to make themselves acquainted with his ideas and proposals, and to inform the Assembly accordingly; and they concluded by again urging that he should recognise the Government with which he had commenced negotiations, and with which he desired to frame a convention. M. Lesseps did not omit to warn them of the peril which they ran by delaying to accede to the terms which had been proposed, and took leave of them, earnestly entreating that they would summon the Assembly instantly, that it might decide on the matter at once. But he had undertaken very unwisely to treat with the Parliament, seeing there is no office for which such bodies are so little suited as the dispatch of business in which judgment is required, not only to moderate, but to correct and even curb the passions. Moreover, to allow so short a time for a very serious discussion, when such haste is not required by imperious causes (and such were neither then nor afterwards apparent), was a piece of French impetuosity ill-calculated to obtain results which time only can mature.

The discussions in the French Parliament had flattered the vanity of those who ruled over the Roman Assembly, so that now they considered themselves not only first-rate manufacturers of popular commotions, but also masters in the art of diplomacy, and preeminent in that tact and penetration on which the rulers of States pride themselves, and of which they have given such striking examples. Add to this, that the election of deputies for the Constitutional Parliament in France was just then taking place; that it appeared to such as were not very far-sighted that the

extreme party amongst the Republicans and the economical party were likely to prevail; and that Mazzini, who applied to the government of the State the same principles by which he was accustomed to govern his own party, showed letters that announced and promised marvels. For these reasons when the Deputies were summoned to attend a secret sitting on the 19th of May, and had heard the report of the Commissioners, it was easy for the Triumvirs and the orators of their party to influence their minds, by saying that the proposals made by the Envoy were tantamount to the promises contained in that manifesto issued by General Oudinot, which he had himself cancelled by another manifesto containing ambiguities instead of clear conditions, and danger, not safety, for Rome, on which the following resolution was passed unanimously:

"The Assembly, regretting that it cannot receive the draught of a convention submitted by the Envoy Extraordinary of the French Government, confides to the Triumvirs the office of explaining its motives, and of adopting such measures as will most conduce to establish the best understanding between the two Republics."

The same day the Triumvirs made M. Lesseps acquainted with the resolution in the following let

ter:

"We have the honour to send you the resolution of the Assembly relative to the proposals which you have communicated to its Commissioners. It has charged us to signify to you, at the same time, the motives of its unanimous vote, and the regret it feels for the painful necessity in which it finds itself placed. We also fulfil this charge with profound

sorrow, as beseems men who love France, and who confide in her still.

When, after the decision of the French Assembly, we heard of your arrival, our hearts palpitated with joy. We believed that a reconciliation, founded on the one great principle proclaimed by you and by us, would ensue between two nations to whom their common sympathies, common memories, common interests, and political condition, enjoin esteem and love. We thought that being deputed to ascertain the true state of affairs, and being persuaded of the perfect harmony which here unites together in one single idea all the elements of the State, you would, by the information you would be able to supply, have destroyed the only possible obstacle to the fulfilment of our wishes, the solitary doubt that might still prevent France from fulfilling the noble idea contained in the resolution of your Assembly.

"The union, the internal peace, the mature resolution, the noble conduct, the spontaneous and solemn vote of the municipalities, of the National Guard, of the troops, of the people, of the Government, and of the sovereign Assembly, all these things are known to you. You have made them known to France, sir, and therefore we had a right to hope that, speaking in the name of France, you would have made use of words more reassuring than those which we find in your proposals.

"The Assembly has remarked the care with which the phrase Roman Republic has been studiously avoided in your first article, and it considers that in that circumstance is contained an unfavourable intention. It is of opinion, sir, that with the exception of the greater importance which your name and your office give to this proposal, it does not contain any stronger guarantees than those which, prior to the 30th of April, General Oudinot had offered by any act of his. Having ascertained the unanimous opinion of the people, the Assembly has not been able to account for the persistence with which you would throw distrust on that opinion, by occupying Rome. Rome does not need protection. No con

test is going on; and if an enemy were to appear before her walls, she would be able to resist with her own forces. On the frontiers of Tuscany, at Bologna, protection can be given to Rome. Moreover, in your third article, the Assembly has been constrained to perceive the influence of a political bias, about which it can the less tranquillise itself, since the decree of the French National Assembly seemed to be decidedly adverse to an occupation of Rome, unprovoked and uncalled for by circumstances.

"We will not conceal from you, sir, that by an unfortunate coincidence a report has reached us with regard to the lines of defence, which has assisted not a little to confirm the resolution taken by the Assembly. This very day, a band of French soldiers, contrary to the spirit of the truce, has crossed the Tiber, near San Paolo, drawing still closer than before the cordon of military operations round the capital; and this act, sir, is not the only one. The suspicions of the people, already excited by the bare idea of seeing their city-their Palladium City-the Eternal City-occupied by foreign troops, have been strengthened, and this will render difficult, impossible, perhaps, any discussion on an article to which, on the other hand, the Assembly adheres as the vital guarantee of its dignity and independence. For these reasons, and many others, the Assembly has resolved, though most unwillingly, that your proposal cannot be accepted. We shall have the honour, sir, to remit to you to-morrow morning, according to the wishes expressed by the Assembly itself, a proposal, not certainly on a par with its legitimate hopes, but one that will at least have the advantage of removing all risks of a conflict between two Republics, based on the same rights, and closely united by the same hopes."

The demonstrations which the French army had made in the neighbourhood of Rome were, to say the truth, little adapted to second the benevolent expressions made use of by M. Lesseps. One day, some officials, who were carrying letters by the post, were

prevented from proceeding; and on another occasion, General Oudinot ordered his soldiers to cross the Tiber unexpectedly, his scouts went close up to the walls, and works continued to go on actively in the camp, exactly as though war were raging. Nor did the expressions employed by the Secretaries of the Embassy, and by the Directors of the French Academy at Rome, harmonise with those of the Envoy; for these men, with great imprudence, had mixed themselves up with the affair, and bruited it about that the Roman Republic was condemned to death, and that French soldiers would soon occupy the capital. General Oudinot, who was eager to retrieve what he had lost by his discomfiture on the 30th of April, murmured in his turn against the yielding disposition of M. Lesseps; and, as he was desirous of pleasing the Catholic party, he had on his side all those who were anxious to place France in a position to complete an illiberal undertaking. "So much delay," he wrote, "increases the pride of the Romans and displeases the soldiers: let us have either peace or war; if peace, let them open to us the gates of Rome; if war, our tactics and our valour will quickly triumph: let them send a speedy and decisive answer." In other letters he said, the dignity of France and the honour of the troops had been tarnished; M. Lesseps ought no longer to fetter the army, which was eager for glory; he might see clearly that all hopes of concord were vain; he ought to let him state plainly to the Romans that the truce was at an end, since they had not accepted his propositions.

Mazzini, also, was more anxious for the supremacy