legislative body refuse the necessary supplies, and manifest its disapprobation of the war, it shall be incumbent on the king to take such measures, immediately as may prevent, or put a stop to all hostilities, the ministers remaining responsible for delays.

VI. The formulary of the declaration of war, and of the treaties of peace, shall be, on the part of the king of the French, and in the name of the nation.

VII. In the case of an impending war, the legislative body shall extend its session into the customary intervals of recess, and may continue to sit, without any recess, as long as the war shall endure.

VIII. During the whole course of the war, it shall be lawful for the legislative body to request the executive power to negotiate a peace, and, in case the king shall head the army in person, the legislative body shall have the right of assembling such a num

ber of the national guards, and in such place, as it shall deem expedient.

IX. At the moment when the war shall cease, the legislative body shall fix the space of time, within which the troops extraordinary shall be disbanded and the army reduced to the permanent establishment; the pay of the said troops shall be continued no longer than to that fixed time, after which, should the troops extraordinary remain still embodied, the minister shall be responsible, and be impeached as guilty of treason against the nation. To this end it shall be incumbent on the committee of constitution to consider forthwith of the mode of ministerial responsibility.

X. It belongs to the king to conclude and sign all treaties of peace, of alliance, and of commerce with foreign powers, and such other conventions as he shall deem consistent with the welfare of the state; but the said treaties and conventions shall become effective, only so far as they shall have been ratified by the legislative body.